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International Organizations and the Rise of 
Social Cash Transfer Programs in the Global South
The idea of international organizations as facilitators of global communication is not a
new one. It started approximately two decades ago and has increased since (e.g.
Finnemore 1993; Deacon et al. 1997; Willets 2001; Iriye 2002). The globe becomes
more  and  more  connected  and  information  flows  from one  part  of  the  world  to
another.  From a global  perspective international  organizations (IOs) appear to be
hubs where knowledge concentrates and then spreads further. 
Another observation is that policies of countries converge and become similar.
Some policy models win through and spread around the world, with more and more
countries reforming their policies or implementing new ones according to role models
from other  countries  (e.g.  Leisering  and  Liu  2010).  It  is  remarkable  that  certain
policies spread globally and become an observable global trend. One of the more
recent  waves of  policy  diffusion  relates  to  Social  Cash Transfer  (SCTs)  policies,
which have been spreading in the Global South since the last decade (i.a. Sugiyama
2011). 
What are the drivers of such a diffusion wave? Since IOs connect countries
and transport ideas from a global to the national level. We may assume that IOs
often play a part in the global spread of policies and function like a transmission belt.
While the causal weight of IO activities in diffusion processes is dif ficult to ascertain
with very few analyses in the field of social protection, this study addresses the no
less  important  but  under-researched  question,  how IOs  are  involved  in  such
processes.  How  can  IOs  act  as  transmission  belts?  What  are  their  tools  and
instruments?
Thus, this study focuses on the question: What are the means and tools of
international organizations to in fluence policy-making in developing countries?
Usually regarded as powerful  and in fluential  are organizations, which can impose
sanctions  and/or  have  large  amounts  of  money  at  hand.  Are  these  the  main
instruments  international  organizations rely  on? In  order  to  identify  the variety  of
instruments  used  by  IOs  to  in fluence  developing  countries,  this  study  has
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investigated in a comprehensive way the activities of international organizations that
accompany global policy diffusion. The diffusion of social cash transfer policies in the
Global South is of particular interest for the discipline of Global Social Policy (GSP).
This  study found that  IOs use a  broad variety  of  instruments.  Most  of  them are
knowledge-based and target the way countries learn, think and evaluate themselves.
The instruments can be categorized along three categories:  advocacy, advice and
incentives. This study provides detailed insights into the case of social cash transfer
(SCT) diffusion by showing how these instruments have been established. 
The study shows that IOs not only use money and power, but primarily use
norms and knowledge in order to in fluence policy-making at national level. The study
elaborates on how IOs function to be a transmission belt that transports policy ideas
from the global  to  the  national  level.  Two of  the  main  modes of  in fluencing  are
“advocacy”, that is norm production and norm distribution through conferences and
other  channels,  and,  second,  “advice”,  which  comes in  form of  technical  advice,
workshops and continuing country dialogues. Both tools are extensively used by IOs
to change the way policy-makers think about their social  problems and the policy
options available to them. This form of influencing via knowledge is a 'soft power'
complementing IOs 'hard power'  instruments. The hypothesis substantiated in this
study is  that  “International  Organizations have been actively  involved in the
wave of SCT policy diffusion in the Global South by promoting policy models
via norm-based and knowledge-based instruments: advocacy and advice”. 
The  study  of  the  instruments  of  IOs  is  not  an  impact  evaluation.  The
instruments of IOs are capable of impacting policy-making directly and may result in
the  implementation  of  policies,  yet  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  analysis  to
investigate how far  global  actors'  activities actually  trigger  national  policy-making.
While  it  can  be  assumed  that  in  one  way  or  another  the  activities  of  IOs  have
impacted national policy-making, it is also clear that not in all cases those activities
led to a policy implementation at national level. The reactions to IOs' activities can be
manifold:  policies  could  be  implemented  directly  and  more  or  less  following  the
policies  advocated by IOs;  or  already existing  programs could be reformed as  a
reaction to the new input given by IOs; or IO activities could trigger discussions within
the society which not lead to a change in national policy in the first place, but might
set the path for future reforms; or advocacy could meet with ignorance resulting in no
change at all; or, finally, IOs inputs could lead to a rejection of the given input so that
policy makers purposefully choose different policy options than those which have
been promoted. While subsequent studies might deeper investigate the reactions of
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policy-makers at national level, this study conceptualizes in a first step the variety of
global  actors'  activities,  and  then  analyses  empirically  in  how  far  international
organizations act as transmission belts in global-to-national interactions.
SCT Diffusion: The Background of this Analysis
In  the mid  1990s several  developing countries in  Latin  America,  Africa and Asia
(defined as 'Global South') began to implement social policies which provide people
in poverty with an income of last resort (often called social cash transfers [SCTs]). It
is puzzling why SCT programs have spread so massively in the Global South in the
last two decades. Among many possible explanations, this study investigates in the
activities of  international  organizations as one potential  influence that  could have
contributed to the diffusion of SCTs in the Global South.
All countries in Latin America introduced non-contributory social programs for
their citizens, and also in Africa and Asia many countries began to introduce new
social  programs. These policy implementations represent a remarkable trend in a
developing country context, even though this diffusion is in some cases dif ficult to
identify  and  can  appear  to  be  rather  scattered.1 It  is  a  wave  of  social  policies
spreading in the Global South that might be considered as puzzling and require some
explanations,  because  traditional  concepts  based  on  modernization  theory  or
functional approaches cannot account for those policy innovations (Leisering and Liu
2010:176). 
Functional theory would tend to see SCTs implemented because the political
system responds to social problems within the society with policy solutions which are
functional to solve these problems. That would presuppose an immense increase in
poverty levels in developing countries within the last two decades. Instead poverty
levels have been already high for a much longer period of time and SCTs have rarely
been considered as  a solution before.  That  makes functional  theory  not  the first
choice for an explanation of this phenomenon of SCT policy diffusion.
Modernization theory would regard the implementation of SCTs as a result of
a  country's  developmental  stage  where  the  next  logical  step  in  the  countries'
1 The quality and degree of institutionalization of programs in the Global South is in many cases
quite questionable, and in some cases SCT policies have been implemented earlier than in those two
decades. Yet, a closer look reveals that in countries with a longer tradition fundamental reforms of
these policies  have been made in  accordance with  global  trends.  The trend towards SCT policy
development is signi ficant and already a matter of quantitative studies (e.g. Böger forthcoming). 
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development is the introduction of several policy packages appropriate to their social-
economic conditions. Yet,  social-economic levels of countries in the Global South
vary to a large extent. Middle-income countries have introduced SCTs just as low-
income countries. This makes it dif ficult to see the introduction of SCTs as a result of
a developmental stage. Many countries lack the developmental preconditions yet to
implement such demanding programs and introduced them nevertheless.
Moreover,  rational  choice  theories  would  have  dif ficulties  to  identify  SCT
implementation as a rational act in view of political instruments and possibilities at
hand at  the current  time.  In  many developing countries  social  programs may be
considered dif ficult to implement because redistributive programs rely on stable tax
revenues.  Such  revenues  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  in  developing  countries
because the majority of the population works in informal work-relationships and does
not pay taxes. Thus, the introduction of social security programs would lack particular
prerequisites that make SCT introduction a rational option to choose. Why one might
doubt  SCTs to  be a rational  option becomes even clearer  when social-economic
situations of developing countries are contrasted with the social-economic conditions
in OECD countries. Whereas social assistance in OECD countries is some kind of
safety-net of last resort for a rather small percentage of the society, the fraction of the
society  living  in  poverty  is  incomparably  higher  in  developing  countries.  With
countries where up to 50% of the population who live below the international poverty
line of USD 1.25 a day ('purchasing power parity' as measured by the World Bank)
social protection programs would become rather costly. Even if taxation revenues in
developing countries were higher it is questionable if they would be suf ficient to fully
finance programs which would subsidies the majority of the population. 
A final point argues for SCT adoption as an unlikely event by considering the
cultural background of many developing countries where social safety nets are based
on a tradition counteracting social  programs based on cash transfers. Developing
countries have a tradition of fighting poverty by focusing on food-security. This is
done by direct food delivery or by subsidies for farming or gas, which is quite a
different approach than the provision of cash via SCTs. Moreover, self-help systems
in  families  are  another  common  safety-net  mechanism.  Social  security  is  not
provided by the government, but through private relationships. 
Summed up, unfavorable social-economic levels and a lack of a welfare-state
culture make it unlikely that so many countries in the Global South have introduced
or reformed SCT. But why have they? While many theories have problems explaining
this  trend,  this  analysis  seeks  to  find  new  explanations.  A  main  prerequisite  to
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consider international organizations as a potential cause is to identify the instruments
IOs use to in fluence policy-making in the Global South.
What  are  different  approaches  to  explain  this  SCT  policy  diffusion  wave?
Taking a look at  a comprehensive analysis  of  social  policies within the countries
throughout the Global South  indicates that the identi fication of cases and drivers of
this diffusion wave is not a mono-causal story (cf. Weible,  forthcoming). Too much
variation among the policies can be found to make a single explanation responsible
for  this  policy  development.  Moreover,  policy  development  at  national  level  is  a
complex process with many in fluential factors (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 10). 
Which factors have been influential  in the end is almost  impossible to say
without an in-depth analysis of single case studies at national level. Yet, with such an
analysis of country cases it is quite dif ficult to generalize the results and to identify
explanatory approaches for the trend of SCTs in general.  Thus, I  look at factors,
which might be of a broader explanatory value for policy processes in the Global
South.  With  an  interest  in  such  more  general  approaches  to  account  for  policy
diffusion  I  had  to  narrow  down  the  number  of  variables  that  might  have  been
influential in this SCT diffusion wave. For two reasons IOs have been chosen as a
potential in fluential factor for SCT diffusion.
At  first,  there  has  been  a  vibrant  discussion  on  the  role  of  international
organizations within policy diffusion for years (e.g. Usui 1994; Stone 2004; Weyland
2005; Dion 2008; Jacobi 2009; Niño-Zarazúa, Barrientos, Hickey and Hulme 2011).
While  traditional  realist  perspectives  emphasize  the  impact  of  'hard  power'  (e.g.
sanctions or money), more recent approaches discuss the in fluence of knowledge
and norms as 'soft powers'. Yet, the effectiveness of soft power instruments of IOs is
contested and dif ficult to measure. 
"[a] handful of recent studies suggest that IOs have not had a signi ficant impact on
social policy outcomes since the 1980s [Brooks, 2005; Hunter and Brown, 2000]. This
article contends that IOs  do in fluence social policy, though not in ways likely to be
measured by  cross-national comparisons of program lending and policy outcomes.
Seldom is  IO  influence  on  social  policy  a  matter  of  a  gross  display  of  in fluence
through  loan  conditionality  or  the  imposition  of  simple  policy  models.  Rather,  the
in fluence of IOs on social policy, though signi ficant, has been more nuanced than
many  characterizations  indicate.  […]  The  comparison  of  social  insurance  policy
formation in Mexico during the 1940s and 1990s illustrates both these commonalities
and differences. In neither period did IOs decisively create the policy outcomes, but in
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both times they provided technical advice and established international norms that
in fluenced the types of policies ultimately adopted. [… studies] too often focus on a
narrow  concept  of  hard  power.  [...]  This  tendency  is  especially  pronounced  in
quantitative studies that attempt to measure IO influence through the size of loans or
the  presence  of  institutionalized  reform  agreements,  such  as  IMF  Structural
Adjustment Programs [Brooks, 2005; Hunter and Brown, 2000]" (Dion 2008: 26-7). 
By applying an institutionalist perspective (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott 2008)
this  investigation  focuses  on 'soft  power',  highlighting  the  range  of  activities  and
influences one might miss out when IOs' in fluence is solely measured by money and
power.  Especially  if  policy diffusion is  understood as  information that  has spread
worldwide,  so  that  it  might  have  fed  into  national  policies,  it  might  be  useful  to
investigate the channels and methods through which this information spreads. This
study on IOs as an influential factor emphasizes the importance of knowledge-based
influencing. In addition to a traditional 'hard power' approach, which is rooted in the
classic 'realist perspective' of International Relations of Political Science, this study
identi fies  two  'soft  power'  approaches  that  have  been  dominant  in  the  scienti fic
literature on policy diffusion in recent years. Yet, soft and hard power in fluencing are
not  understood  to  be  mutually  exclusive.  Rather,  these  approaches  might
complement each other. This study finds that both modes apply in this case of SCT
diffusion and both modes strengthen the role of IOs as an active promotional factor
for policy change at national level. The tools of how global actors promote particular
policies, is matter of this study. 
A second reason to  chose IOs as  a  potential  explanatory  variable  for  the
global diffusion of SCT policies is that IOs and other global actors have been very
active at the discursive level and have accompanied the process of policy diffusion
with  concepts  and  ideas  for  the  development  of  new  policy  ideas  and  policy
instruments to be implemented at national level (cf. Gliszczynski 2015). What has
been missing so far is an analysis of the activities and instruments used by global
actors  to  in fluence  national  policy-makers.  The  analysis  of  the  instruments  and
modes of IOs serves two scienti fic interests: first, to uncover the range of activities
which  IOs  have  used  in  this  speci fic  policy  diffusion  wave  and,  second,  to
substantiate two further perspectives based on 'soft power' in order to broaden the
'realist perspective' based on 'hard power instruments' (e.g. money and sanctions).
With this study we learn more about the instruments used by global actors to
become a transmission belt for global ideas. Extant research on how global actors
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in fluence  national  policy-making  identi fies  some  instruments,  but  rarely  provides
insights on how those instruments are used. Through intensive research on literature
about policy diffusion, I identi fied two complementing perspectives that capture two
different aspects of 'soft power in fluencing'.
Soft Power: The Research Perspective 
This  study  understands  global  actors  as  entities  that  carry  global  norms  to  the
national level. Thus, this study uses an institutionalist (DiMaggio and Powell 1991;
Scott  2008)  and  World  Society  perspective  (Meyer  et  al.  1997)  and  develops  a
research design  that  captures  the global  actors'  activities  on in fluencing in  three
categories.  These  categories  represent  modes  of  in fluencing  and  have  been
developed as a result of the analysis of instruments used by global actors. Operating
foremost with knowledge in the form of norms and expertise, 'soft power' instruments
seem to represent an important aspect of global actors' in fluencing. In a nutshell, my
research framework consists of three modes: advocacy, advice and incentives. While
advocacy-based  in fluencing for  the  most  part  refers  to  the  establishment  and
promotion  of  norms  and  models,  advice-based  in fluencing refers  to  technical
expertise, which is in most cases directly delivered at national level. To test if global
actors have further means to reinforce the uptake of knowledge at national level with
'hard power' instruments, a third category is incentive-based in fluencing. 
World Bank & HelpAge International: The Case Studies
My case studies are on the World Bank and HelpAge International,  which where
chosen based on two criteria: First, what are the most active and most present global
actors that  have been involved in this  SCT diffusion? Second,  how can different
types  of  actors  be  chosen  according  to  a  most-different-research  design?
Traditionally, different types of actors are associated with being equipped with very
different instruments and strategies on how to in fluence. Such a variety is interesting
for case studies selected according to a most-different design. This study chooses an
international  governmental  organization  (IGO),  which  often  are  considered  to  be
particularly  in fluential  actors  in  the  global  sphere,  and  an  international  non-
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governmental organization (INGO), which in most cases has fewer resources and,
thus, tries to be in fluential in other ways.
The most recognizable SCT models that have spread globally include non-
contributory pensions and conditional cash transfers, that is, child benefit for families
affected by extreme poverty.  Even though many actors talk  about  and work with
those models, each models has a key proponent. On the one hand, non-contributory
pensions are particularly advocated by HelpAge International, an INGO which is the
only global actor that promotes the rights and needs of older persons globally. On the
other hand, conditional cash transfers are mainly associated with the World Bank,
which is an IGO with a long history in development cooperation. Despite the focus on
just two major players the analysis covers the key instruments that matter in most
SCT diffusion process. Moreover, this study provides an overview about other actors
that are active in SCT diffusion.
Structure of the Study
Chapter  1 provides an understanding on the role global  actors play according to
institutionalism,  world  society  theory  and policy  diffusion  research.  Based on  the
literature on policy diffusion, the research framework is developed, to be applied in
Part  II  to  the  the  case  studies  of  the  World  Bank  (Chapter  2)  and  HelpAge
International (Chapter 3). Part II also provides a brief overview on contributions by
other  global  actors,  such  as  the  International  Labour  Organisation  (ILO),  DFID
(Department for International Development, UK), GIZ (Gesellschaft für internationale
Zusammenarbeit, Germany) and regional development banks (Chapter 4). 
Part III discusses the findings of the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 identi fies
repercussions for the development of a research design and tries to identify in how
far IOs' activities might have led to policy change at national level by using a global
policy-cycle  concept.  Moreover,  Chapter  5  took  quantitative  data  about  how fast
particular policy models have spread among world regions into account in order to
see, if the global actors' activities on in fluencing correlate with activities on policy-
making at national level. The Conclusion of the study sums up the empirical results of
the study in order to highlight the interplay of global actors' activities and to conclude
with a general take-away lesson.
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The General Observation
Finally, the conclusion points out that all empirical findings indicate that global actors
have been heavily involved in this SCT diffusion process, promoting particular policy
models. Among the factors that can impact on national policy-making, it is hard to
ignore international organizations; although, the prominent role of knowledge-based
influencing makes it dif ficult to measure IOs' influence because the effect is indirect.
Yet, it is dif ficult to neglect IOs' in fluence, because the  advocacy of policy models
increases the attractiveness of models so that countries might intend to follow a trend
or  adapt  to  global  norms/models;  and  the  technical  advice delivered  by  IOs
continuously  streams knowledge  on  policy  implementation  into  the  policy-making
process.  This  can create a demand at  national  level  which makes policy-makers
request further assistance from global actors. Global knowledge and norms at global
level can indirectly in fluence and can impact on multiple countries across the globe
without the direct involvement of global actors, but global actors can also  directly
engage nationally and function as ampli fiers of knowledge diffusion by stimulating
local policy learning. 
Both, direct and indirect influencing take time until they become effective. The
stimulation of learning-effects is demanding, requiring the development of knowledge
(policy models), the diffusion among IOs and the spread of models to states. This
study shows that both, the World Bank and HelpAge International, promote SCTs on
the global and national levels and engage in a long and steady manner in order to
stimulate learning-effects.
The results of this study have led me to a picture of international organizations'
activities as “dropping stones and making waves”. The metaphor of policy diffusion
waves is often used to describe a trend-pattern: several countries implement similar
studies in a narrow time frame. But what is the driver of such a wave? How do waves
of policy diffusion emerge? A policy of ficial from the World Bank told me that they are
'riding a wave' because they observe trends, pick up those trends and facilitate its
further spread. Instead, this study suggests that the agency of IOs is stronger: While
IOs are also inspired by policies of single countries, they decide what model to pick
up,  they  craft  their  own  models  and  coin  terms.  Due  to  the  dominant  role  of
knowledge  and  the  continuing  long-term  interactions  between  global  actors  and
nation  states,  IOs  induce learning  effects.  It  is  like  IOs  are  constantly  sending
incentives and learning lessons to the national level until national governments give it
a try. IOs appear to drop stones and make waves.
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Part I
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
11
Chapter 1: Research-Design to Analyze the Contribution
of  International Organizations to Policy Transfer
This  chapter  provides  in  'Section  1.1.'  an  understanding  on  how  international
organizations are global actors in a world society. Moreover,it is described how IOs in
such a role are carriers of norms and ideas. Finally, it is also highlighted that IOs play
on the global  as well  as on the national  table,  and thus,  they are an active link
between  those  spheres,  calls  world  society  links.  Based  on  these  theoretical
considerations I review the state of the art of policy diffusion research in 'Section
1.2.'.  This  section  outlines  the  differences  between  policy  diffusion  (macro
perspective) and policy transfer (meso perspective) and shows that the involvement
of global actors in national policy-making is one of the main observations in the last
decades. As a result, this section explains why mediated policy transfer is matter of
this study. 'Section 1.3.' explains the analytical perspective, which is an x-centered
analysis  focused  on  international  organizations.  Moreover,  I  present  a  research
design that focuses on global actors and reflects a  qualitative approach to policy
transfer. Based on theoretical considerations, I introduce three analytical categories:
advocacy, advice and incentives. Finally, in 'Section 1.4.' I briefly describe how the
data for the empirical analysis were collected.
1.1. Theoretical Approach: 
Global Actors and Policy Models
In the last centuries, globalization has been the force embedding nation-states in
global structures and communicative systems. Thus, it has been argued that national
policy-making is also in fluenced by factors, such as global actors and global events,
global  institutions and regimes, and global  normative and cognitive cultures.  This
perspective is relevant for the analysis of diffusion of social policies:
"[...]  no modern State exists in splendid isolation,  independent of the international
community that surrounds it, the study of factors which in fluence the establishment of
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social insurance in a country will  necessarily have to go beyond the frontiers of a
national community and be considered also at the international level" (Rys 1964).
Furthermore,  globalization  has  made  mutual  observations  between  states  much
easier  than  ever  before  ('global  horizon  for  observations  and  comparisons'  /
'Beobachtungs-  und Vergleichshorizont',  cf.  Heintz  2008)  enabling states  to  learn
from each other (Rose 1991). Research about policy diffusion has shown that it is
valuable  to  take  international  factors  ('exogenous  forces')  into  account  to  get
meaningful insights on national policy making which would have been dif ficult to get
by just relying on national factors ('endogenous forces') (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).
One remarkable conclusion has been that international governmental organizations
(IGOs)  and  international  non-governmental  organizations  (INGOs)  have  gained
more in fluence in domains of national policy making (Hasse and Krücken 2005). 
The  perspective  of  Global  Social  Policy  (GSP)  acknowledges  international
actors per definition by stating that GSP is about "supranational and global actors
[which]  are  actors  in  the  emerging  processes  of  in fluencing  national  policy  and
engaging in transnational  redistribution, supranational  regulation and supranational
global provision" (Deacon et al. 1997: 22; original emphasis). Beyond such a broad
recognition  of  international  actors,  the  empirical  evidence  for  IGO-  and  INGO
influence on social policies differs a lot. 
On the one hand, studies about the diffusion of the 'new pension reform' in the
1990s showed an in fluence of ideas of the World Bank, which worked to spread its
policy around the world. As a result this policy diffusion was a 'global policy process'
with a minor in fluence of national conditions and actors (Orenstein, 2005). 
On the other hand, researchers emphasize that the final decision-making is
always done at the nation state level and, thus, the final result is always expression
of national processes as well (Dion 2008). Global in fluences on policy diffusion are in
general understood as follows: “national forces determine the timing and speci fics of
the adoption in cases of both policy learning and policy emulation, while the global
forces  provide  basic  ideas  without  determining  the  speci fics  of  adoption"  (Hu  &
Manning 2010:129). This study adopts a similar understanding of nation states as
embedded  in  a  global  communicative  system where  global  actors  are  in fluential
factors on national  policy-making.  In the following, I  develop an understanding of
global actors from the perspective of institutionalism and world society theory, which
emphasize the delivery of knowledge as means to in fluence national policy-making.
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In principle, I understand every actor as a 'global actor', which regards its field
of activity not restricted to a certain country or region, but operates in view of many
countries  and  on  a  genuine  global  level.  Because  the  observational  horizon
('Beobachtungshorizont') of global actors is global in scope, such actors may react to
incidents happening in  distant  locations around the globe.  In  this  sense,  national
governmental organizations for international cooperation can be global actors in the
same way as international organizations, or individual consultants. In the following, I
stress the importance of norms and knowledge for global actors. This is of particular
importance for conceptualizing the instruments of global actors which can be used to
in fluence national policies. The contribution of global actors to the spread of a policy
is  the main  criteria  to  define a 'global  policy':  "Global  policies are those that  are
developed, diffused, and implemented with the direct involvement of global policy
actors  and  coalitions  at  or  across  the  international,  national,  or  local  levels  of
governance" (Orenstein 2005: 177).
Institutionalist  approaches have conceptualized global  actors as constituted
and legitimized by the current world culture, which the international system is built
upon (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Meyer 1980; DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Nation-states
are social constructs as are international organizations (Meyer et al. 1997). Neither of
them is thinkable without the rules, norms and culture of their social environment
which construct and define them (Jepperson 1991; Hasse & Krücken 2009). In order
to be recognized as a proper nation-states several structures, norms and rules have
to  be  implemented.  The  development  of  ministries,  the  design  of  a  flag  and
composition of a hymn, and a membership at the United Nations are described as
rituals and ceremonies that constitute and legitimize nation-states as actors. 
Similarly, to be a legitimate actor, international organizations have to follow
what is enshrined in world culture as a proper,  adequate, rational  and necessary
organization  (Meyer  &  Rowan  1977).  Both,  nation-states  and  organizations  are
legitimate global actors. When trying to pursue their interests, both kinds of actors
need to respect the world culture in order to remain legitimate. For example, there is
no global cultural frame for aggressive warfare to extend the territory, but there is a
legitimate  cultural  frame  for  self-defense.  Due  to  those  cultural  frames  wars  of
aggression have disappeared and, instead, the meaning of 'self-defense' has been
increasingly  overstretched.  Even  attacks  on  a  foreign  sovereign  territory  are  re-
labeled as 'preemptive strikes' for the sake of 'self-defense'.  This example should
show that nation-states or organizations depend on a cultural frame to pursue their
goals. 
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New frames for development policy regarding poverty, development, risk and
human  rights  emerged  in  the  1990s  (von  Gliszczynski  2015).  Against  this
background of the new frames, in the 2000s, all major IOs came to espouse the idea
of SCT as a global  model,  and basic submodels were devised (von Gliszczynski
2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). 
Having  embedded  its  aims  in  established  cultural  frames  allows  an
organization to craft its mandate and to understand it as guidance for its actions. By
doing so, global actors represent more than just a self-interested unit; instead they
can  become  “agents  of  principle”  as  'agentic  actors'.  Those  are  actors  which
transport and promote world cultural principles:
“The proper modern actor assumes responsibility to act as agent of the imagined
natural and moral law. Otherwise the actor risks either incompetence or corruption. At
the  extreme,  agentic  actors  represent  not  any  recognized  entity  or  interest,  but
instead become purely agents of principle” (Meyer & Jepperson 2000). 
Thus,  the  development  of  a  mandate  is  essential  to  legitimize  the  organization's
ongoing activities. Taking the cases of this study as an example, the World Bank
follows its mandate to eradicate poverty in each corner of the world, and HelpAge
International aspires the proper and adequate realization of human rights for older
people.  Both,  human rights  and the  eradication of  poverty,  are  highly  legitimized
concepts in the current world culture, and by incorporating those values into their
mandate the organizations reconfirm and strengthen them through their activities.
However, neither the acquisition of legitimacy through the embedding of the
mandate  in  cultural  norms,  nor  the  enactment  of  those  cultural  norms  must
necessarily be seen as a strategic action of organizations. The more cultural values
and norms are institutionalized, the more they become 'taken-for-granted' for global
actors who adjust their mandate accordingly (Berger & Luckmann 1966). Yet, world
culture is described as highly dynamical with cultural material changing constantly
(Meyer  et  al.  1997).  Even though very basic principles remain established,  much
more variation appears for rationalized social models which are more concrete and
closer  to  policy  models  than  being  abstract  background  principles.  For  example,
while education and health in general are regarded as important features of modern
societies, some more concrete models about what is most common and, thus, most
legitimate exist as well, like models of primary and secondary education (Meyer et al.
1977;  1992).  These  models  can  be well  institutionalized  and,  hence,  strong  and
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in fluential models, or the models are newly created by global actors and are more
contested. 'Success' of diffusion depends on how well speci fic cultural models are
embedded in more general cultural norms and principles and to what degree this
policy model has become institutionalized (Strang & Meyer 1993).
Global actors may be the innovators in world culture; they actively draw on,
select from, and modify shared cultural models, principles, and identities (Swindler
1986). 
"In the work of Peter Berger, these global structures are maintained and transformed
by the actors they constitute. World culture defines modern actors not  as cultural
dopes  but  as  creative  innovators  who  are  the  one  and  only  source  of  change,
adaptation, and restructuring in response to situational contingencies" (Boli & Thomas
1999b:4).
Swindler  refers  to  an  actor-centered  perspective  on  institutionalism,  which
emphasizes the agency of actors and their ability to innovate. Institutions may be
both  the  independent  and  the  dependent  variable  (Mayntz  &  Scharpf  1995).  As
suggested above, I would differentiate a little between abstract principles which are
fundamental institutions and rather unquestioned premises, and policies, which are
more speci fic social  models and comparably more likely  subject  to global  actors'
active editing. The development of policy models as well  can impact and change
more general principles and craft new ones. In consequence global actors and global
cultural  structures  interact  with  each  other.  Policy  area speci fic principles  and in
particular policy models can change over time (Boli & Thomas 1999b). Accordingly,
this  study pays attention to the activities of  global  actors of  how they attempt to
innovate new cultural models by bringing them from an idea to implemented policies
at national level (Policy Diffusion).
The next step for this diffusion study would be to analyze what global actors
do  with  certain  cultural  elements  which  they  have  either  crafted  or  'borrowed'
somewhere else at global, national or local levels. The definition of policy diffusion
used  here  goes  back  to  the  most  prominent  and  classic  de finition  saying  that
„diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain
channels  over  time  among  members  of  a  social  system"  (Rogers  1965/2003:5).
Hence, 'policy innovation' is used here as one of the basic terms for this study with
particular attention to the mechanisms of how this policy innovation is communicated.
Characterizing  'communication'  as  the  fundamental  principle  of  policy  diffusion
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emphasizes the importance of knowledge and knowledge distribution.
In this regard, world society assumes that global actors may in fluence national
structures and policies by means of knowledge transfer. This is already emphasized
in the classic example of the discovery of a previously unknown island, which would
quickly  adapt  to  all  the cultural  models  at  global  level  because numerous global
actors would be active advising and educating the inhabitants of  this island,  and
because the inhabitants observe the customs and practices of other countries and
may adapt accordingly (Meyer et al. 1997:145). Knowledge can flow vertically to this
island stemming from IOs or horizontally flowing from one country to another. Global
actors can be involved as 'transfer agents', which drive this process or facilitate the
knowledge exchange (Stone 2004). Yet, not every policy innovation is due to direct
global  actors'  in fluence.  Policy  diffusion  can  also  be  driven  by  the  countries
themselves, which aim to 'rise' up to global standards and most legitimate models.
This kind of  learning can be outlined as  an  indirect  effect stemming from global
norms.  Especially  in  developing  countries  institutionalized  'best  practices'  are
considered for national policy-making based on the cultural norms development and
social progress.
"The world is an extraordinarily unequal place, and filled with distinctive cultures, but
models of the good society are strikingly isomorphic. And changes in these models
flow  around  the  world  with  great  rapidity:  adopted  often  on  an  enthusiastic  and
voluntaristic basis by societies eager to progress" (Meyer 2007:263).
Yet, the scienti fic literature is not clear about the models and instruments of diffusing
policies. Weyland (2005) contrasts normative and cognitive-psychological in fluences,
reflecting  different  theoretical  approaches  (cf.  Weyland  2005)  I  hold  that  policy
models can act in both ways. On the one hand, 'best practices' can have a normative
in fluence because a model describes what 'proper behavior' looks like at a certain
point of time. On the other hand, 'best practices' which are carefully designed with
regard  to  established  world  cultural  principles  are  also  discussed  among  global
actors,  with  IOs  as  'transfer  agents'  delivered  to  the  national  level.  Thus,  'best
practices' can have a 'cognitive-psychological in fluence' which biases the perception
of policy-makers towards certain policy blueprints or 'cognitive heuristics' (Weyland
2005). “The process underlying diffusion can be seen as an inherently sense-making
one,  where  actors  jointly  construct  an  understanding  of  the  appropriateness  and
worth  of  some practice"  (Strang &  Meyer  1993:  489).  In  this  process of  'sense-
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making' global actors ful fill a doublefunction. First, they appear to be the 'teacher of
norms'  and inform national  actors  about  how a legitimate  policy  would  look like;
second,  they  draw attention  to  particular  models,  which  increase the  salience of
those models. The second aspect might be more important when a policy model is
rather newly developed and not yet fully institutionalized, but in principle global actors
often act in both ways.
In sum, I have argued to understand global actors as active elements carrying
and  developing  world  cultural  elements,  norms  and  principles.  Their  agency
encompasses activities that can be conceptualized in a way similar to Finnemore and
Sikkink's 'two-level-game'  of  increasingly linked domestic and international  forums
(/norm tables) (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). On the international table, global actors
appear to be  'norm entrepreneurs' which have the ability to establish new policy
models as 'best practices' (advocacy). On the domestic table they are the 'transfer
agents',  which  teach  global  norms  to  national  policy-makers  and  increase
recognition and availability of global models (advice).
What  instruments  might  global  actors  use  for  normative  in fluencing?  This
mode of advocacy includes the publication of documents and studies about a policy
innovation  and/or  the  ideas  supporting  this  policy  innovation.  Publications  allow
global  actors  to  establish  their  policy  models  as  'best  practice'.  Moreover,  other
instruments  to  advocate  are  global  events  such  as  global  summits  and  global
conferences (Lechner & Boli 2005). In my analytical design I pay particularly attention
to  instruments  of  normative  in fluencing.  Additionally,  I  look  for  instruments  and
strategies global actors might use to anchor their policy model nationally, because
“international norms must always work their in fluence through the filter of domestic
structures  and  domestic  norms"  (Finnemore  &  Sikkink  1998:893).  Thirdly,  the
institutionalist emphasis on in fluencing through knowledge as soft power should not
rule out in fluencing by means of hard power emphasized in a “realist” perspective.
That is, in fluencing by 'carrot and stick' mechanisms (Keohane & Nye 1998) do play a
role  and are  taken into  account  in  the  analysis.  The three  categories  advocacy,
advice and incentives will guide the empirical analysis.
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1.2. State of the Art in Policy Diffusion Research: 
The Perspective of Mediated Policy Transfer
Designing  a  study  about  policy  diffusion  research  requires  developing  an
understanding of the particular terms and theories I use. This is even more important
because the literature on policy diffusion entails diverging understandings even on
basic terms (Elkins & Simmons 2005: 38). I concentrate on the literature on diffusion
in  the  field  of  global  social  policy.  Only  a  few studies,  which  have analyzed the
diffusion of SCT. Taking stock of these studies, I  point out the aspects that have
been under-researched so far.
Two Perspectives: Policy Diffusion & Policy Transfer
Policy diffusion research consists of basically two approaches that explain the same
phenomenon, namely policy convergence among states (Tews 2002; Lütz 2007). It is
the main goal of both approaches to identify potential explanations of the observable
phenomenon that many states have adopted similar policies within a relatively short
time frame. 
The general approach to policy diffusion originated in the 1960s in the USA
and analyzed the spread of  policy innovations among the  federal  states (Walker
1969; Gray 1973). This discipline observes the phenomenon from the macro-level
with the spread of policies within a region, and the speed of this spread as the main
variable. In most cases quantitative approaches are utilized, such as event-history
analyses. While such analyses have turned out to be effective in testing different
approaches against each other, the main causalities explaining the policy diffusion
remain unclear. As an answer the British research tradition developed in the 1990s
the  policy  transfer  perspective  mainly  established  by  Rose  (1991,  1993),  and
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000). The analysis of policy transfers is about qualitative
approaches to zoom into the process of policy diffusion either in order to unfold all
the complexity involved in individual processes, or in order to test the validity of one
particular variable. In the following I will  sketch both perspectives brie fly to clarify
what it means for this study that I used the policy transfer perspective.
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Policy  diffusion  research  observes  the  convergence  of  policies  from  the
macro-level. Although from such a perspective many individual processes are black-
boxed,  the  findings  from  policy  diffusion  research  have  revealed  interesting
hypotheses  which  can  contribute  to  the  analysis  of  policy  transfer  processes  as
valuable hypotheses. In general, the policy diffusion approach is rather focused on
the results of the diffusion process. The two key variables are the spread and the
speed of the diffusion.
Just  analyzing  the  spread, such  approaches  often  confirmed  that  regional
cluster  emerge  and  speak  of  'neighborhood  effects'.  Based  on  the  thesis  that
neighbor-countries observe each other more thoroughly and are more open-minded
towards policy innovations because countries from the same region tend to share a
certain cultural background, the concept of 'availability' became important. National
policy-making rarely has to start from scratch. Instead countries can recognize policy
innovations in their  environment and take them into consideration.  It  is  up to the
country how much the received information is  modi fied in order to fit  its  national
conditions.  Processes  of  syncretism (brie fly  defined  as  the  alteration  of  a  policy
innovation through national in fluences) are the expression of high internal dynamics
stemming for example from path dependencies or strong interests groups within the
country.  Such national in fluences leading to a thorough reflection on the received
information are connected the term 'policy  learning'  (Rose 1991),  while  countries
could also take over more or less information in a rather unreflected way, which is
called 'policy adaptation' (Elkins & Simmons 2005). Syncretism as well as negative
lesson-drawing, which is an informed rejection of knowledge, are dif ficult to analyze
from  such  a  macro-perspective  because  the  process  of  policy-making  is  not
analyzed.
Analyzing the  speed of diffusion results in spread-curves, which often show
that policy diffusion occurs in waves often visualized as a bell-shaped curve in which
the  diffusion  process  is  introduced  by  some  innovators,  then  quickly  adds  up
becoming a trend and ultimately fades out by laggard countries adopting the policy
considerably later (Rogers 1965, 2003). The diffusion literature basically has three
explanations for such a global trend: cultural norms, support groups and competition
(Elkins & Simmons 2005, Dobbin et al. 2007). These explanations show a strong link
to  world  society  theory  by  putting  either  the  cultural  norm  or  the  global  actors
involved in the delivery of  expertise at national  level  in the foreground.  The third
explanation, competition, is appealing as well but, may be less valid for social policy
diffusion, which is rather discussed in terms of a 'race to the bottom'. Countries do
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not generally compete to have the best and most encompassing social protection
system. Instead, such programs are under constant risk to be subject to budget cuts,
especially in times of recession.  World Society Theory emphasizes 'world society
links' (Meyer 2009) a country holds with the global level; measured e.g. in terms of
membership  of  a  country  in  international  organizations  or  the  number  of  rati fied
international covenants. Research in this tradition (e.g. Jakobi 2009) provides strong
evidence that world society links matter, but it is not entirely clear how they matter,
which is part of the focus of this study on instruments.
Yet,  an  analysis  of  the  speed  of  diffusion  can  also  indicate  that  such
processes can be even more complicated, calling for complex explanations. Abbott
and  DeViney  (1992)  analyzed  the  diffusion  of  a  vast  variety  of  welfare  state
institutions. Instead of just one bell-shaped curve they found humped curves where a
smaller bell-shaped curve comes before and after the main curve. The authors called
it the “wait and see” model where a non-adoption (waiting and analyzing) wave can
be as contagious as a policy adoption. Explanations of policy diffusion are dif ficult
just  knowing the spread and speed of  a  diffusion process.  Similarly,  analyses of
diffusion processes from a world society perspective are powerful ways of deteccting
diffusion (for social policy see e.g. Adu Sharkh 2010), but the precise mechanisms of
diffusion remain elusive, due to the macro-approach. This study seeks to contribute
to filling this gap by investigating the modes and instruments diffusion actors use.
Research from a policy transfer perspective can reveal more of the dynamics
involved in policy diffusion and can show what mechanisms underlie macro-effects.
This  perspective  “[operates]  at  the  meso  level,  below  more  general  studies  of
convergence and diffusion but above more speci fic treatments of local applications of
ideas and instruments” (Freeman 1999:3, Tews 2002:2). The perspective focuses on
the intentional exchange of knowledge with a bias towards voluntary transfer. Studies
on policy transfer are focused on 'action-oriented intentional activities'  rather than
only on the result but the process of diffusion (Evans & Davies 1999:366) and are
actor-centered  (Stone  2004).  The  actor-centered  perspective  extends  beyond
transfer processes between states to include “vertical” diffusion processes between
IOs and states.
"The literature has focused on lessons and policy transfers between nation-states with
an implicit tendency to assume a bilateral relationship. The policy transfer metaphor
implies  a  direct  exchange  process  between  exporting  and  importing  countries.
However, there can be transfer agents that are not based in or identi fied with either
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the importing or exporting  jurisdiction but  which facilitate the exchange between a
number of polities. Rather than bilateral horizontal transfers between states, policy
transfers  can  occur  vertically  between  states  and  international  organizations  or
between transnational non-state actors. [...] The objective has been to shift the focus
from institutions  and policies  at  the  nation-state  level,  and to address how policy
transfer not only takes place in international domains but can also be considered as
one constitutive element of transnational governance" (Stone 2004: 549/561).
However, this emphasis on vertical diffusion and the role of global actors does not
say which side drives the process. The policy transfer could be driven by countries
actively seeking policy innovations (import or demand driven) or by global actors who
want to disseminate their policy prescriptions (export or supply driven). Even though,
in any case countries would not learn in a normative vacuum or tabula rasa but rather
a bounded-rationality would drive their actions. 
In both cases, domestic factors shape the transfer process or may block it.
Path-dependencies,  fiscal  constraints  or  national  interest  groups  come  in.  Policy
transfer research just emphasizes that transnational in fluences can be relevant and
in certain cases even more dominant than national in fluences. How these processes
are linked with each other is hard to tell and can only be discovered through single
case studies. Depending on the focus of the policy transfer studies, transnational
in fluences can be the dependent or the independent variable according to the focus
of the study, which can be either on the effectiveness of transnational in fluences or
the policy-making process at national level (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). 
However  this  study  focuses  on the  mechanisms and instruments  used by
global  actors,  analyzed  qualitatively,  rather  than  analyzing  in fluence  in  a  causal
sense.  Moreover,  this  study  is  not  confined  to  cases  of  'successful  in fluencing'
leading to actual policy adoptions and domestic implementations. The interactions
and the exchange of knowledge between the national and global level are of major
importance for my analysis. In policy transfer research there is still much to be done
regarding the measurement of global actors' activities in terms of concrete strategies
and instruments (Tews 2002: 4). In response, this study seeks to develop a research
design that captures these strategies and instruments of global actors, revealing how
global actors seek to exert in fluence.
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Policy Diffusion in the Field of Social Security
Early studies on the global diffusion of social security programs focused on some
basic social security programs, which were dealing with the hardships of workers'
injury,  illness,  old age, unemployment,  and low income (Collier  & Messick 1975).
Those  programs  were  considered  to  secure  a  minimum  standard  of  living
representing core institutions of a welfare state. It is a classic diffusion study taking
into account  the spread and the speed of  the spread.  This  study found regional
clusters  indicating  'spatial  diffusion',  and  center-periphery  dynamics  called
'hierarchical  diffusion'.  Without  revealing the reasons behind these dynamics,  the
study presents those forms of diffusion as the main findings.
"Within this overall  pattern, three striking subpatterns clearly emerged. Among the
earliest adopters, social security actually diffuses up a hierarchy of nations rather than
down a hierarchy. In the middle group of adopters, a pattern of spatial diffusion is
present in which social security is rapidly diffused among countries at widely differing
levels  of  modernization.  Finally,  a  combination  of  hierarchical  diffusion  and  a
prerequisites explanation appear to be the most satisfactory means of accounting for
the pattern of adoption among the latest adopters" (Collier & Messick 1975:1314).
The authors of this study come to the conclusion that  it  is  dif ficult  to explain the
spread of  social  security  programs solely  with  endogenous factors as  posited by
modernization  theory,  which  explains  policy  innovations  by  the  level  of  socio-
economic development of a country, which practically makes the implementation of
new programs a necessity. But diffusion studies have shown that states implement
similar policies with very different socio-economic levels. Still, regarding basic social
protection  in  the  Global  South better-off  countries  tend to  have more  substantial
welfare programs (Leisering et al. 2006). 
The policy diffusion study by Weyland analyzed the spread of the privatization
of  pensions  in  Latin  America  and  Eastern  Europe.  This  spread  started  in  Latin
America in the 1980s and continued well into the 2000s. The starting observation of
Weyland's study was that
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“[...]  these  waves  of  diffusion  affect  countries  that  are  at  very  different  levels  of
economic,  social,  and  political  development.  This  variety  suggests  that  domestic
functional needs alone cannot account for the rapid spread of innovations; external
factors make a major contribution" (Weyland 2005:262). 
The study confronted several theoretical approaches with three basic observations
on  the  speed  and  spread:  first,  policy  diffusion  occurs  in  a  wave,  second,  the
diffusion  shows geographical  clusters,  and,  third,  a  similar  policy  framework  was
adopted in different national settings. While Weyland's study acknowledges external
in fluences,  it  dismisses  both,  the  'external  pressure  approach'  (powerful  IGO
motivating a country to implement a policy) and the 'normative imitation approach'
(countries  following global  trends).  Rather,  Weyland emphasizes horizontal  policy
diffusion, with countries observing and learning from each other. Moreover, the low
degree of syncretism (all of the countries have basically implemented a very similar
policy model) in Weyland's view suggests an bounded-rationalities. This leaves the
question open where the impulse or  the incentive to  look for  a policy innovation
stemmed from in the first place. Such answers are dif ficult to be provided by diffusion
studies from a macro-level, but by research approaches, which analyze the policy
transfer on a qualitative basis from a meso-level.
Research  on  welfare  state  development  in  Europe highlights  an  important
factor that might help to account for policy diffusion: "In a political environment the
advocates of reform need to employ strategies to overcome the skepticism of others
and persuade them of the importance of reform" (Cox 2001: 475). While global actors
can persuade and motivate national actors to take action, global norms serve as an
orientation  and  can  further  motivate  by  being  in  particularly  attractive  for  policy
reform. These policy norms are attractive by being portrayed best practice, “modern”
and  scienti fic  as  they  are  based  on  scienti fic  evidence  e.g.  the  effectiveness  of
poverty reduction policies. 
Orenstein (2005, 2008) analyzed the dissemination of pension privatization as
Weyland, but on a world-wide scale. He made a policy transfer analysis in order to
test if this diffusion was in fluenced by global actors. Orenstein found that the World
Bank  as  the  main  driver  was  involved  in  every  step  of  policy-making,  as  e.g.
described in the policy-cycle model. The study highlighted the involvement of global
actors  in  particular  in  the  implementation  of  the  policy  rather  than only  in  policy
advocacy:
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"Global policy actors [...]  may help to implement similar policies in many countries
simultaneously  and  may  continue  to  in fluence  policy  as  it  undergoes  further
modi fications  and  adaptations  over  time.  Global  policy  actors  may  offer  ongoing
technical  assistance  to  policy  regulators  or  actively  carry  out  policy  in  different
settings" (Orenstein 2005: 180).
Orenstein's study showed that  the World Bank not just persuaded the country to
consider policy innovations, but that the ongoing advice and technical assistance fed
into  the  country's  learning  process.  This  implies  that  learning  was  biased  by  a
bounded-rationality.  Moreover,  spatial  diffusion  cannot  be  regarded  as  just
contradicting vertical diffusion, but it can be also be a result of global actors' focus on
particular world regions. Some global actors, like the regional development banks
which support policy-making, are by definition focused on world regions. In this case,
the World Bank,  among others, intentionally focused on Eastern Europe after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
Yet,  how can “in fluence” with regard to global  actors be understood?  Dion
analyzed the development of social insurance programs in Mexico. This is again a
qualitative perspective on policy transfer. Dion confirms the in fluence of global actors.
She points out that other studies might dismiss global actors' in fluence because they
are too much focused on hard power mechanisms (as described by Keohane and
Nye (1998) as carrot and stick in fluencing), like the World Bank's ability to set strong
incentives via loans (carrot) or to impose sanctions by withholding loans (stick). Such
hard  power  mechanisms do not  figure  prominently  in  the  field  of  social  security;
rather a more nuanced analysis reveals that global actors may exert in fluence via the
delivery of technical assistance and policy networks (Dion 2008). While the impact of
global actors on a country's preferences is strong, domestic factors remain strong as
well and determine the timing of the policy adoption and specify how the received
information about a policy innovation is adapted to the national context. This implies
that soft power means are essential. Global actors can also be identi fied as in fluential
with qualitative analysis, when on the macro-level is less or no policy convergence
recognizable. As mentioned before, an analysis of policy transfer is much more about
the process of how a policy innovation is communicated among members of a social
system (Rogers 1965, 2003) and less about the outcome.
Most  recent  studies  on  welfare  state  research  reconfirm  the  distinction
between a policy diffusion and policy transfer perspective. Moreover, they highlight
the  relevance  of  Meyer's  world  society  approach,  emphasize  that  learning  and
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lesson-drawing at national level can be in fluenced quite a lot by cognitive shortcuts,
and  reaf firm that  the  'methodological  nationalism',  which  dominated  social  policy
research  for  a  long  time  by  emphasizing  the  importance  of  external  in fluences
(Obinger et al. 2013). 
Most studies on global social security diffusion investigate countries mostly by
case  studies  of  one  or  few  countries.  By  contrast,  this  study  focusses  on  IO
instruments and therefore takes IOs as points of observation, investigating strategies
and instruments adopted by IOs in view of all countries. 
The Diffusion of Social Cash Transfers: Approaches & Results
Social Cash Transfer (SCT) have spread to 75% of countries of the Global South
(Katrin  Weible,  forthcoming;  s.a.  Barrientos  2013).  Implementation  varies  a  lot,
suggesting that the same program idea was modi fied and adapted a lot at domestic
level. 
"At least 45 countries in the Global South now give cash transfers to more than 110
million families. [...]  Every program is different and there are huge variations, from
universal  child benefits in Mongolia to pensions in Africa to family grants in Latin
America. Some grants are tiny - only $3 per month - whereas others give families
mote than $100 per month; some cover more than one-third of the population, and
others  aim  only  for  the  very  poorest.  The  size  of  public  spending  also  varies
enormously, from as little as 0.1% of GDP up to 4% of GDP, although most programs
fall in the range of 0.4% to 1.5%. Six countries took the lead and still have the biggest
programs - Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India, Indonesia, and China - and several
countries  (including  Mongolia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Ghana)  are  introducing  cash
transfers that will reach a large portion of their population. The huge variation in cash
transfers reflects signi ficant differences in local politics, history, resources, and goals."
(Hanlon et al. 2010:47)
While  sovereign  states  obviously  turn  program  ideas  into  national  programs
according to their preferences of budget constraints, it is still puzzling where all these
activities stem from. The regional effects,  which are present in this SCT diffusion
(Weible, forthcoming) indicate that countries might mutually observe and learn from
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each  other.  Moreover,  South-South-Cooperation  is  a  new  mechanism  where
countries pass their experiences on to other Southern countries.
In addition, there is evidence that IOs in fluence this diffusion. One program
which diffused in Latin America, is conditional cash transfers (CCT). The World Bank
is the strongest and most prominent actor advocating this policy (von Gliszczynski
2015). Most studies refer to countries, often only case studies (but for large-n studies
see  Böger  2013,  Brooks  2015),  and  therefore  do  not  generally  analyse  IO
instruments  (which  are  the  topic  of  this  study),  but  they  provide  useful  hints.
Sugiyama (2011) took a mixed-methods approach to test which in fluences may have
driven the policy diffusion of CCT. She took a  quantitative approach by using an
event  history  analysis,  and  found  out  that  neither  the  ideology  (left/right)  of  the
government, nor the different development levels (Human Development Index), nor
the  government's  capacities  (as  measured  by  the  World  Bank)  had a  signi ficant
in fluence on whether a country adopt a CCT program or not. 
Having  disproved  all  domestic  variables  and  being  left  just  with  a
neighborhood effect, she took a qualitative approach to test for external in fluence.
Based on the assumption that just looking at loan conditionality is not enough, she
finishes her article with a brief overview on World Bank's activities that go beyond
lending. She describes that CCTs also can be considered a norm developed by the
World  Bank  and  distributed  through  meetings  and  conferences  which  played  a
signi ficant  role  in  connecting  policy-makers  from  various  countries  (Sugiyama
2011:263). 
Sugiyama comes to a similar explanation to what Weyland (2005) describes
as biased-learning  because IOs'  advocacy causes policy-making under  bounded-
rationalities.  Vertical  and  horizontal  diffusion  are  linked.  Sugiyama  saw  the  'soft
in fluencing'  of  the  World  Bank  as  in fluential  on  these  learning  processes,  but
additionally, the World Bank's loans represented strong incentives as well.
Franzoni and Voorend (2011) looked into the spread of CCTs from a policy
transfer perspective, investigating, in how expert-driven international ideas entered
the domestic policy process in three Latin American countries. The authors found
that  the  World  Bank  is  also  in fluential  via  expert  and  learning  communities.
Subsequently, this in fluence was ' filtered' by domestic actors (Franzoni & Voorend
2011:290). However, the impulse for those policy innovations came 'top down' from
“policy experts rather than grassroots organizations of the poor themselves” (ibid.).
Though this was a study based on a small sample, this qualitative policy transfer
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analysis substantially contributed and deepened the insights into the policy diffusion
process Sugiyama provided an overview on. 
What is missing, is a qualitative policy transfer study, which is not centered at
the national level with countries as cases, but centered at the global level with global
actors as cases. My study intends to make exactly this contribution. Moreover, most
studies on external in fluences are focused on governmental organizations (IGOs),
ignoring the potential in fluence of non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Also, the
focus mostly is on IFIs, which are considered to be in fluential due to their ability to
access financial resources. But the recent studies presented above draw attention to
the fact  that  also for  big  IFIs like the World  Bank,  'soft  in fluencing'  via expertise
seems to play a role as well.
Stubbs (2003) argues that in the course of the proliferation of INGOS since the
1990s, many of the INGOs stuck in short-term projects and competition for financial
resources. This situation changed with new aid and development regimes emerging,
adopting  more  coordinated  approaches  to  poverty  reduction.  With  more  financial
resources,  which became concentrated in  a few INGOs, these actors could form
alliances  and  became  more  important.  According  to  Stubbs,  it  is  likely  that  the
importance of INGOs will increase in the future.
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) were among the first to investigate the role of
INGOs in more depth, conceptualizing them as norm entrepreneurs with the ability to
develop new norms and inject them in the international system. Their role as transfer
agents active in 'advocacy networks' (Stone 2004) is rarely analyzed in studies on
policy transfer, and almost absent in policy diffusion studies. 
Articles taking stock of the NGO literature often find that INGOs are under-
represented.  This  is  puzzling  since most  of  the  INGOs are  active  in  the  field  of
human rights, and social policies and development (Kruse & Martens [forthcoming]).
Although INGOs are seen to be of central interest for studies on global social policy
(GSP), Kruse and Martin are silent about the role of INGOs in policy diffusion. By
contrast this study seeks to ascertain the role of INGOs in the diffusion and how
INGOs compare to IGOs in this respect.
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1.3. X-oriented Research Design: 
A Qualitative Approach to the Analysis of Policy Transfer
The literature on methods and research design distinguishes between x-centered
and y-centered approaches (Blatter  & Haverland 2012).  Y is  the phenomenon of
interest, in our case the observation here that many countries around the world have
implemented certain SCT programs in a relative short time frame of sometime more
than a decade. X are the potential variables in fluencing policy diffusion. Theoretical
there can be numerous x-variables, but usually it is possible to identify the few most
likely variables based on an analysis of  former studies and analyses. Y-centered
studies are interested in explaining the phenomenon by taking multiple x-variables
into account, either quantitative or qualitative. 
Good  examples  of  quantitative  y-centered  studies  are  multivariate  event-
history analyses, which are trying to identify which x-variables can be considered as
signi ficant influences on the observed phenomenon. As stated above, partly such
studies  already  exist  and  indicate  external  in fluences  as  responsible  for  policy
diffusion because internal factors have turned out to be insigni ficant for the adoption
of SCT policy innovations. 
A qualitative way to set up a y-centered study are country-case studies. At
national level all the different in fluences merge and, thus, such approaches would do
a good job in showing the actual in fluence of external in fluences on policy-making
and how national in fluences absorb, modify or reject those in fluences coming from
the global level. However, a country case study would shrink the perspective down to
one particular setting and the global outlook would get lost. 
I chose with this study a x-centered approach, and to investigate in external
in fluences focusing on global actors which seem to be among the most promising x-
variable.  From world  society  theory,  as  my theoretical  perspective,  global  norms
individually are also a promising factor with the potential to unfold its effects rather
indirectly. Yet, I see global actors as being heavily involved in the process of norm
production. As described in my theoretical chapter, global actors actively work with
norms, edit them or even develop new normative content. Thus, I intend to develop a
more comprehensive perspective on global actors and their means to in fluence, and
include a normative perspective as one of three analytical dimensions, as well. 
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This x-centered study takes a qualitative approach to  zoom into the policy
diffusion of SCTs in the Global South, and investigates in the policy transfer process,
which focuses on global actors' activities to in fluence national policy-making. Global
social  policy  (GSP)  considers  global  actors  as  potentially  being  involved  in  the
development,  the  diffusion,  and  the  domestic  implementation of  global  policies
(Orenstein  2005).  I  analyze the diffusion aspect  and proof  according to  my GSP
perspective  this  SCT  policy  diffusion  is  a  matter  of  GSP,  or  not.  With  my
comprehensive  analysis  of  the  activities  of  global  actors  in  this  policy  diffusion
process I will  qualify the assumption that global actors had an impact on national
level by in fluencing policy-making. This is not to say that national in fluences don't
play a role. Political constellations, veto-players and path-dependencies may all be
factors that play a role for the adoption and implementation of policy models.  Of
particular interest here is how much global actors try to in fluence. According to a
sender-receiver model, I do not intend to investigate in how the receiver interprets
the arriving signal. Instead, I want to investigate how strong and which strategies the
sender is using to send a signal for policy change. This perspective is much more
focused on revealing the global actors' involvement in policy-making rather than on
holistically explaining the causes for the spread of SCT programs. Yet, in the final
part I re flect on the global actors' activities, on the one hand, and the quantitative
data about the policy diffusion, on the other hand, in order to evaluate how in fluential
global actors could have been and what further in fluential variables beyond global
actors' activities can be considered for further investigations.
In the following, I present my methodology to analyze the contribution of global
actors, which includes the case selection and the analytical framework designed for
x-centered  studies  from  a  world  society  perspective.  The  analytical  framework
considers  three  different  perspectives  to  capture  global  actors'  activities
comprehensively.
Case Selection: Capturing the Diversity of In fluences
An analysis  of  the spread of  SCT programs is  dif ficult  because much variety  on
country level is involved (e.g. Weible, forthcoming). Yet, some policy models can be
identi fied.  With  multiple  actors  involved  and  several  SCT  policy  innovations
spreading, I have to select cases which represent as much of this diffusion process
as possible. Are there policy innovations that are more prominent than others? 
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Three out of the four models of SCT that have become consensual in global
discourse during the 2000s refer to children and older people (von Gliszczynski 2015;
von  Gliszczynski  and  Leisering  2016).  While  social  assistance  policies  for  the
working age do not diffuse much, programs for young and the old diffuse in a fast
pace  in  the  form  of  recognizable  policy  models.  The  non-diffusion  of  social
assistance for persons of working age may have multiple reasons. Two reasons, first,
no global actor is advocating especially social assistance (von Gliszczynski 2015),
and, second, the idea to hand out cash to people who are poor but able to work is not
very  popular  in  many  developing  countries.  There  is  a  great  fear  that  social
assistance  would  disincentive  recipients  to  go  to  work  and,  thus,  make  them
dependent on the cash transfers; moreover SCT for all poor workers would require
considerable resources.
This is contrary to programs for vulnerable groups – like for children and older
people.  Such  programs  are  advocated  by  IGOs  and  INGOs'  and  have  a  high
legitimacy at global and national level since the mid 2000s (von Gliszczynski 2015).
This is why I consider programs for children and older people as predestined to be
case studies.
The second criterion would be to cover not just the main SCT policies but the
major actors, too. There are multiple global actors recognizable which are classi fied
mainly as IGOs and INGOs. Moreover, some regional development banks, national
development agencies (NDAs), think tanks, and individual consultants contribute to
the diffusion of SCTs. From all this variety I chose my cases based on two criteria:
first, the selected actor should be a main advocate each of the main types of social
policies, which are SCTs for children or families and SCTs for older people. Second, I
intended to choose an IGO and an INGO as most-different cases in order to capture
the diversities of instruments and strategies actors can use to  influence national
policy-making. 
It turns out that the World Bank is an IGO and the most active global actor in
the field of  conditional  child benefits (for non-conditional child benefits and family
allowances,  UNICEF has  been  the  main  advocate)  and that  for  non-contributory
pensions  an  INGO  -  HelpAge  International  -  is  the  most  active  actors  (von
Gliszczynski 2015). According to HelpAge, the fact that for social pensions the main
advocate is an INGO might be due to the fact that the rights of older people played
just a minor role at global level, where is almost no organization, which has promoted
the rights and needs of older people, except HelpAge. Thus, HelpAge International is
31
the  main  global  actor  that  advocates a  social  policy  which  is  targeted especially
towards older people.
From  what  is  known  about  these  actors,  those  cases  seem  to  be  fairly
different. While the World Bank is known as a strong and in fluential actor, which can
use large amounts of money in order to in fluence and effectively push for its policy
preferences (Orenstein 2005), HelpAge International as an INGO would be known for
country projects and general advocacy for all kind of issues around aging. Yet, so far
there is no scienti fic analysis about this organization which would provide any more
profound understanding of how this INGO is involved in in fluencing national policy-
making (but see Walker Bourne et al.  2011).  Nevertheless,  it  meets the eye that
HelpAge  International  holds  a  strong presence at  global  level  by  organizing  and
attending global events. Can an INGO which does not have the financial means of
the World Bank be influential on policy-making? From a world society perspective
both actors could use norms and knowledge to in fluence. This investigation in 'soft
power'-in fluencing provides a common ground to make both cases comparable and
to develop an analytical framework in the following to compare the World Bank and
HelpAge International according to their strategies and modes of in fluencing.
 
Three Perspectives on Global Actors' Activities
This study intends to capture the governance mechanisms and instruments which
global actors that have used in this diffusion wave of Social Cash Transfers; which is
a deeper investigation into the question of how policy innovations are transmitted
from the global  to  the national  level.  Grounded in  theory,  this  study understands
global actors as 'world society actors'. From this perspective knowledge and norms
appear as powerful means to in fluence. Traditionally, the influence of knowledge and
norms has been widely ignored by more realists' approaches, which emphasize 'hard
power'-mechanisms (sanctions) as being in fluential. Global actors also appear to be
the ones delivering expertise and advice to the national level. 
I discern three analytical perspectives, which have a clear focus but are also
able  to  capture  a  variety  of  activities  within  each  perspective.  The  analytical
perspectives  fall  together  with  basic  mode  of  in fluencing.  Each  mode  describes
particular instruments, which global actors can use to make use of this mode. My
research interest is: First, what are the activities within each mode? And second,
what are the strategies behind those activities? Furthermore, the consideration of all
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modes  of  in fluencing  can reveal  the  interplay  between activities  and instruments
used at different levels and in different modes. Such an encompassing overview of
those activities might signi ficantly facilitate a better understanding of global actors'
contribution to policy diffusion. With its findings, this study contributes to the analysis
of the diffusion of social cash transfer programs in the Global South and reveals the
activity pattern of global actors; how they are contributing to Global Social Policy, to
the  development  of  Social  Cash  Transfers  in  general  and  for  policy  models  in
particular.  Moreover,  the comparison of different  types of actors (IGO/INGO) with
analytical categories can show at glance the differences of how instruments are used
and strategies are designed. Among others, this study reveals that INGOs use their
capabilities in such a way that they compensate the (potential) advantages of IGOs.
Due to the categories developed in the following it becomes clear how they do that.
The  analytical  perspectives,  which  are  presented  in  the  following,  are
consequences of the chosen theoretical perspective. The examples of instruments
are based on the findings of previous studies.
Mode of In fluencing 1: Advocacy
Global actors are characterized as 'global' based on their scope of activities. Even
though a particular actor is based in a single country it can be considered to be a
global actor when it operates globally. The global actors promoting SCTs are active
at national level and might act as a transmission belt for global ideas. World society
theory characterizes global actors as transmission belts between the global and the
national  level.  The  global  community  organizes  numerous  conferences,  which
primarily are directed towards other global actors. Global communication grows and
develops  its  own  sphere.  This  global  cultural  environment  establishes  its  own
institutions, normative models, and socializes certain codes of conduct and norms for
appropriate behavior.  The first  perspective of  this  study looks especially  on such
activities.  What  does  this  speci fic  global  actor  do  to  interact  with  the  global
development  community?  Does  this  actor  use  global  norms  in  order  to  edit  or
develop new cultural norms? And, the main question is: How does this global actor
make use of the global environment to send a recognizable signal at national level for
the consideration of its policy suggestions? 
If  global  actors  use  such  kind  of  norms  and  arguments  behind  their
suggestions and ideas, I will call it advocacy. Defined as the act of arguing in favor of
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something,  I  will  pay  extra  attention  to  the  question  for  what international
organizations argue and with what instruments they put their arguments out there. A
prerequisite  for  advocacy  is  interest.  Only  if  international  organizations  have  an
inherent  motivation to diffuse a certain  policy advocacy can come into play.  This
motivation or self-interest can be less obvious to detect because World society theory
describes global  actors as 'disinterested others'  (Meyer  2009),  which means that
international organizations portray themselves as neutral and altruistic with the aim to
support  domestic  policies  according  to  their  socio-economic  development  and
national priorities. This does not mean that these organizations do not follow their
own agenda and advocate particular elements of this agenda towards governments.
It is just that it is more dif ficult to identify in how far global actors are motivated by an
own agenda. 
This  study  investigates  the  publications,  interactions  between  other  global
actors  and  global  conferences  in  order  to  identify  in  how  far  international
organizations are driven by a world cultural mission and in which ways publications
and conferences are instruments in order to advocate global ideas and models. Of
particular interest are all those instruments which are directed towards nation-state
so they might have an impact on national-level.
Advocacy can have direct effects and also impact indirectly taking effect to a
later point of time. Advocacy can make a policy idea more popular in general so that
it can trigger learning-effects in multiple national-states without the direct involvement
of global actors. The implemented policy can be initiated by the government and yet
follow a global trend. Advocacy is a rather abstract stimulus for policy diffusion. This
study  investigates  qualitatively  in  how far  global  actors  have  used  this  mode  of
in fluencing for the diffusion of social cash transfer programs.
Mode of In fluencing 2: Advice
A further key characteristic of global actors in the field of global social policy, is their
direct involvement in domestic politics. World society theory has pointed out how the
promotion  of  policy  models  re flects  world  culture:  models  are  rationally argued,
underpinned  by  scienti fic evidence;  and  advocacy  by  global  actors  has  to  be
'disinterested' and expertise-based. In other words: 'advice' is a seemingly neutral
way  to  assist  developing  countries  in  a  legitimate  way.  'Disinterested'  basically
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means that it  is somehow illegitimate that global  actors would act based on self-
interest. 
Thus,  those  actors  invoke  global  norms  and  appear  to  be  the  executive
organization  of  norms.  For  example,  instead  of  being  self-interested  HelpAge
International works for the rights and needs of older people based on global norms
and codi fied agreements, and the World Bank appears not to be interested in selling
loans but to work for the national development of countries and to end global poverty.
Poverty  reduction,  development,  and  support  for  'most  vulnerable  groups'  (like
women, orphans and vulnerable children, cultural minorities, and disabled and older
people)  are  highly  legitimated  global  norms  embedded  in  our  global  culture.  To
operate at national  level mainly with expertise and advice allows organizations to
appear as neutral advisors. With their advice, international organizations are helping
countries with the proper design and implementation of global norms and models. It
seems that technical details are a much-needed resource at national level, like, for
example, the technical know-how on how to set up a primary education system or a
work injury insurance. The delivery of technical advice and expertise as 'disinterested
others' to the national level seems to be a less provocative way to tell people what to
do. The delivery of technical advice is considered to be key for influencing national
policy-making directly.
The main questions for the analysis are: How do global actors get access and
contact the national level to start communications? What are the instruments used to
deliver the expertise about SCT policy innovations? Inspired by the classical policy-
cycle model (Jann and Wegrich 2003:82)  this study asks: In how far does advice
influence agenda setting, so that IOs preferences get on the national agenda to be
further  discussed  and  processed  within  the  political  system?  How  does  advice
influence  the  process  of  policy  formulation?  Policy  formulation  is  the  actual
development of a policy. In this process global  and national  influences like path-
dependencies  merge.  In  a  syncretic  process  policies  are  developed.  Finally,  the
question:  How  advice  in fluences  policy  implementation?  The  implementation  of
policies is often a gradual process and correlates with the building of institutions.
Social  policies'  survival  is  ensured,  if  the  building  of  institutions  succeeds.  The
development  and implementation  of  a  policy  is  a  process where much advice is
needed and multiple chances exist for international organizations to deliver and to
in fluence. If  and in how far global actors have taken this chance is matter of  the
analysis.
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Again, I do not necessarily expect that all global actors are actively making
use of advice in order to in fluence. Yet, to strengthen the assumption that global
actors  have  been  in fluential  in  this  SCT  policy  diffusion  and  have  effectively
contributed to national  policy-making,  cognitive in fluencing via  advice would be a
prerequisite. 
Mode of In fluencing 3: Incentives
My  focus  on  'soft  power'  in fluencing  to  study  how  global  actors  make  use  of
knowledge and norms in order to in fluence policy-making should not exclude the
more classical perspective of more 'hard power' mechanisms based on sanctions.
This mechanism is captured best by Keohane and Nye's concept of carrot and stick
in fluencing which emphasizes the two sides that certain instruments – like loans –
can have. 
"The withholding of loans may not be a stick that IOs use often to in fluence social
policy,  but  the promise of  loans may be a useful  carrot.  [...]  If  IOs offer  financial
carrots for particular types of reforms, we would expect reformers to acknowledge
forthcoming support and find evidence of financial support following the reform. [...]
IOs can also provide funding for  technical  or  pilot  studies,  thereby increasing the
likelihood that reforms will occur" (Keohane & Nye 1998: 27).
These two aspects of more 'hard power' influencing show that it is merely a matter of
perspective if this kind of 'hard power' is characterized as a 'coercive' mode or an
'incentive-based'  one.  Due to  the strong fixation on the World  Bank's  conditional
lending policy  in  the 1990s,  the  term coercive  influencing made its  way into  the
diffusion literature. And even though the term 'coercion' is still very prominent in the
diffusion  literature,  I  do  not  understand  this  term  as  an  adequate  description,
because it  seems to  me that  international  organizations have learned to  operate
more and more in a mode based on partnership and support avoiding antagonistic
relationships.  Moreover,  developing  countries  –  especially  in  Latin  America  –
experienced  economic  growth  and  developed  a  more  self-confidential  attitude
allowing them to easily reject loan offers or loosen the conditions attached to this.
Brazil is a good example for a developing country which became one of the major
self-confident  players  in  a  relative short  time frame.  Thus,  I  focus on the 'carrot'
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instead of on the 'stick' and use the term incentive in order to capture IOs' usage of
“hard power”. I see two instruments serving as hard power incentives: first, financial
means, which global actors make available to national governments for certain policy
reforms; second, political pressure, which is providing the government an incentive to
gain support from certain parts of the society or political players by responding to
their claims.
Table 1: Models and instruments of International Organizations 
for in fluencing domestic social security policies
Mode of
In fluencing
 Advocacy Advice Incentives
Instruments  - Policy Models
 - Documents
 - Conventions 
   & Agreements
 - Conferences 
   (global/regional)
 - Expertise & 
   Technical Assistance
 - Workshops &   
   Trainings
 - Financial Means
 - Political Means
Source: the author
The table above presents the analytical framework as it was used for the empirical
analysis of this study. The chapters on the World Bank and on HelpAge International
follow  this  categorization.  Additionally,  for  the  introduction  of  each  case  study  I
investigated in the actors' ambitions; analytically speaking: the mission of the actor.
The analysis of the mission is part of the advocacy mode of influencing, because
such  intention  is  the  prerequisite  for  advocacy.  The  guiding  questions  for  this
analysis are: Does this actor intend to in fluence national policy-making? How direct
or indirect does the particular actor show that it supports and advocates a SCT policy
model? Those questions help to get a better understanding of how actors portray and
perceive themselves. The modes of 'advocacy' and 'advice' evaluate the role 'soft
power'  plays  within  policy  diffusion.  Therewith  one  might  better  understand  how
global  actors  serve  as  a  transmission  belt  for  global  policy  innovations.  This
understanding can enhance the conceptualization of policy diffusion/ policy transfer
studies. Showing global actors' activities on in fluencing beyond 'hard power' means
Table 1
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to influence should provide a fuller picture which allows to evaluate if global actors
have been involved in the diffusion of SCT programs in the Global South. 
1.4. Data Collection: 
Interview and Document Analysis
To get all necessary data for the analytical framework this study relies on multiple
methods  to  gather  the  information.  Moreover,  the  access  to  information  for  the
different case studies varied among each other, because each time different sources
were available. Multiple methods have been necessary in order to compensate the
dif ficulties and challenges with regard to access to the empirical fields of each case.
While international organizations are devoted to a high degree of transparency and
provide much information online, there, however, is a difference between INGOs and
IGOs. Non-governmental organizations are easily approachable for interviews while
governmental organizations tend to be more closed and did not respond to interview
requests. While interviews are a highly valuable source of information to get to know
the strategies involved in policy diffusion, I had to compensate the lack of interviews
with the World Bank with a much more extensive document analysis. In sum, I made
a  document  analysis,  expert-interviews,  and  participating  and  non-participating
observations. Each method is linked to different data sources. All methods together
contribute to get solid information on the instruments, modes and strategies used by
global actors to in fluence national policy-making. In the following, I give an overview
on the methods and sources which I used for my analysis.
1. Websites & Conferences: Know the Background!
It would be dif ficult to make sense of the collected data without tan observation of
global discussions, which explain the broader context. To understand the broader
context  help interpreting  the data  and make statements,  which  might  be hard to
conclude  merely  from  the  data  of  a  document  analysis.  Participatory  and  non-
participatory observations have been used in order to get an understanding on the
activities and thoughts of the international policy community. A first good impression
on the global actor's ambitions can be found on the websites of those organizations.
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Why can websites be considered a valuable source of information? Do global actors
publish documents and protocols about their activities publicly online? From a world
society perspective websites and publicly available information is considered as a
valuable  source  of  information,  because  the  need  for  global  actors  to  present
themselves and provide information on their activities is strong. To make information
publicly  available  through  the  Internet  not  only  serves  the  global  norms  of
transparency and accountability, it helps to get reputation and recognition from other
global actors and, thus creates or reconfirms the actor's reputation. While the need
for self-projection is strong,  the information might  be biased especially when it  is
about the achievements of this actor. Yet, I found a way of presenting information,
which is primarily based on technical facts. Furthermore, disregarding any biases the
websites reveal in any case the worldview of the particular actor and how it terms,
defines  and  categorizes  social  facts  on  SCTs.  With  my  observations  I  look  in
particular at the way categories are build, introductions are written, and what image
the actor cultivates for itself. This source contributes to understand the actor and the
actor's behavior better. 
The analysis of the actors' websites was the main source to investigate in the
analytical aspect which I  called 'mission',  which is about the expression of global
actors' ambitions to in fluence policy-making in favor of SCT policy innovations. Do
global  actors  just  work  on  SCTs,  or  do  they  expressively  intend  to  diffuse  their
worldviews and programs? Are they on a 'mission' to diffuse their knowledge, or is a
potential spread of knowledge a rather unintended byproduct?
For  the  general  characterization  of  the  actor  it  is  also  necessary  to  have
information about the actors' origins, their past and development to the present. I
could not rely on my own observations for that but was dependent on observations
other experts have made. I found for each actor a recent publication. For the World
Bank case study Katherine Marshall (2008) wrote about the IGO based on a insider
perspective  grown  over  years  based  on  multiple  interviews.  For  the  HelpAge
International case study the INGO's staff wrote a contribution for an edited volume
itself. The article was written by Astrid Walker Bourne, Mark Gorman and Michael
Bünte  (2011)  who  are  central  persons  within  the  organization.  Both  publications
helped a lot to get a fundamental understanding on the organization's past.
Additionally, in order to find out how people discuss SCTs, I relied heavily on
participating observations of individuals who are key to the development community
around the topic of SCT. With this method I could observe controversies, what is
consent, and on what global actors intend to focus on their activities. Supported by
39
the  FLOOR project  of  the  Bielefeld  University  I  visited  several  conferences  with
multiple  global  actors  attending.  Most  of  the events  were attended by the whole
sociology department of the FLOOR research group, which was a great plus for the
discussions and reflections on those events. Additionally,  I  presented parts of my
results in academic forums in order to get comments and different perspectives from
other scientists.
In the following, I enumerate the events I attended to make transparent which
events  have  fueled  my  observations:  In  2011  I  attended  a  workshop  in  Bonn
(Germany) with policy experts of the development community discussing in how far
development  aid  is  in  a  crisis  because  it  is  in  between  of  two  paradigms,  first,
providing help for the purpose of stimulating self-help, and second, providing support
for the development of social protection systems. In the same year, I participated in
discussions on social  protection at events organized by German parties and think
tanks  in  Berlin,  like  the  meetings  of  the  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung  (German  Social
Democrats)  and  Bündnis90/Die  Grünen  (Green  Party).  Moreover,  I  went  to  a
conference  in  Bochum  (Germany)  about  the  topic  “Reforming  Social  Protection
Systems in Developing Countries” where also many policy experts and global actors
attended. The University Bielefeld also invited several experts on development and
global  rights  and  hosted  their  stay  for  half  a  year  funded  by  the  Center  for
Interdisciplinary  Research  Bielefeld.  In  this  time,  we  were  visited  by  Armando
Barrientos (University Manchester, UK) who is one of the major scientist on social
protection in the Global South, especially in Latin America, with many publications in
this field and who had also advised himself several developing countries on policy
reform. Also in 2011, Arup Banerji – the director of the social protection and labor
division of the World Bank – visited Germany, and presented the new World Bank
strategy in Bonn, which will  serve as a guideline for the organization for the next
decade.  At  the  end  of  that  year,  I  attended  in  Geneva  (Swiss)  the  100 th ILO
Conference where the International Labour Office tried to get countries to agree on a
convention/recommendation on the social  protection  floor.  In  the first  year  of  the
project, I collected most of the fundamental impression I based my research on later
in the process. The main event in 2012 was a workshop in London organized by
HelpAge International where most of the INGO's staff from all over the world came
together. It was a unique opportunity for me to get first and impressions of what was
going on within the organization and how it was working on and thinking about its
current  mission.  Later  this  year  our  project  organized  a  workshop  with  Bernd
Schubert in Berlin who is one of the main policy consultants from Germany active in
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African countries  to  disseminate  SCT programs targeted towards people living in
extreme poverty.
To get re flections on my observations I presented my work basically in three
different  scienti fic  settings;  for  the  world  society  community  (Institute  for  World
Society Studies “World Organizations” 2011 in Bielefeld [Germany]), for the political
science community (Annual International Studies Association “Panel: Development
Practices From Below” 2013 San Francisco [USA]), and for the global social policy
community  (Workshop  “Studying  International  Organizations  in  Social  Policy”
Bremen [Germany];  International  Sociology  Association  –  RC 19 Annual  Meeting
2012  “Welfare  States  Facing  Global  Turbulence,  Ageing  and  Migration”  Olso
[Norway]).  Additionally,  I  had  several  presentations  and  workshops  at  both
universities of my supervisors: Bielefeld University (Germany) and Emory University
(USA). 
In sum, the participating observations have contributed substantially to make
sense of the information I received via interviews and the document analysis. I have
met most of the key figures of the SCT and global social policy community in person
and could hear their opinions and talk with them about their work. The next section
explains my approach to a document analysis.
2. Document Analysis: Get the Facts Straight!
As mentioned above, global actors do provide a lot of information on their website
about their policies and activities. This can serve to be a valuable basis to get more
detailed information. A document analysis was my main source to find out the main
facts about  the instruments global  actors use to  in fluence national  policy-making.
INGOs have a particular need to be recognized at global level and, thus, provide a lot
of information easy accessible.  HelpAge International provides access to multiple
documents which provide information about  their  activities in a  clear,  simple and
recognizable  way.  Moreover,  the  INGO  has  several  papers,  magazines  and
newsletters publishing on a regular basis. Information about the World Bank is a little
harder  to  get  and instead of  information provided in the style  of  short  brochures
World Bank documents tend to be around one hundred pages or more and entail
much more technical material like charts, tables, an numbers. This technical style is
simply  the  way  this  IGO  communicates.  Additionally,  the  World  Bank  has  also
established several types of documents, which provide new information on a regular
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basis, publicly accessible in a huge database. The main difference between these
the sources of  HelpAge and the World  Bank is,  that  the information of  HelpAge
provides an overview with country examples, while the World Bank provides speci fic
information in country examples, so that it is up to the reader to discover the general
information. Fortunately, the country examples of the World Bank are a rich source of
hundreds of documents.
I found that the database of the World Bank (http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/docsearch/document-type/540613)  is  a  valuable  source  of  information
that is hard to get otherwise. For the case study on the World Bank I relied mainly on
one type of document the World Bank calls 'Country Assistance Strategies' (CAS).
What are CAS? Whereas developing countries which receive loans from the World
Bank have to periodically publish 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper' (PRSP) in order
to  show what  kind  of  progress the country  has made to  mitigate  poverty  and to
stimulate economic growth, the World Bank answers to this papers with CAS. I found
this type of document in particular helpful because it is about the activity areas of the
country's development policies the World Bank engages in and entails at the same
time the country's vision of its development goals. The expected outcomes of the
World  Bank's  support  discovers  it's  preferences and policy advice.  The usage of
multiple of the Bank's instruments, activities on advising, and support can be found in
the  CAS.  I  analyzed  the  CAS  for  all  developing  countries,  which  have  an  SCT
program in place, since the end of the 1990s until today. With new CAS published
ever three to six years that means between two to four reports for each country.
Covering the World Bank's activities in 24 countries I studies in sum about 130 CAS
reports.2 A CAS is on average about 100 pages long; including reports that are just
between 40-70 pages long, while others have 130-160 pages. Those reports are so
long because they cover the countries' development with regard to many aspects.
With a filter system I went through the 13.000 pages to discover those parts which
are about  poverty, social protection, their policy model, education and health. Based
on this analysis I made a summary report for these countries which served my as a
source for illustrative examples and details for the empirical chapter.
2 For a list of the CAS reports used for this analysis: see appendix.
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3. Expert Interviews: Discover the Strategies Behind the Actions!
Documents are a valuable basis to collect the details about global actors' activities,
but they have a weakness when one wants to discover the strategic usage of the
actors' governance instruments. I conducted for this study interviews with the staff of
these organizations. I was in particular interested in the ambitions of these actors
with regard to their SCT policies, and how they approach national governments. I
attempted to discover the organization's aims and the strategies with which these
aims are pursued. As mentioned above the workshops of HelpAge International held
in London was an excellent opportunity to conduct several expert interviews with staff
from different  departments and world regions of this organization.
All interviews where guided interviews based on a guideline which I developed
according  to  the  questions  about  the  process  of  in fluencing  stemming  from  my
analytical framework.
It is to note that the access to information about these two actors was very
different.  While the access to  information about  HelpAge International  was rather
simple due to the fact that INGOs publish so openly and directly, and due to the fact
that  I  could  make multiple  interview where the people have talked with  me very
openly about processes inside the organization, the access to information about the
World  Bank  was  much  more  dif ficult  due  to  missing  contacts  which  made
interviewing a complicated endeavor. Thus, the case study on the World Bank relied
for the most part on the extensive document analysis.
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Part II
Empirical Analysis of Diffusion Strategies
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Chapter 2: The World Bank 
and Conditional Cash Transfers
In the following I give an introduction in how to understand the World Bank as an
actor in the Global South. The introduction shows how to understand the range of the
World  Bank's  activities  and  how  the  World  Bank's  instruments  have  developed
towards  'knowledge-based'  instruments  complementing  loan  provision.  After  this
more general introduction I describe my findings supporting the thesis that advocacy
of  global  models  is  one  to  the  main  strategies  to  influence  national  policy
development. Following this chapter I describe that technical advice at national level
is  an  important  mechanism  to  support  institution-building  so  that  the  globally
established models become institutionalized. In a final part, I discuss incentive-based
means to promote institution-building at national level apart from technical advice.
The results confirm what the introductory section about the nature of the World Bank
as a 'Knowledge Bank' already theoretically described, namely that knowledge-based
instruments have become important means to promote particular policies. 
2.1. How to Understand the 'World Bank'
The World Bank is an international governmental organization (IGO) which “aspires
to  be  the  world’s  premier  development  institution”  (Marshall  2008:1)  with  an
emphasis on lending money to developing countries in order to fight poverty. It has
close working relationships with most of the UN institutions, and can be considered
as part of the UN system, though it holds a special status due to the governments'
direct  in fluence  on  the  organization  (Marshall  2008:35).  The  World  Bank  is  well
equipped with financial resources by governments that are able and willing to devote
money to this institution. Even though governmental influence is weighted according
to  their  financial  contribution  it  wouldn't  be  appropriate  to  merely  understand the
World  Bank  as  acting  on  behalf  of  national  governments.  The  World  Bank  is  a
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complex set  of  institutions which is driven by an own dynamic. “The World Bank
consists of a complex set of multinational, multisectoral, multidisciplinary institutions
that are involved in almost every issue imaginable” (Marshall 2008:2). Above that the
World Bank is driven by its mandate and ideology which changed its focus through
the  reforms  in  the  1990s.  To  understand  the  World  Bank  current  activities  and
instruments one can take a look at the development of the World Banks's policies,
the  logic  of  its  particular  departments,  its  general  mandate  and  its  underlying
ideology. Yet, this policies and the logic of its institutions has to seen in relation to the
partners it interacts with and the arenas in operates in. In this regard I emphasize two
different  arenas,  namely,  on  the  one  hand,  the  World  Bank's  activities  towards
nation-states in the Global South, and, on the other hand, the World Bank's activities
towards other international organizations in the global developing community. The
World Bank “is a major actor both in countries that seek its support and partnership
and in the development community at large” (Marshall 2008:1). Both arenas have
their  logic  and  requirements.  Being  constantly  involved  into  interactions  in  those
arenas, the World Bank's behavior seems to be much more driven by its activities in
those arenas and its policies than by the interests of the governments that provide
the funding for the World Bank, like e.g. the United States of America or other major
actors.  Most  recent  research  on  international  organizations  does  confirm  this
perspective: "IOs exist independently of states, and have an effect of their own that
makes them matter in various ways" (Oestreich 2012: 5).3 An additional factor that is
giving  the  World  Bank  even  some  more  autonomy  is  that  it  generates  its  own
revenues. Noticeable, the World Bank is not a charity organization but a bank which
lends money with interests. The cash delivered to developing countries is not a give-
away or  donation,  it  merely  is  lending.  Due to  this  fact  the  World  Bank holds  a
relative  autonomous position because it  is  not  necessarily  dependent  on  speci fic
funding provided by states:
“The World Bank had operated with relative autonomy in its early  years,  in  large
measures  because it  did  not  depend on  regular  budget  allocations  from member
governments  and because borrowing countries  repaid  their  loans on time and its
financial borrowing program was so successful” (Marshall 2008:38).
3 “We understand that IOs are often severely constrained in their powers, particularly when their
actions go against the wishes of important states, and we don't suggest that states can't control IOs
when they really want to. Still, a growing body of literature takes seriously the option that IOs can be
independent, and, when conditions are met, serious actors in the international system." (Oestreich
2012: 2).
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Thus, the World Bank can be understood as a more or less independent institution
that is part of the UN system and foremost guided by its policies. 
To be precise the “World Bank Group” does include many institutions but there
is a narrow set of institutions which I refer to when mentioning the World Bank. 
Historically, “the Bank began as a relatively minor player whose primary role
was seen as financing postwar reconstruction in Europe and Asia” (Marshall 2008:2).
The institution  that  still  today represents  the  World  Bank the  most  because it  is
responsible  for  lending  is  the  “International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and
Development” (IBRD). The name of this institution clearly describes the World Bank's
focus  on  after-war  reconstruction.  However,  “over  the  succeeding  decades,  the
second part of the institution’s of ficial title – development – became its core mission”
(ibid.). Even though the IBRD is the core institution with respect to the multiple other
institutions it would be more appropriate to speak of the World Bank Group: 
“The World Bank should be seen as composed of several different institutions, with
different  charters and mandates.  The three principal  institutions include the IBRD,
also confusingly called the World Bank; the International Development Association
(IDA), created in 1960 as a fund for  concessional  financing; and the International
Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  which  lends  to  private  companies  for  private-sector
projects” (Marshall 2008:6).
Next  to the IBRD the IDA is  the second core institution which is interacting with
governments and, thus, of importance for my analysis. As in the 1960s most African
states became independent as a consequence of decolonization, the Bank had to
react to this changing realities: “It was becoming crystal clear that the resulting new
nations – especially but not exclusively in Africa – were not creditworthy on the near-
commercial terms at which the Bank’s financial structure allowed it to lend” (Marshall
2008:36). As a consequence the IDA emerged as a new entity within the World Bank
Group to  provide  the  African  countries  with  funding  free  from interests.  Marshall
(2008) provides a short summary:
“Unlike IBRD, IDA depends on grant contributions from wealthier nations – set initially
at  a  total  of  $1  billion  –  which  the  agency  lends  to  poorer  nations  on  highly
concessional terms. The management of this system and its overall operating policies
would mimic those of IBRD, which would run the new fund. [...] While the reality is that
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it functions as an integral part of the Bank, often so closely allied that the two are
indistinguishable except in financial structure and financial terms. Still, that distinction
is an important one. The IBRD relies on careful tests of creditworthiness to determine
whether  a  country  is  eligible  and  for  what  amount  before  lending  on  close  to
commercial terms. IDA, in contrast, offers “credits” (distinct from IBRD loans) with 0
percent interest, repayment over 40 years after a 10-year grace period, and a 0.75
percent service charge on outstanding amounts. [… Additionally,] IDA grants were
introduced in 2002 for some IDA countries and projects” (Marshall 2008:36-7).
The IBRD and IDA together form what I will call in the following “the World Bank”
noticing that in most cases the IBRD is active while in Africa it is mainly the IDA. The
IDA is especially focused on the poorest countries. It has by far not the capacities of
the IBRD because it is dependent on voluntary grants of countries. While the IBRD
became stronger with the years, it began “to grant some of its profits to IDA on a
regular  basis,  but  these  funds  represented  only  part  of  IDS’s  financial  needs”
(Marshall 2008:39). Chronically under-resourced the IDA has in particular to focus on
the most urgent needs of its client countries. 
What is the mission of this lending organization? Keeping in mind that the
World Bank was founded as a financial organization for after war reconstruction, it
had  an  economic  and  a  social  dimension  from  the  beginning  on.  The  social
dimension might be best described by referring to the slogan written at the entrance
of  its  main  building  in  Washington:  “Our  Dream  is  a  World  Free  of  Poverty”.
Therefore, the World Banks works with the poorer countries of the world to further
their economic and social development.
“It  does this  by  providing  a  combination  of  financial  resources,  technical  support,
advice and analysis, training, and coordination of development assistance. In practice
the World Bank is deeply involved in virtually every facet of development, and is a
major  actor  both  in  countries  that  seek  its  support  and  partnership  and  in  the
development community at large“ (Marshall 2008:1).
The World Bank pursues this broad variety of activities with “several thousand teams
at work in over 120 countries, some based in the World Bank’s many of fices, others
traveling on what the Bank calls 'missions' ” (ibid.). Still lending is the central purpose
of the organization:
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“Unlike many other organizations working in the development field, the World Bank
has access to signi ficant resources. The World Bank lends on the order of US$20-25
billion each year, and its outstanding loan and credit portfolio stood at $200 billion as
of June 2007. Its approved operating budget for fiscal 2008 was $2.1 billion, and a
myriad of other funds administered by the World Bank gave it still  further financial
leverage” (Marshall 2008:4).
Marshall (2008) with his insider-knowledge about the World Bank does not stop at
emphasizing the lending part of the World Bank. Marshall highlights the importance
of  knowledge  as  the  World  Bank  does  also  provide  technical  support,  trainings,
advice and analyses.  Thus, two of the main analytical categories for this actor are
about the cash/lending as “incentives for national institution-building” and about the
knowledge as “advice on national institution-building”.
“The “banking” role of the World Bank should not overshadow its many non-banking
roles. Indeed, most who work at the World Bank understand well that money alone
solves few problems, and that ideas are by far more important as a vector for lasting
change. Lending and money are indeed central to the character and structure of the
World Bank, but they are not the whole story” (Marshall 2008:4).
This quotation emphasizes “ideas” as a third aspect which plays an important role for
knowledge-based  advice  but  is  –  as  described  in  my  theoretical  framework  –  a
category of its own. If  it  is true that the World Bank has particular ideas on how
certain policies are suppose to look like, policy models to play a role. Thus, the third
analytical in this chapter is “advocacy of Global Models”. 
After this overview of how to understand the World Bank I explain how the
Bank's operational approach to poverty reduction has changed over the years. It will
show that the perspective has chanced from a top-down mode to one that is much
more  country-led  and  takes  different  development  paths  into  account.  A  further
aspect of the shift away from a top-down mode is that next to lending the role of
knowledge gained constantly more weight, so that current the World Bank is as well
described  as  a  'Knowledge  Bank'.  The  next  section  sheds  more  light  on  this
transition.
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The 1990s: shifting policy concepts of the World Bank
Loewe's  publication  on  social  security  (2008)  includes  a  short  overview  of  the
development inside the World Bank: After the post-war reconstruction, especially in
the 1980s, the World Bank was guided by the “Washington Consensus”, which was
based  on  a  neoliberal  economical  ideology.  Stability  and  structural  adaptation
programs were core elements of the politics in this time. The consolidation of public
budgets in developing countries was the top priority. Poverty reduction was regarded
as being a consequence of economic growth and a trickle-down-effect. According to
this idea economic development would stimulate after a “while” (in terms of years or
decades!) social development as well. 
Thus, the World Bank focused foremost on the consolidation of public budgets
by  suggesting  reductions  in  public  expenditure  and  the  privatization  of  public
services. This kind of outsourcing and austerity measures concerned foremost the
social  sector.  This kind of 'advice'  was delivered to the developing countries in a
rather authoritative way. Being in a strong need for new financial resources they had
to accept the suggestions of the World Bank. As a consequence of those policies
income poverty deepened and the Bank was heavily criticized by social movements.
After 50 years of the Banks existence civil society protests arose with the “50 Years
Is Enough” campaign (Marshall 2008:49). Already before, in the 1970s and 1980s
some changes within  the World  Bank occurred,  when economic shocks forced a
rethinking of the concepts applied so far. Moreover the Bank already was criticized
for  its behind-closed-doors-politics focusing foremost  on infrastructure and human
resources. More important, the notion of development broadened in this time making
institutions aware of the complexity of the task confronting them. “Education, health,
nutrition, land tenure: a steady drumbeat of new topics appeared on agendas and
filtered into organizations” (Marshall  2008:14).  In this time the focus of the World
Bank still was on economical factors and less on poverty. Thus, poverty reduction
was  included  in  a  residual  'safety  net'  approach  instead  of  being  part  of  an
encompassing social protection plan.
The  1990s  are  understood  as  the  period  of  trend  reversal  in  international
development politics (Loewe 2008) that finally also reached the World Bank. At latest
in 2001 were the United Nations agreed upon the Millennium Development Goals
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(MDGs)  which  became a  benchmark  for  the  World  Bank  as  well.  Loewe (2008)
describes numerous UN conferences preceding the MDGs as responsible for that
change. Starting in 1991 where the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
confronted the World Development Report of the World Bank for the first time with its
Human  Development  Report.  In  the  following  years,  the  international  community
focused more on social and ecological development. This process resulted in a new
paradigm of international development policies with a stronger emphasis on and a
more  encompassing  understanding  of  poverty  and  the  dimensions  involved.
Education,  health,  and  social  and  political  rights  became  inherent  to  the
understanding of poverty. Especially education and health became important activity
areas of the World Bank. 
Also due to Wolfensohn, who became president of the World Bank in 1995,
the  focus  of  the  Bank  widened.  He  introduced what  came  to  be  known  as  the
'comprehensive development framework'. “The core message was that the economic
and social aspects of development were like 'breathing out and breathing in', and he
insisted on recognizing the complexities of the development process, and thus of the
Bank’s work” (Marshall 2008:50). In the years of Wolfensohn's presidency the World
Bank faced the critique already mentioned above and reacted to it by abandoning
most of its authoritative style:
“Two new mantras entered the discussion. The first was country ownership, re flecting
the important observation that unless leaders and mangers responsible for politics
and programs are convinced and determined to act, development programs cannot
succeed. Too often,  it  became clear,  development institutions including the World
Bank had taken too heavy a hand in program design, suiting it to their perceptions of
how development should proceed, and had taken far too much at face value national
government  acceptance  of  proposed  programs  and  conditions  without  testing
commitment and recognizing the obvious pitfall  that  came when of ficials accepted
proffered  funds  in  the  face  of  limited  options.  The  second  traced  a  path  from
consultation  to  participation and  empowerment.  This  path  reflected  the  crucial
observation  that  communities  must  be  far  more  directly  involved  in  programs
designed to help them. An array of advocacy, tools, and rules emerged to ensure that
programs  did  indeed  engage  the  people  they  most  affected”  (Marshall  2008:16;
emphasis added).
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In a nutshell, the general understanding of development and poverty changed in the
1990s in the international community. This trend made it into the World Bank as well
with a new perspective including three major changes. 
First, the Bank adopted a more open perspective towards a more complex
definition  of  poverty.  As  a  consequence  education  and  health  gained  a  more
important role. 
Second, the developments within the UN system leading to the MDGs and the
experiences of global economic crises stimulated that the World Bank was rethinking
its economic approach based on a 'trickle-down' effect and introduced an economic
approach that also includes what is know today as a 'trickle-up' effect, echoing the
new credo of the international community that 'poverty is not the problem, but part of
the solution'. As a consequence the World Bank became more open towards social
protection and direct support of the poor. Fighting extreme poverty with a more direct
approach encapsulates the idea that social protection measures are an investment in
human capital that contributes to a favorable environment contributing to economic
growth. 
Third, due to the critique the World Bank received in the 1990s it abandoned
most of its authoritative style and emphasized country-led development. However,
due to its financial commitment in form of lending the World Bank still has an interest
that  national  governments  implement  policies  that  stimulate  economic  growth
enabling the country to pay back the loans. Thus, it is important for the World Bank to
have a say when countries design programs and think about policy innovations. To
ensure that the lending can be payed back in a more or less near future, the World
Bank must ensure that those programs are beneficial for the country's economy.
A final  transformation  within  the  World  Bank,  that  was  also  introduced  by
Wolfensohn, is connected with a couple of innovations and the new term 'Knowledge
Bank' which is supposed to re flect the new emphasis on information technology.
What is the “Knowledge Bank”?
Wolfensohn intended to  equip  the  World  Bank with  new instruments  to  exercise
influence.  Well  aware  of  the  information  revolution  he “launched  the  ambitious
Development Gateway, designed to bring together in a giant web site and database
information on development ideas and projects. He also pressed hard to launch a
Global Distance Learning Network, which uses state-of-the-art videoconferencing to
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provide flexible training courses and conferences” (Marshall 2008:51). While that is
proof of the fact that data and knowledge production and the speed of its traveling
increased, the term might also indicate that knowledge has become more important
as  an  instrument  to  in fluence  national  policy-making.  In  this  light  Marshall
emphasizes:  “When  asked  to  highlight  the  World  Bank’s  primary  contribution  to
development,  most  staff  members  would  cite  ideas  and  knowledge”  (Marshall
2008:72).  The World  Bank directly  says on its  website  that  it  addresses national
governments with this new strategy on in fluencing: 
“Fighting poverty  requires a global  strategy to share knowledge effectively and to
ensure that people who need that knowledge get it on time, whether from the World
Bank or other organizations. Sharing knowledge enables the World Bank to respond
faster to client needs, deliver a quality product, encourage innovation, and continually
introduce new services to its clients” (World Bank Website 2011; emphasis added).
How  can  the  World  Bank  use  its  rational  and  scienti fic  behavior  to  “encourage
particular  innovations”?  The  World  Bank  can  introduce  new  ideas  and  policy
suggestions by making it appear to be an outcome of seemingly rational calculations.
These “results” can become facts when just mentioned often enough: 
"By repeating certain propositions suf ficiently often, they can be made to sound like
facts, and given the credibility of economics in other areas, most people treat them as
facts.  This  creates  scope  for  subversion,  feeding  people  with  ‘facts’  that  are
convenient to some" (Basu 2003:892–893).
Continuing  with  this  strategy  the  World  Bank  has  the  potential  to  increase  its
in fluence dramatically, and, at the same time, in a new more cooperative and less
authoritative  style.  Already  at  the  end  of  the  1990s  the  World  Bank  has  been
described  as  “the  single  most  important  external  source  of  ideas  and  advice  to
developing-country  policymakers”  (Gavin  and  Rodrik  1995;  see  also  Stern  and
Ferreira 1997). 
From  this  perspective  another  part  of  the  World  Bank,  the  Human
Development Network, is of some importance as well. It is the intellectual arm that is
working in all the fields of importance for social cash transfers and social protection.
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“The  Human  Development  Network  (HDN)  is  the  World  Bank's  home  for  policy,
programs, and research in the fields of education, health, and social protection and
labor. The HDN Chief Economist's Of fice supports evaluations and training measure
program impact and improve service delivery” (World Bank Website 2013).
The HDN is just mentioned to sensitize for the fact that some other institutions next to
the IBRD and the IDA will  be of importance for the analysis of the World Bank's
modes of in fluence.
Finally, it  is to notice an important feature of indirect and knowledge-based
influencing,  namely  to  appear  as  an institution  that  provides  its  knowledge on a
neutral  basis and free of particular policies. Instead of simply prescribing policies,
advice has to be delivered as a result of consultations and scienti fic analyses. I found
no statement in World Bank publications or on its website that clearly indicates the
World Bank's intention to in fluence. I  understand this as being part  of  the World
Bank's  new strategy to establish itself  as a 'knowledge bank'  that appears to be
interest and advocacy free. The analysis of the World Bank's modes of in fluencing in
the following shows has the Bank manages to make policy suggestions while merely
providing technical advice.
2.2. Advocacy of Global Models: 
Constructing “Conditional Cash Transfers”
In  this  section  I  describe  the  World  Bank's  ideas  and  thoughts  on  social  cash
transfers (SCTs).  I  will  point out that its actions are guided by a particular policy
model which has become recognizable for other global actors as well as for national
governments: the model of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). I have to note that the
World Bank works in so many fields that it dif ficult to say that one particular policy
model is the only favored policy. Instead multiple different programs and policies are
mentioned on one or another context. For example, social pensions as a social policy
for older people has been already mentioned in 1994 in “Averting the old age crisis”
(World Bank 1994). Yet, it was not a concept that guided the World Bank's actions in
any  way  since  it  became  more  prominent  one  decade  later.  So  I  focused  on
references to policies that were dominant within action related policy papers  of the
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World  Bank.  From  this  point  of  view,  I  claim  that  CCTs  are  the  major  policy
suggestion of the World Bank for SCTs, besides non-contributory pension and cash-
for-work programs (referred to as the zero-pillar in the revised multi-pillar pension
model of the World Bank; Holzmann and Hinz 2005, see Wodsak 2011) CCTs have
been the flagship model for the World Bank's activities on SCTs. In a first step, I
describe in how far the World Bank has developed a policy model and, in a  second
step, I describe I how far the World Bank has made use of the global environment in
order to increase the model's normative in fluence.
How a National Social Security Model 
became a Global Policy Model
The  story  about  conditional  cash  transfers  begins  in  Latin  America.4 The  policy
innovations of Mexico in 1997 and Brazil in 1995, reformed in 2001 mark the initial
phase of the development of CCTs. As those programs grew larger within a short
time  frame  covering  millions  of  households  with  direct  cash  transfers  to  the
poor/extremely poor,  both programs caught  the attention of  global  actors like the
World Bank at the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s. At this time the term
conditional  cash transfer  was not yet  born.  The programs of those countries can
simply be described as social policies in the form of child benefits targeted towards
poor families based on the recipients compliance with certain conditions. While the
child benefit programs within the countries involve a high degree of complexity the
World Bank managed quickly to find formulations that reduce the complexity and
establish  catchy  descriptions  instead.  The  payments  of  Mexico's  Oportunidades
(beginning in 1997 with the name PROGRESA; renamed in 2001) consist of several
components.  At  its  core  households  with  children  received  a  monthly  benefit
depending on the type of school the children go to, their gender, and the grades the
kids get in school. Next to the condition that the children need to have good grades
the  children  have  to  have  a  minimum school  attendance  of  93% over  the  year.
Moreover, they have to complete the 12 grade before age 22, and complete middle
school. This benefit was complemented with a payment for school material and a
benefit  that  was  payed  out  once  after  completion  of  the  high  school.  Moreover,
Oportunidadas provides  a  benefit  depending  on  compliance  by  all  household
members with required preventive medical checkups, and the attendance of family
4 For an in-depth analysis of the rise of four social security models where the roots can partly be 
traced back to Mexico and Brazil see von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016. 
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members older than 15 years at health and nutrition lectures (cf. World Bank 2009:
268). 
How to  describe  such a  complex  program with  so  many  components  and
factors in a brief and concise way? The innovation of the World Bank describing this
program simply as a child  benefit that  is  dependent on an education and health
condition  cannot  be  underestimated.  Brazil  with  its  Bolsa  Familia program is  the
second  case  of  a  country  that  innovated  a  country  program  which  became  a
lighthouse example in the CCT debate in the following decade. It started in 1995 as a
program called Bolsa Escola which disbursed a monthly benefit to poor households
with children that have a minimal  school attendance of 85% a year.  In 2003 this
program was closed and integrated into the newly introduced program Bolsa Familia
which  made  its  benefits  dependent  on  compliance  with  education  and health
conditions. Described in this abstract way which is leaving most of the complexity
aside one could already say that Bolsa Famila had an education and health condition
just like Oportunidades in Mexico. Reducing complexity makes it possible to compare
heterogeneous cases and to describe them as one of a kind. 
It was the 'Latin American and the Caribbean Regional Of fice' of the World
Bank  that  described  those  programs  as  conditional  cash  transfers  (World
Bank/LACRO 2001) at a time were the World Bank referred to those programs as
'targeted human development programs': 
“Targeted human development programs for poor households with children transfer
income in cash or in kind on the basis of such observable criteria as children’s age,
attendance in school, or participation in a health care program. They thus serve the
dual  objectives  of  poverty  reduction  and  human  development”  (World  Bank
2001:158).
However, those 'targeted human development programs' were already mentioned in
this report as a separate  kind of program next to child allowances.  A few years later
the  World  Bank  switched  its  language  calling  those  programs  conditional  cash
transfers and consequently used the acronym CCT in publications and reports. All
kind of child allowances that include some kind of education and/or health conditions
became quickly known in the international community as belonging to the type of
social policies called CCTs.
The World Bank's attempt to establish its policy as a clear policy model does
play a role in many publications since 2001, but becomes most visible in its 2009
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flagship  publication  titled  'Conditional  Cash  Transfers'.  This  publication  is  widely
recognized and often mentioned in the international development community. As a
senior  World  Bank of ficial  told  me: “We don't  do advocacy.  We are just  riding a
wave”. That is indeed how the World Society Theory describes global actors who
portrait themselves as disinterested others. In the World Bank publication CCTs are
presented  as  an  overview  of  programs  which  are  already  in  place  and  as  an
evaluation of how they work and what effects those CCTs have. It is portrait as a
pure analysis, and advocacy can just be found implicitly. However, the World Bank
does advocacy, or at least tries to increase the attractiveness and popularity of its
policy model.  In the following I  describe how the World Bank did this in its 2009
flagship publication.
Even though the World Bank merely presents an overview, the IGO does sum
up very different governmental programs under the umbrella term 'conditional cash
transfers', as they would belong to one type of model. In fact, I found that the World
Bank has a clear vision of what it describes and it would like to see implemented as a
CCT,  namely,  a  monthly  benefit  for  households  with  children  dependent  on  an
education  and a health condition. The publication however does include to a large
extent scholarships which originally had nothing to do with CCTs but are now portrait
as a kind of CCT that just has an education condition and no health condition. I
understand that such a perspective is a good reflection of what the Bank's staff is
confronted with in its daily experiences at national level, but I also see the deviance
to the World Bank's ideal model. Although the World Bank has a clear vision of CCTs
it is writing its report from a bottom-up perspective. There is nothing wrong with such
a perspective but it is labeling programs retrospectively as CCT what in fact never
was designed to be one. I understand this as a technique to design a model and
make it popular. 
Especially present is this intention with a map that the Bank connects with a
bold claim, namely that the last decade can be characterized as a 'CCT wave' (World
Bank 2009:3). To underscore this claim a world map gives a global overview of all
the countries with some sort of CCT programs; one world map shows the state of the
spread of “CCTs” in 1997 and another world map shows the spread in 2008. What is
visible at first glance is a massive increase of CCT programs around the world. It
seems to be the proof of the Bank's observation of a CCT wave. That is in particular
interesting because the description of such a wave is more than just a description it is
a creation of social facts as well. The border between describing a trend and creating
a trend is blurred. I recognized that the world map does also integrate countries that
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merely have a small scholarship program, such as  Cambodia, or just a pilot program
of a scholarship program tested, like Pakistan, as well as it includes countries that
already have shut down their CCT and merely continue with some kind of a 'pilot', like
Nicaragua and Colombia. To integrate such large countries as India into a CCT map
just because it has a program which is paying a benefit to girls once they become 18
and managed not to get married before, can be seen as a stark overstretch of the
CCT definition and foremost intends to make the global spread of CCT seemingly
larger than it actually is. I argue that this is used as a technique to push a policy
model by making it part of a popular trend. 
The map of how CCTs have spread globally may look impressive but what
(small) country programs are exactly integrated can be read in the appendix of the
publication. That is were I openly found that the World Bank simply had integrated
every bit of information on CCTs it  empirically found, even if  some programs are
quiet small or already somehow odd to the CCTs model. Still, the World Bank has a
point here: CCTs have spread globally in an enormous pace. But it would have been
more  appropriate  to  speak  of  a  Latin  American  phenomenon  that  is  tested  and
spreads in recent years as well to other parts of the world. [hmm,.. I need my map
here!]
The intention to make the CCT model more popular and to increase the global
awareness for this policy option is the main driver of the World Bank's efforts to raise
the normative account of CCTs. The World Bank leaves out policies that differ from
the World Bank's norm and does also not rate country programs according to how
close the program matches the CCT norm. With such a strategy the World Bank
chose a rational and descriptive way to establish a norm. It has not written a book of
how countries “should” design their programs, is has demonstrated what policy is
seemingly becoming a trend and a new standard tool for social policies. Above that
the World Bank gives several reasons why CCTs are a rationally “wise” decision in
order to fight poverty and invest in “human capital” at the same time. I already have
explained in how far the World Bank tries to display and exaggerate a trend towards
CCTs by the way facts are presented,  so I  do now show how the 2009 flagship
publication on conditional cash transfers argues for CCTs as the 'most rational policy
option'.
For the World Bank CCTs are a good policy option for a country either if it
wants a policy that helps it to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reduce
income-poverty  of  people  living  in  extreme poverty,  or  if  it  wants  to  invest  in  its
economic development. The publication makes clear that if a country would like to
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achieve the aims mentioned above CCTs are recommended by the World Bank as
the way to go. It is important to point out that CCTs are still presented to be a policy
option, but as it is presented in the publication, the introduction of CCT programs is
always rational for the World Bank. In the chapter 'When Is a CCT Program the Right
Policy  Instrument?'  that  Bank  gives  the  reader  a  decision  tree  to  answer  if  a
conditional or unconditional cash transfer would be the best option. Even though this
decision tree leaves room for choice the result will be in almost all cases that a CCTs
would be the best option. How can this be? 
My first explanation refers to the Bank's ideology which has slightly changed in
recent years. In the last decade, the World Bank has changed its core beliefs about
how to  stimulate  development.  The belief  that  a  trickle-down effect  would  finally
reduce  poverty  within  countries  shrunk  and  the  main  new  concept  that  gained
prominence  in  the  World  Bank's  logic  is  the  the  concept  of  human  capital.  If
governments invest  directly in the people they can increase human capital  which
contributes to economic growth much faster as if macro-economic programs would
try  to  finally  reach  the  people  by  trickle-down-effects:  “Although  market-driven
economic growth is likely to be the main driver of poverty reduction in most countries,
markets cannot do it alone” (World Bank 2009:8). The suggestion of the World Bank
is  that  governments,  on  the  one  hand,  have  to  invest  in  health  and  education
services and provide people living in poverty with a direct cash transfer, while these
transfers, on the other hand, need some conditions in order to ensure that people will
prioritize the usage of those services. 
Thus,  the  main  feature  of  CCTs  is  that  they  “make  payments  to  poor
households on the condition that those households invest in the human capital of
their children in certain prespeci fied ways” (ibid.). The main question of the World
Bank's decision tree is if in a country an 'underinvestment in human capital' can be
found (for example, because parents need their kids as workforce instead of sending
them to school)  or not.  If  a country has no underinvestment in human capital  an
unconditional cash transfer is the right policy option, otherwise a conditional one is to
prefer.  Having  defined  'underinvestment  in  human  capital'  as  a  main  cause  of
persistent  poverty  in  advance  as  part  of  the  World  Bank's  new  approach  to
development,  the  answer  to  this  question  can  only  be  'yes,  there  is  an
underinvestment'. Also in the following the publication presents a couple of scenarios
to further specify when a CCT will be the best policy option, while the result is always
in favor of CCTs. If in a country the majority of people is underinvesting in human
capital,  CCTs are the right  option (scenario A).  And what is the preferable policy
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option in scenario B, where the majority is not underinvesting in human capital? Here
the publication comes to the result that “in this case, conditions are unnecessary (but
harmless)  for  a  majority,  but  are  needed  for  a  minority.  A  CCT is  still  the  right
instrument” (World Bank 2009:171). The only scenario where CCTs are not argued to
be the best policy option is the situation when the quality of schools and health clinics
is so low in a country that the increased usage due to a condition cannot possibly
enhance  human  capital.  What  I  wanted  to  show  with  this  analysis  of  the  2009
flagship publication is that the World Bank is using advocacy in a more indirect way,
namely by discovering it behind rational argumentation.
In  sum,  I  showed that  the World  Bank has a clear  policy  model  and also
explicitly  frames  it  as  a  model.  This  model  is  suppose  to  be  an  effective  and
appropriate tool to fight poverty and invest in human capital at the same time. This
argumentation makes it appealing to policy makers which follow the same norms as
set out by the World Bank. In conformity with the World Bank's ideology conditional
cash transfers appear to be the new best practice which is applied by many countries
and a already global trend. The 2009 flagship publication is a cornerstone to show
this model, a global trend towards this model, and an argumentation in favor of the
CCT model. In the next section I shed light on the activities which the World Bank
conducted at global level to advocate this model even further.
The World Bank's relationship to other International Organizations
Looking at  the World Bank's activities at global  level it  is remarkable to see how
independent the organization is. It holds many contacts with other organizations and
most certainly is a global player, not only by looking at the range of countries the
Bank is involved in operationally but also in its ability to influence other global actors.
The World Bank is observed my many others and changes within the World Bank's
policy and politics are well recognized. 
“The World Bank has [...] developed cooperative arrangements with specialized UN
agencies – most importantly with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) which
also exercises  a  lead  role  within  the UN for  development  work.  Important  formal
cooperative arrangements with the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United
Nations Education, Scienti fic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have brought the
institutions  into  close  and  regular  contact.  The  Bank  also  has  developed  close
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partnerships  with  other  UN-specialized  institutions,  notably  the  United  Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United
Nations Population Fund” (Marshall 2008:35).
Thus, it is noticeable that the World Bank does not openly try to in fluence others to
get its preferences on the agenda of the United Nations. This is puzzling because
from a World Society perspective one would expect that especially the UN are a
forum for the creation of legitimacy of policies. Here I have two answers: One the one
hand, the World Bank still tries to benefit from the UN's legitimacy via participation in
the UN's highly  legitimized Millennium Project which is  defined by the Millennium
Development Goals. “The World Bank has been and remains very much part of the
MDG process” (Marshall 2008:21). On the other hand, the World Bank is so much an
institution in itself that it has much less to in fluence other global institutions in order to
stay  legitimized.  To  have  a  policy  anchored  within  its  own  organization  is  effort
enough to place a topic at the global agenda. And by having done so it can expect a
policy coalition (see Sabatier 1987; 1988; Sabatier and Weible 2016) of further IOs to
emerge around it.
However, even though I argue for the independence and importance of the
World Bank as an institution in itself, I see that World Bank's policies are carefully
legitimized including three components. First,  it is really important for the World Bank
to have its policies rationally argued to be a best practice against the backdrop of its
economical  focus.  This  argumentation  is  supported  by,  second,  a  normative
foundation like the MDGs as a benchmark-orientated normative agenda for poverty
reduction, and, third, evidence-based information like shown in its 2009 publication
which tried to take stock of all CCTs worldwide trying to build its arguments on the
country examples provided.
As scientists have analyzed in 2006 the global activity-level of international
organizations concerning basic social protection they found that this topic is still small
compared to other fields of interest within the social security agenda. This situation
has changed much in the following years, but at this time it seemed that the other
organizations wait until the World Bank finally would give a clear signal that social
cash transfer are considered to be a viable policy option (Leisering et al. 2006:249).
Certainly  international  organizations  are  driven  by  multiple  in fluences,  their  own
agenda and particular individuals in leading positions, but for many the World Bank is
an institution that also sets important stimuli about what is on the global agenda.
Therefore, my first  answer to the question of how the World Bank in fluences the
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global environment is that it is in the comfortable position to be an institution in itself
and, thus, it is suf ficient for the World Bank to argue in favor of CCTs like I have
described above. In doing so, it automatically brings issues on the global agenda,
raises  awareness  and  in fluences  other  global  actors  as  well.  But  does  this
automatically lead to a signi ficant in fluence of national policy-makers? From my point
of view the World Bank policies seem to have to targets: to provide guidance for the
organization itself  and to put  out  signals for  the international  community.  For the
interactions and influence at national level I  couldn't find global agendas a visible
instruments  to  in fluence.  Instead,  I  found global  conferences as a tool  to  spread
global models to national level, as described in the next section. 
Global Policy Diffusion: launching global conferences
Since CCTs became a part of the World Bank's operational  portfolio it  organized
global  conferences  especially  on  CCTs.  On  the  World  Bank's  website  and  their
document database I found information about three major conferences at global level
which were designed to be workshops on CCTs: 2002 in Mexico, 2004 in Brazil, and
2006 in  Turkey.  There were only  very  few information  about  further  conferences
taking place at this time. If there were some they must be considerably smaller and at
national level. In the following I describe the three major conferences in more detail.
It meets the eye that the first conference was pretty early in 2002 and shows
that  the  World  Bank  was  among  the  first  that  pushed  a  particular  SCT  model.
However,  the  first  two  conferences  were  rather  focused  on  the  Latin  American
region, and, thus, were a bit below the radar of the global community. Yet, it reflected
the World Bank's focus at the beginning of the 2000s on the Latin American region
where most of the operations took place and most of funding was invested in this
region. The second major event took place in Turkey in 2006 and attracted a very
broad audience with participants from all over the world. This event took place quite
distant from the Latin American region where the first CCT policies emerged and was
situated much closer to the Europe. It can be understood as a clear signal from the
World Bank to the Western countries that the World Bank commits itself to SCTs and
is not just participating in this global trend but is also providing a clear policy model.
I  understand  the  main  effect  of  those  conferences  to  raise  awareness  at
national  level  for  CCTs  as  a  policy  model.  Each  conference  was  headed  with
'conditional  cash  transfers'  as  the  topic  and  with  all  its  side-aspects  the  whole
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conference was exclusively about CCTs. However, the events were not in any way
portrait  as  an  event  for  advocacy  –  on  the  contrary.  The  events  were  very
technocratic about all the aspects of CCT implementation and CCT development:
“The Bank’s objective in  organizing the workshop was to provide a forum so that
executing agencies or units of different CCT’s could share their experiences—both
successes and challenges —so that they could learn from one other with the final
goal of improving the operation of their programs. This workshop was the first of its
kind to  focus exclusively on operational and implementation issues related to CCTs”
(Ayala Consulting 2003:3).
However, I found it striking that the exchange of the countries' experiences on CCTs
was part of the conference under the headline 'successes and challenges' of national
CCT programs. It was not matter of debate if CCTs are appropriate or make sense at
all.  The participants  were government  specialists  from countries that  already had
some kind of a CCT in place, most of them financed by the World Bank or the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). It was a rather small conference with participants
from  eight  countries:  Mexico,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Honduras,  Jamaica,
Nicaragua, and Turkey. It  was almost exclusively a conference for and with Latin
American countries. Turkey was the only country from a different region what was
due to the World Bank's early involvement in financing a CCT pilot project in Turkey.
Many of the other countries merely had some kind of a scholarship in place or some
more  or  less  patch-worked  grant  systems.  In  this  regard,  I  understand  those
conferences also a an attempt to reframe programs which were initially not designed
to be a CCT. To the participant of the CCT conference the national programs were
framed  to  be  a  kind  of  CCT  which  simply  would  benefit  from  some  technical
improvements. In such a way advocacy is performed in a rather indirect way which is
hidden behind technocratic lessons and best-practice sharing. This implicit in fluence
of the World Bank can be found in further details which are noteworthy. The World
Bank does not appear to be the initiator of a promotion event, but as an international
organization which is merely responding to its clients' needs:
“Program of ficials from different countries who are in charge of implementing CCTs
have often requested the Bank to organize international  workshops that  deal with
operational  issues,  which  have  demonstrated  to  be  very  complex  in  practice.  In
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response  to  these  requests,  the  World  Bank  decided  to  organize  this  workshop”
(Ayala Consulting 2003:10).
However,  none  of  those  conferences  was  merely  about  technocratic  knowledge
exchange. I argue that it was also about vivid influencing and advocacy. As I argued
above advocacy is already implicitly included simply because the conferences are
exclusively  about  CCTs  and  discuss  details  about  successful  CCT  program
development. Moreover, I would emphasize that each conference was designed to
be an event  which  is  able  to  leave a strong impression in  favor  of  CCTs.  Each
conference  was  held  much  longer  that  just  some  hours.  The  conferences  last
between three to four  days,  and one of  the days was nor about  discussions but
organized as a field trip where practitioners could see how an implemented CCT
looks like within the country. In consideration that a lot of countries were skeptical at
this time to set up cash based social protection programs those field trips can as well
be understood as advocacy for SCTs in general.  Summed up,  each of  the three
conferences was designed to deliver expertise, to raise the account of CCTs and to
leave  policy-makers  with  personal  impressions  gained  from  directly  made
experiences.
Finally,  I  want  to  emphasize  that  the  CCT  conferences  grew  in  size  in  a
tremendous pace and the countries were the conferences took place are the ones
that  received considerable  support  form the  World  Bank  and became lighthouse
country  examples in  the CCT debate.  The first  conference with  participants from
eight countries was small but the country were it took place was well chosen. With
Mexico as on of the pioneering countries with a program that included an education
and health condition it became a central reference in the following years. Just one
year after this conference Brazil turned in 2003 its scholarship program Bolsa Escola
into  Bolsa  Famila which  is  as  well  a  CCT  with  both  conditions.  Together  with
Mexico's  program  the  activities  of  these  two  countries  became  the  lighthouse
examples  for  developing  countries  that  have  been  able  to  set-up  an  effective
program  for  human  capital  development.  In  2004  the  second  conference  called
“Second International Workshop on Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs” took
place in  Brazil  and included a  field  trip  to  visit  Brazil's  program.  The number  of
participants of this conference had grown in this short time immensely. The Brazil
conference  had  100  participant  from  25  countries.  Again  “the  objective  of  this
workshop was to bring together practitioners and policymakers from established CCT
programs to share their experiences with one another, as well as with policymakers
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from countries currently setting up CCT programs” (World Bank Website 2004). This
time it was not just the World Bank organizing this event. The development agencies
of the United Kingdom as well as of Germany were already involved. I take this as a
signal  that  the  conference  already  began  to  become  recognized  in  the  global
development community.
“The  workshop  was  a  collaborative  effort  between  the  World  Bank  (the  Social
Protection  Units  of  the  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  Region,  the  Human
Development  Network  and  the  World  Bank  Institute),  the  U.K.'s  Department  for
International  Development  (DFID),  the  German  Technical  Agency  for  Technical
Cooperation (GTZ), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Brazil's
Bolsa Familia  Program,  and  the Municipality  of  São Paulo”  (World  Bank Website
2004).
In 2006 the third conference in Turkey was again much larger than the one before.
Around  375 participants  from 40 countries  joined the  conference.  Above that  18
international  development agencies and NGOs were present and the World Bank
made use of its instruments as a knowledge bank by streaming the whole conference
via internet. Around 1,600 further participants viewed the live-stream of the virtual
conference  (World  Bank  Institute  2006).  Being  able  to  increase  the  number  of
participants to this extent shows how much the interest in CCT increased at national
level as well as in the development community.
Conclusion
The World  Bank defined the conditional  cash transfer  (CCT) policy model  at  the
beginning of the 2000s. Reframing earlier national scholarship programs as “CCTs”,
the CCT policy model had already been part of policy developments at national level
in Latin America. In 2009 the World Bank published a book taking stock of all the
CCT programs worldwide and explaining the positive effects of CCTs especially on
poverty  reduction  and  investment  in  human  capital.  Moreover,  the  publication
presented a map ( figure 1) which showed a global spread of CCTs, a CCT wave of
policy diffusion. It seems that just in one decade the model spread throughout the
Global  South,  though mainly  in  Latin  America and only  partly  in  Asia,  while  it  is
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almost  absent  in Africa.  Especially  for  low-income countries CCTs are dif ficult  to
implement, because CCTs are highly demanding programs. Countries need a good
infrastructure and suf ficient schools and hospitals in place in order to make possible
that the people can comply the the conditions imposed to them. Besides the fact that
policy-making  is  a  dif ficult  process  which  takes  time,  information  and  political
coalitions  in  favor  of  a  particular  policy,  the  weak  infrastructure  within  many
developing countries is another factor that makes CCTs policies spread much slower
than suggested by the World Bank. 
Source: World Bank 2009
The attractiveness of CCTs was increased by major conferences which promoted the
policy model.  The number of participants of the conferences grew constantly with
Figure 1
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more and more national policy experts recognizing the CCT model. All the advocacy I
found  was  led  by  the  World  Bank  itself  and  portrayed  as  technical  advice  or
technocratic  workshops to  share  expertise.  This  does not  diminish the  normative
in fluence it has raising the awareness for CCTs, but it is striking how much the World
Bank tries to argue every point it  makes in rational  and scienti fic terms. It  is  not
enough for the World Bank just to raise the account for particular norms or pass
declarations of intent. Rather, the norm to invest in human capital as a reason for
tying the receipt of cash transfers to conditions is advanced through expertise and
advice.  The  World  Bank  presents  itself  as  a  hub  of  expertise.  The  major  CCT
conferences have shown that the World Bank can attract enough attention just by its
own activities without canvassing the case of CCT in the broader UN environment.
However,  the World  Bank's  activities are embedded in  broader  framework  of  the
development community through the Millennium Development Goals and the Social
Protection agenda. 
In the next chapter I argue that the World Bank's af finity to a cognitive mode of
in fluencing is even stronger at national level. The World Bank has shifted away from
its approach to impose particular policies to countries by providing loans with strings
attached. Instead the World Bank rather provides advice to national governments.
CCTs simply appear to be an appropriate model to help countries to improve the
targeting of social protection programs.
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2.3. Advice on National Institution-building:
       Partner for Development
While  the  World  Bank's  activities  at  the  global  level  have contributed to  a  trend
towards a broad spread of the policy model called CCT. This does not automatically
mean that  those ideas are  turned into national  programs in  the  countries  of  the
Global South. Workshops at the global level may stimulate a lot of activities, but the
introduction  of  such  a  program  depends  on  further  favorable  conditions  at  the
national level. Newly introduced small scale programs are constantly at risk of being
shut  down because of  changing priorities  of  the  national  governments  or  due to
fragile  national  budgets.  Thus,  I  found that  the World  Bank is  very active  at  the
national level – even more than at the level of global policy development – in order to
support  the  institutionalization  of  CCTs  as  being  a  permanent  and  integral
component of national social protection systems. Recently, the World Bank strictly
emphasizes  a  systemic  approach  to  social  protection  programs  in  developing
countries. Even though this focus had already been visible for quite some years, the
systemic  approach  manifested  at  highest  level  as  part  of  the  World  Bank's  new
second social protection sector strategy in 2012 (World Bank 2012). In the following I
unfold the World Bank's activities at national level on institution-building.
In  a  nutshell,  I  found three kind  of  activities  with  three different  strategies
which  all  support  the  institutionalization  of  CCTs  at  national  level  in  Southern
countries. First, the World Bank holds continuous country dialogues with countries. It
is an excellent tool influence the mindsets of national policy-makers in order to open
them up for the arguments which favor the introduction of CCT policy innovations.
Second, the World Bank has a direct approach to stimulate the introduction of CCTs
via  pilot  programs.  Before  a  country  rolls  out  a  cost  intensive  social  protection
program it might be useful to demonstrate in a test phase with a pilot program the
effectiveness of CCTs. Third, I found that the most important activity of the World
Bank  for  the  institutionalization  of  a  CCT  program  is  not  about  setting  up  new
programs  but  about  supporting  the  institutionalization  and  expansion  of  existing
“CCTs” - or CCT-like programs. This is plausible because due to multiple in fluences,
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countries try to implement different SCT programs in many cases. Yet, their survival
in changing political settings and political priorities is at risk. 
In my observation, with regard to the process of policy-making and program
introduction  the  World  Bank  attempts  'to  bring  something  in' by  influencing  the
mindsets of policy experts and decision-makers and by initiating pilot projects which
often can help to form a policy coalition in favor of CCTs. More importantly, the World
Bank focuses its activities  on the institutionalization of social programs through the
delivery of expertise and support that contributes to the institutionalization of CCTs.
In order to support the institutionalization of CCTs the World Bank supports that small
programs go to  scale (scaling-up),  that  the  quality  of  newly introduced programs
improves (improving targeting), that the program development is properly monitored
in order to convince the government of the programs effectiveness (monitoring &
evaluation),  and it  supports  that  existing CCT programs become the main social
protection  program of  the  country  (e.g.  by  motivation  the  country  to  remove  its
subsidies and allocate this cash to CCT programs).
Before I start the analysis I want to point out two things: First, the Bank has
privileged access to  the  government  and ministry  of  finance because one of  the
Bank's  core  business  still  is  lending.  “The  Bank’s  relationships  with  developing
countries often start and finish with financing as a central focus” (Marshall 2008:4).
Second,  the  World  Bank  often  engages  on  a  long-term  basis  establishing  tight
working-relationships with the ministries. The purpose of this behavior is in the first
place to ensure that the money of World Bank grants is spend in a sustainable way
that contributes to the countries growth so that the country will be able to pay back
the loan in the future.
“Early  expectations  were  that  the  lending  process  would  be  fairly  simple,  with
countries submitting loan applications and the World Bank assessing their viability.
However, in practice the Bank found itself in the business of helping shape project
proposals and, from the start, it saw itself as having responsibilities for judging how
well  projects  fit  country circumstances,  and how much they would contribute to a
country’s  economic  progress.  Early  operational  work  also  drew  attention  to  the
importance  of  managerial  skills:  development  was  not  simply  about  financing but
involved  the  full  battery  of  disciplines  and  skills  needed  to  make  projects  work.
Training  administrators  in  developing countries  thus  quickly  became an  important
Bank activity” (Marshall 2008:31).
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So  the  World  Bank  is  an  actor  with  privileged  access  and  long  term  working
relationships. Moreover, “the professionalism of its staff and its capacity for action,
especially in times of crisis, are widely admired” (Marshall 2008:7). Those features
are crucial prerequisites that make the Bank a little more than just one actor among
many, but gives it more weight so it becomes something like a development partner. I
would like to introduce the term 'development partner' because I think that this term
reflects the Bank's role quite well. A partner is someone engaging on a long-term
basis with privileged access to decision-making. In this case the World Bank delivers
for the contribution to the countries development expertise and advise to partners
with whom the Bank is connected via a lending/borrower relationship.
Before I start my analysis of the World Bank's strategies and instruments to
stimulate institutionalization of CCTs, I analyzed in how far the World Bank made use
of its CCT policy model within its advices at national level.
How is the World Bank's policy model used at national level?
As presented above, the CCT policy is designed to be a model that can easily be
understood and picked-up by policy-makers. The way the World Bank advocates this
model at global level is re flected in the Bank's way to in fluence at national level. As
described above, the World Bank does not advocate CCTs as a panacea, which
would be prone to critique; instead, the Bank provides an argumentation where as a
result of a conditional cash transfer has to be preferred to an unconditional one. In a
quite similar way the World Bank advocates CCT. It starts with a technical analysis to
answer the question what kind of cash transfer would be the most appropriate for the
particular country. The CCT suggestion, then, can be presented as a policy advice
after a technical analysis.  In the following I show further elements that follow this
technocratic approach. It seems to be very important to the Bank that it seems like
policy makers have act upon an informed decision.
It meets the eye that CCTs are very demanding programs which are not easy
to introduce as a low-budget version. To administer CCT programs involves relatively
high administration costs and efforts because the programs are not  universal  but
designed to help the poorest  of  the poor.  In  countries with  very fragmented and
incomplete  information  about  its  citizens  this  process  of  targeting  is  rather
complicated. Furthermore, the governmental bureaucratic system has to monitor if
recipients comply with the conditions imposed to them. This involves additional effort
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for the recipients who not just have to meet the conditions, like sending the kids to
school, attending health checkups or nutrition workshops, but have to get documents
that give proof of that as well. However, the most dif ficult precondition for developing
countries to introduce a CCT is that suf ficient infrastructure must exists. A suf ficient
number  of  schools  and  hospitals  in  a  good  quality  have  to  be  available  with
appropriate roads and transportation to get there. Those conditions are often missing
in developing countries. How is it possible that the Bank argues in favor of CCTs
against such a background?
Due to this rather complex prerequisites I found two strategies that facilitate
the introduction of CCTs. I present the  development approach of the World Bank
which  combines  the  Bank's  activities  supporting  the  general  development  of  the
country  (especially  the  education  and health  sector)  and the  speci fic support  for
CCTs. From this perspective the World Bank is preparing the advocacy for CCTs by
supporting  developing  countries  in  education  and  health  sector  first.  Moreover,  I
present the World Bank's strategy of technical advice which allows a government to
introduce a  low budget version of a CCT while at the same time the policy model
remains unchanged with regard to its demanding prerequisites. The main suggestion
of the World Bank is to design the targeting in such a way that only the poorest of the
poor are targeted where schools and hospitals are in reach. The more restrictive the
government  defines  extreme  poverty  and  the  more  schools  and  hospitals  are  a
prerequisite for the introduction of a CCT the smaller can be the program, because
only regions with schools and hospitals in place and in particular poor citizens living
there are included into this area targeting.
In this section I showed that the cognitive strategies about the CCT model
gives  governments  the  choice  to  decide  whether  to  introduce  a  CCT  or  not
(conditional  vs.  unconditional  programs),  helps  countries  to  be  prepared  for  the
introduction of a CCT (development approach), and to design the targeting in such a
way that the CCT can start as some kind of a small-scale pilot (advice on targeting).
In the following I investigate further the strategies of how the World Bank delivers its
policy model to the countries in the Global South and explain those aspects of the
development approach and the Bank's advice on targeting which motivates a country
to pick-up, design and institutionalize CCT programs. 
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Approach 1: In fluencing Mindsets through Country Dialogues
As mentioned above the World Bank decided early not just to provide loans but to
monitor the process of policy development as well,  and guiding this process with
advise and expertise. Therefor, I found it interesting that with most of the countries in
the Global South the World Bank holds a long term dialogue. This is the instrument to
continuously  harmonize  mutual  expectations.  While  the  countries  are  obliged  to
produce 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers' (PRSP) in order to explain to the Bank
what  kind  of  priorities  the  country  has  set  for  itself  to  stimulate  the  country's
development and economic growth, the World Bank produces 'Country Assistance
Strategies' (CAS) as an answer:
“The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) identi fies the key areas in which Bank Group
support can best assist a country in achieving sustainable development and poverty
reduction. It is the  central tool with which Management and the Board review and
guide the Bank Group’s support for the country’s development programs.  […] The
CAS starts from the country’s vision of its development goals, which may be set out in
a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) or other country-owned and -led strategy process.
The CAS describes the Bank’s diagnosis of the country’s development situation. The
CAS  is  grounded  in  a  results  framework  that  highlights  the  outcomes  that  are
expected from Bank support during the implementation period” (World Bank Website
2012; emphasis added).
The  World  Bank  itself  describes  this  instrument  as  'the  central  tool'  for  'guiding
support for the country's development program'. Though it is an instrument used by
the  Bank  to  give  advice  and  to  present  the  status  quo and  the  prospective
development of the country (re)formulated in the Bank's language, it is presented to
be for the most part  driven by the country itself.  The Bank merely  'supports and
assists a country' to realize 'the country's vision and country-led strategy'. It can be
assumed that in the CAS the policy priorities of both sides meet and it might be a
particular  characteristic  of  a  dialogue  that  it  is  to  a  certain  extent  unclear  who
influenced whom, and with  what.  I  understand the CAS as a type of  report  that
reflects the countries priorities from a World Bank's perspective. Moreover, the CAS
gives the Bank the opportunity to sketch what kind of development it foresees. The
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Bank uses CAS, on the one hand, to criticize particular developments (e.g. program
fragmentation;  too  low institutionalization  of  programs;  to  slow implementation  of
programs)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  outline  the  support  it  offers  to  assist  the
country.  Although  the  Bank  describes  that  its  CAS  “mirrors  the  government’s
development  goals”,  the  Bank  describes  Bangladesh’s  development  goals  as
“lessons from IDA’s recent assistance” (CAS Bangladesh 1998: 4). As an ideal type
of the country dialogue I describe it as a relationship of the World Bank providing
critique  on  and  support  for  particular  policy  developments,  and  nationally  made
lessons which policy makers take on board or react upon. In the following I present,
first, what I describe as the World Bank's development approach which is about the
timing of support, and, second, how the World Bank is using CAS deliver critique in
order to facilitate the introduction of CCT programs or to better institutionalize CCTs.
I consider critique as the main feature of the country dialogue. Even the development
approach is based on critiques of the development in the education and health sector
as I explain subsequently.
First of all, I found that the focus of the World Bank on the education sector
and health sector has a long tradition. The CAS in the 1990s already discuss the
progress in these sectors. Slowly at the beginning of the 2000s the topic of cash
transfers emerged in form of CCTs. From the perspective that already was focused
on education and health the creation of the CCT policy model make most sense,
because this model  can be seen as a supplementary program. All  parts together
( figure 2) contribute to the investment in human capital which is for the Bank a key
concept for stimulating economic growth and getting people out of poverty.  While
education and health are already established sectors, the idea of cash-based social
assistance is new for most countries in the Global South and, thus, absent or weakly
institutionalized. Due to the Bank's particular policy model of cash transfers based on
the condition of school enrollment and attended health check-ups the three sectors
are closely connected. And because education and health facilities are preconditions
for the introduction of CCTs it makes sense for the World Bank to continue with its
focused support  for  the development of  the education and health sector until  the
introduction of a CCT is possible.
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author's visualization, based on the Country Assistance Strategy Papers
I argue that the World Bank as a developing partner which engages on a long-term
basis,  responds  to  national  contexts  by  carefully  proofing  if  advocacy  for  CCT
programs  would  be  already  appropriate  or  if  first  needs  to  further  invest  in  the
education and health sector. This sensitivity to timing and the finding that the World
Bank is supporting only CCTs in CAS when the education and health sector is at a
certain  stage  of  development,  is  what  I  call  the  development  approach. This
approach is characterized by an organization's sensitivity for the current development
stage in order to make policy suggestions that take national conditions into account.
In  the  case  of  CCTs  it  means  that  at  least  a  suf ficient  number  of  schools  and
hospitals must exist before the suggestion of CCTs makes any sense. Understanding
that the World Bank is in the first place a bank that wants to sell loans as its main
product, it is easy to understand that such a development approach is advantageous
for the World Bank because if a country finds CCTs appealing it has to engage in a
multitude of program activities in the health and education sector in order to realize
CCTs. The Country Assistance Report for Guatemala in 2012 shows very clear that a
well-functioning CCT requires a whole package of measures implemented by the
government. In the CAS the Bank indicates the fields of action: 
Areas of Human Capital 
Investment
Education 
Sector
Health
Sector
Conditional Cash 
Transfers
Figure 1
74
“(i)  increasing  effectiveness  of  the  CCT  program  by  improving  institutional  and
implementation arrangements, including monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; (ii)
expanding access to quality education among the poor and indigenous; (iii) improving
and  expanding  access  to  health  and  nutrition  services,  with  a  special  focus  on
maternal and child health; and (iv) expanding services and investments in other areas
that would maximize the impact of the CCT program (i.e. rural roads, and electricity)”
(CAS Guatemala 2012:46). 
This package which is necessary for CCT implementation, is so broad that all the
activities for infrastructure development are part of CCT as well. The Bank provided a
loan  of  USD  220  million  available  for  ‘Rural  Infrastructure  and  Expanding
Opportunities: CCT’. So in the end the development approach of the World Bank is in
harmony with the organization's interests, because it delivers good arguments why
countries need even more loans. I found in many CAS that CCTs are discussed in
terms of  such  policy  packages.  Yet,  I  don't  want  to  let  the  Bank's  development
approach appear to be merely a marketing strategy to promote further loan-taking.
This might be true as well, but the development approach is also simply necessary to
establish the preconditions for a CCT introduction. In the African region for example
are almost no CCT programs at national level and the World Bank does also not
mention and suggest its introduction in its CAS for African countries. In contrast, in
Latin America the Bank does suggest and support CCT development quite strongly
for more advanced countries. Less developed countries in Latin America have to go
through certain stages first before the World Bank does suggest the introduction of a
CCT program. 
In Bolivia the Bank points out that the country is among the poorest in Latin
America with social indicators similar to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. According
to the Bank the reason for this is a “history of slow growth, limited investment in
human capital and high inequality” (CAS Bolivia 1998:1). As in most cases the Bank's
analysis  directly  refers  to  the education  and health  sector  for  potential  solutions,
because obviously so far investments in those sectors have been too low: “Poverty in
Bolivia is also directly associated with low levels of education, vulnerable health and
poor  nutrition  –  investment  in  human capital  has been below that  of  other  Latin
American countries” (ibid.). Thus, the Bank focused on rural infrastructure projects
and rural development strategies. In the following years the IDA of the World Bank
financed developments in the areas of health, education, and water and sanitation
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with  USD  20  million  in  2004  and  USD  17  million  loan  in  2008.  Bolivia  got  an
educational cash transfer in 2006 and another cash transfer program conditional on
health check-ups in 2009. This shows very well that a CCT is the next step when the
prerequisites have been met. 
If  a  country  reaches  the  point  that  the  health  and  education  sector  are
developed enough the Bank suggests CCT as a further instrument to increase the
investment in human capital. An example can be found in the CAS for Guatemala in
2008:
“The Poverty Assessment finds that  Guatemala’s  strong performance in delivering
services  over  the  past  six  years  suggests  that  further  progress  can  be  made to
improve what are still low levels of social indicators. [...] A conditional cash transfer
program could be an effective instrument in this context” (CAS Guatemala 2008:3).
According to the World Bank if the country's performance for health and education is
developed enough and social  indicators are still  low the remaining problem must
simply be the poor don't use this services enough. The Bank's brie fly describes this
problem as a 'demand-side problem' in contrast to too few schools and hospitals as a
'supply-side problem'. In Brazil the World Bank supported poverty reduction early with
loans of USD 1.5 billion for human capital formation and investments in infrastructure
(CAS Brazil  1995:13).  The  problem  the  Bank  mentioned  early  refers  to  both,  a
supply-side as well as a demand-side problem:
“Education and Safety Nets: Brazil is making relatively slow progress in improving the
poor quality of primary education.  In addition, there is evidence of low demand for
education among the poor and in rural areas. Repetition and school dropout rates are
among the worst in LAC, and highest for children in poor rural northeast areas. […] If
more rural children attended school and, for those who go to school, stayed in school
longer, they would be less likely to remain poor” (CAS Brazil 1995:28).
The early developed cash transfer program  Bolsa Escola was introduced together
with a fund and program called FUNDESCOLA to improve the performance of the
public education system in the poorest regions of Brazil (CAS Brazil 2000:23).
The development approach is about the timing when support  for  education
and health can switch to a support of CCT or when both has to be supported in
parallel. A final aspect which I want to mention is how the Bank handles with the
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uncertainty of development. In general, a CAS report is released at the beginning of
a new funding period.  In other  words,  even with  a development  approach in  the
background it is unclear to the World Bank when exactly a country will be ready for a
CCT. Thus, the Bank tries to take into account potential scenarios of the country's
further  development  for  its  lending  strategy.  Depending  on  certain  scenarios  the
World Bank has developed several lending cases (low, base, and high) which make
the availability of loans dependent on certain conditions which the country has to
meet in advance. Funding for certain policies are in the 'low case' and relatively easy
available while other loans are in the 'high case' and only available if the country has
developed to a certain degree. A demonstrative example of this lending strategy is
again visible in an early CAS for Brazil  in 1995. As stated in this report: If  Brazil
makes only little progress with reforms in order to stop inflation Brazil can just access
the loans made available in the low case which limits the loans available to USD 1.5
– 1.8 billion. In case Brazil can introduce reform that keep inflation below 35%, the
country is eligible for the base case and can access loans up to USD 4.2 billion. And
if Brazil even manages to keep in flation below 25% it can access up to USD 6 billion
through the high case. Depending on the progress made with its development, the
World Bank can regulate the amount of loans offered and choose the purpose the
money  can  be  spend  on.  Still  it  depends  on  the  general  level  of  the  country's
development if the Bank puts support for social protection policies and CCTs in the
low or high case for a country.  Countries like Brazil  get support  for programs on
poverty reduction already in the low case: 
“Lending in  the low case would  be limited to  US$1.5-1.8  billion  [...]  with  an anti-
poverty focus.  The program will  be focused on core anti-poverty needs in human
capital  formation and infrastructure, with rural  poverty loans, education and health
loans and water/urban development projects accounting for the overwhelming share
of lending” (CAS Brazil 1995).
In less developed countries like Paraguay for example the Bank offered support for a
CCT program when the conditions of the high case have been met. In the low case
the Bank supports such things as health and education reform, while the base case
already includes loans supporting social protection, and only the high case supports
CCTs. This proceeding of the Bank was due to its skeptical appraisal of Paraguay’s
development. The Bank literally says that it is “unlikely that Paraguay would enter the
high case until the latter years of the CAS period” (CAS Paraguay 2003:23). Overall
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the Bank thinks that the introduction of CCTs is “highly ambitious given Paraguay’s
current context” (CAS Paraguay 2003:34). The amount of loans for less developed
countries is also considerably smaller. The maximum amount available through the
high case is USD 425 million. Of that amount USD 100 million would be triggered
through the high case only and available for a whole bunch of policies. In the end
around USD 7 million would be for CCTs. Compared with other countries that receive
between USD 500 – 1000 million, a loan of USD 7 million is not that much. Yet, I just
wanted to show that the strategy of how to organize the lending is supporting my
argument that the World Bank's lending and engagement is sensitive to the context,
and, thus, follows a development approach.
The second aspect of the country dialogues which already came through in
the paragraphs above, is the Bank's opportunity to criticize via its CAS reports. The
World Bank does make use of this aspect for the sake of its development approach.
The  main  logic  of  the  development  approach  is  that  one  measure  to  support  a
particular social policy leads to the support of further measure supporting follow up
social policies. The introduction of CCTs is one major achievement to be pursued
and visible in the Bank's CAS. Yet, I will show that this again is a first step which
entails further support for these programs in order to make them stay, which means
to institutionalize them. In the following, I describe how the country dialogues point
out the necessity for a national government to strengthen the institutional focus on
conditional cash transfers.
Analyzing  the  Country  Assistance  Reports,  I  found  that  the  World  Bank
understands CCTs not so much as one program among others, but intends to see it
integrated in the country as the main social protection program. This does not mean
that the Bank does not support many other programs like non-contributory pensions
as well and it does as well accept other actors that advocate other policy innovations.
However, given the fact that program survival in developing country is continuously at
risk the World Bank prioritizes CCTs as the main program which the Bank would like
to see properly  institutionalized.  The main critiques of  the World  Bank towards a
country are that subsidies for particular products should be phased out and several
minor SCT programs introduced on a more ad hoc basis should be closed or merged
into one CCT flagship program.
In  Indonesia  the  World  Bank  directly  and  openly  suggests  “reallocating
savings  from  subsidies  towards  strategic  targeted  interventions  and  successful
implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers” (CAS Indonesia 2009:28). One the
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one hand, such suggestion is pretty much in line with the neoliberal agenda of the
World Bank which want to remove market distortions through subsidies anyways, on
the other hand, the removal of subsidies is used as an argument to the question
where the additional  funding for the introduction of a  SCT program should come
from. According to the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank in
Indonesia  “the  CCT implementation  has commenced on a pilot  basis  in  order  to
reduce  fuel  subsidies  and  to  redirect  the  savings  to  pro-poor  programs”  (IEG
2012:11). It seems that the same strategy was successful in Turkey which agreed to
test a 'direct income support program' in the year 2000; financed at the expense of
subsidies: “The shift  to direct income support is being accompanied by actions to
eliminate credit subsidies, phase out fertilizer subsidies” (CAS Turkey 2000:10). In
some cases the Bank's advice to phase out subsidies is connected with the Bank's
further critique with regard to the multiple small-scale SCT programs introduced on
an  ad hoc basis. In Argentina the Bank suggested to  “move away from a subsidy-
based approach to one more likely to build longer-term job creation” (CAS Argentina
2004:81). The World Bank offered a USD 30 million loans to support the plans of the
government  to  move to  long-term programs.  The new priority  of  the government
concerns the multiple other programs as well. The Argentine government considers
“to integrate the various existing income transfer programs (including the Heads of
Households  project)  into  a single coordinated and well-targeted conditional  cash-
transfer scheme” (CAS Argentina 2004: 105). It is obviously that the government was
considering  this  according  to  the  Bank’s  suggestions.  Interestingly,  Argentina's
workfare program was phased out  the next year (2005),  and instead the country
launched a CCT program in 2004 which was based on several minor CCT programs
the government has launched together with the 'Jefes y Jefas de Hogar' in 2002 as a
crisis response. In other countries like Bangladesh the World Bank was never really
successful  with  its  attempts  to  install  a  full-fledged  CCT  program.  Instead
Bangladesh got one scholarship program after another introduced in 1994, 2001 and
2004. In 2006 the Bank criticizes that the programs are an unrelated patchwork with
low benefit levels and very limited scale and coverage (CAS Bangladesh 2006:26). In
order to “address poverty or to mitigate vulnerability to poverty” in the short- or long-
term, appropriate safety nets have to be developed (ibid.). Yet, in 2011 such a state
was still not in reach so that the World Bank renewed its critique:
“Historically, Bangladesh has implemented an array of social safety net programs to
reach the ultra poor. At present,  the country has 31 social  protection programs in
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operation. This includes 13 cash transfer programs, 7 food transfer programs and 11
social  protection  funds.  Nonetheless,  coverage  is  low,  targeting  is  weak  and
government’s  planning  and  delivery  capacity  needs  signi ficant  strengthening.
[Moreover] The programs have a food support bias, adding to administrative costs
and increasing leakage possibilities” (CAS Bangladesh 2011:28).
In the end it  is  totally up to the national  government and ministries if  the overall
systemic policy framework will be strengthened and be focused on one program as
the main social protection flagship or if the country continues to run many programs
in parallel. In Chile the support of the World Bank seemed to have been successful.
The  CCT  Chile  Solidario was  introduced in  2002 and “signi ficantly  improved the
policy framework for poverty reduction and social protection” (CAS Chile 2007:77).
The Bank point’s out that it represents a “shift form the previous piecemeal approach
of separate, targeted social assistance and social insurance programs by combining
multiple services and cash transfers into  a new conditional  cash transfer  to poor
families” (ibid.).
In this section I presented one of the main instruments the World Bank uses to
in fluence national policy-making through advice, namely through country dialogues.
They  ensure  regular  interactions  and  a  kind  of  taking-stock  of  the  country's
development over long time-periods. Thus, the Bank does not recommend CCTs at
the time this  model  emerged within  the organization,  but  it  strategically  brings in
suggestions in favor of CCTs when the timing is right, what means that suf ficient
schools and hospitals are available in order to make school attendance and health
check-ups mandatory.  Moreover,  the World  Bank does not  need to wait  until  the
timing is  right  but  it  can work  towards  that  goal  by  concentrating to  support  the
education and health sector until  the countries meets all  the preconditions for the
introduction  of  a  CCT  program.  I  called  this  kind  of  long-term  thinking  and
responsiveness to the individual state of development of a country the World Bank's
development  approach.  Additionally,  I  argued that  the  Bank  is  using  the  country
dialogue to actively make recommendations and criticize the country's performance
on  social  protection.  The  critique  shows  that  the  Bank  actively  supports  the
sustainable  institutionalization  of  CCTs,  even  if  this  has  to  be  achieved  at  the
expense of other smaller programs and the termination of subsidy programs.
Even though I showed that the World Bank highlights those two aspects, it
remains unclear to what extent the country dialogues itself contribute to stimulate
policy-making in this direction. However, the Country Assistance Reports revealed
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some  part  pattern  of  the  Bank's  advocacy  (development  approach)  with
recommendations  and  critiques  as  its  core  elements  which  are  delivered  and
recognizable through CAS.
Approach 2: Introducing policy innovations through pilot projects
Among other instruments the World Bank sets up pilot projects in order to convince a
country of the viability of a CCT program in this country. I found that this instrument
rarely is used alone but in most cases in combination with other instruments like
monitoring & evaluation (more about that in the next section) and the availability of
loans (incentive-based in fluencing). It means that I cannot describe a pilot project so
much as an example per se installed in order to influence. Instead it is the coupling of
a pilot with evaluations which translate the pilot into a mean to in fluence. Available
loans have the function to provide an incentive for a country either to take on board
the idea of testing a pilot project or to scale up the pilot project later on when it has
created the necessary political will behind it.
Nicaragua is a good example of how essential political will is; not just for the
introduction of a CCT but as well for the continuance of such a program. In the year
2000 Nicaragua introduced a CCT program due to available funding through a loan
from  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  (IDB).  Though  this  program  was
regarded by  the international  community  as pretty  successful  in terms of  poverty
reduction and hasn't cost much of the public budget (around 4 per cent of the amount
the government spends on health and education) the new government that came to
power in 2006 discontinued the program (IADB 2002). As Charity Moore from the
International  Policy  Centre  for  Inclusive  Growth  (IPC-IG)  of  the  United  Nations
Development  Programme (UNDP)  explains:  the  reason for  the  discontinuance of
Nicaragua's social protection program Red de Protectión Social (RPS) was the lack
of  political  will.  The  example  shows  clearly  how  important  it  is  to  convince  the
government by presenting the positive impact through evaluations. Just to set up an
effective program is not enough.
“One former RPS of ficial put the programme’s ultimate collapse aptly. She said that
RPS’s greatest  weakness was its  failure  to educate domestic  stakeholders on its
components and positive impacts. There had been much skepticism about RPS from
its inception. Programme staff believed that, rather than wasting their time arguing
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with government of ficials, it would be more profitable to prove that the programme
could work. RPS staff did not ignore the public relations aspect of the initiative, but it
is  clear  that  the efforts  they made to educate the public  and politicians of  RPS’s
purpose, components and successes were inadequate” (Moore 2009:33f).
While  this  is  an  argument  to  the  necessity  of  monitoring  and  evaluations,  and
continuous dialogue with the national government, I want to point to the World Bank's
reaction to the discontinuance of the program in 2006. Apparently the Bank quickly
established new contacts to the political government which was new in of fice. With
funding from the British development agency DFID, the Bank introduced four different
CCT pilot projects. This time the World Bank clearly points out that “a rigorous impact
evaluation will monitor economic and social results” (CAS Nicaragua 2007:84). The
combination of the strategic use of pilot project in combination with monitoring and
evaluations is very obvious in this case. 
In several countries pilot projects signify the start of a CCT country program.
Program implementation in general has to be understood as a gradual process which
can take several years. This holds in particular true for developing countries where
programs  can  start  rather  small  and  their  institutionalization  depends  on  the
program's survival in the initial period. For example in  Turkey, Argentine, Panama
and Indonesia the of ficial program introduction coincides with World Bank supported
pilot projects. Turkey got a pilot project for a direct income support program in 2000
and set up a CCT program in 2001. In 2004 the Bank provided a USD 30 million loan
for a pilot  in order to support the government of Argentine to move to long-term
programs. Argentine of ficially introduced a CCT program in the same year. Before
Indonesia got  its  CCT program in  2007 the government  decided to  make a pilot
project  in  2006.  The  CAS claims  that  this  pilot  was  an  outcome  of  the  country
dialogue between the Bank and the Indonesian government in the last five years.
The World Bank supported as well the design of Panama's CCT program. As a result
the country got a full-fledged CCT program in 2006. The report says that Panama's
administration  chose  to  prioritize  to  make  investments  in  human  capital  and
“introduced a flagship targeted conditional cash transfer program coupled with the
continued expansion of pre-school education, primary health care and nutrition and
basic infrastructure, especially in poor and indigenous areas” (CAS Panama 2007:8).
The World Bank supported “to design the targeting mechanism and pilot initiative of
the CCT program, in addition to assessing the targeting ef ficiency of current social
assistance initiatives” (CAS Panama 2007:42). As a final example, in 2002 the World
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Bank developed in the Philippines a “pilot income support  system for the poorest
families conditional on their children's regular school attendance and participation in
critical social services” (CAS Philippines 2002:25). However, the pilot itself was not
in fluential for a long time, unless finally, seven years later the World Bank offered
considerable financial resources (about USD 400 million) in order to scale up the
CCT pilot (CAS Philippines 2009:16). Additionally the Bank's support is connected
with the provision of expertise. To improve the targeting of the CCT the Bank will
“support  the  improved  design  and  operation  of  a  well-functioning  CCT  program”
(CAS Philippines 2009:19). The Philippines began to implement their CCT program
in 2008 receiving the financial support for the scaling-up in 2009.
This section should have shown that pilot projects are an important instrument
to initiate and in many cases it turned out to be a pretty effective instrument because
it  contributed to  stimulate  the  introduction  of  national  CCT programs.  However,  I
argued as well that in many cases pilot project do not turn out to be in fluential per se
but they need to be actively supported from the World Bank with financial resources,
monitoring and evaluations, and continuous dialogues with the government. 
Approach 3: Supporting national policies 
& institution-building through technical advice
While the last section showed that in some cases the World Bank uses pilot projects
as an instrument to get a CCT program in, I already gave some examples of the
World Bank's further instrument to provide technical advice in order to make the CCT
program stay. Technical advice can also be used for initiation of a political debate,
like when it  is used to argue the feasibility of CCTs in the country's context or to
provide advice on how to set up a CCT; however, in most cases I found that pilot
projects  are  used  to  make  a  start  or  the  country  started  a  program for  several
unknown reasons –  like being inspired by neighboring countries for example – and
the  World  Bank  is  providing  its  technical  advice  to  help  the  country  scaling  up
existing programs. From this perspective technical advice is mostly used 'to make
sth. stay', what means that the World Bank contributes to the program's survival and
institutionalization.
In the following, I explain how the World Bank can use advice on targeting to
cognitively adjust the CCT model in order to facilitate the program's introduction. This
is a strategy 'to get a program in'. After explaining the potential for in fluencing via
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technical  advice  concerning  the  targeting  I  explain  the  importance  of  (economic)
crisis  in order  to stimulate further  demand for technical  expertise from the World
Bank. After these aspects of how to get a program in I continue to explain in how far
technical advice is used 'to make the CCT program stay'.
As  mentioned  above  the  CCT  model  is  demanding  and  it  is  not  much
adjustment  possible  in  order  to  make  the  program's  introduction  more  likely.
However, the Bank's advice on targeting entails a strategy of how the World Bank
tries to tailor its policy model to national contexts. The most crucial point that would
stop a government from introducing a CCT is when the costs for the introduction are
too high. The other way round it is an incentive for the CCT introduction if a program
can be started small-scale and expanded progressively.  The Bank's  approach to
make the CCT introduction more appealing in this regard is to design the criteria for
the programs targeting in such a way that a low budget and small-scale version can
be  set  up.  This  can  be  achieved  through  the  means-tested  approach  of  CCTs.
Designed to cover just the poorest of the poor the access to CCTs can be rather
restrictive.  Due  to  missing  census  data  about  the  citizens  in  many  developing
countries  the  World  Bank suggests  to  organize  the targeting  of  CCTs via  proxy-
means-tests. Proxy-means-tests allow to omit the actual means-test by focusing for
the introduction of a CCT only on regions where most people are below the poverty
line. The drawback of this method is that is exclude many people living in poverty that
with a proper means-test would be eligible for a cash transfer. On the other hand, the
government can easily test this new program called CCT in some region(s) only and
evaluate later if the CCT can go to scale or not. The advocated targeting mechanism
of CCTs can be even more restrictive, yet better match with the preconditions of
CCTs of  good access  to  the  education  and health  system.  In  the  2004  flagship
publication the Bank already suggested to design the geographical targeting in such
a way that only such areas are included that have a high share of people living in
extreme poverty and in a region where suf ficient schools and hospitals are in reach.
That shrinks the target group again and excludes people that are in extreme poverty
and,  on  top  of  that,  have  not  enough  social  services  like  schools  and  hospitals
available. However, this restricted targeting reduces the costs of the program and
allows  the  government  to  introduce  a  CCT  although  in  a  strict  sense  suf ficient
services are not available yet. Progressive expansion of the CCT would mean in this
case that the government can in parallel to the already introduced CCT continue to
invest in its infrastructure (schools, hospitals, electricity, roads, etc.). New regions to
the geographical targeting can be included step by step. Without much detail I found
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that the World Bank is offering support and/or critique with regard to the targeting in
almost every report. Though it is unclear to what extent in each case the Bank has
made use to the strategy as explained above.
The World Bank seems to have most  credibility  in  times of  crisis  because
countries listen carefully in order to get advice and loans that increase the countries'
development. Colombia, which became for the Bank an important country to facilitate
South-South-Cooperation,  might  be a good example of  how CCT has helped the
country to manage its macroeconomic crisis. Colombia introduced its CCT program
in 2001, set up in reaction to the macroeconomic crisis in 1999. The Bank used its
support via a project called ‘Human Capital Development Project’ “to help Colombia
protect its most vulnerable and meet the MDG target of reducing the proportion of
people living in extreme poverty, the Bank is providing support to promote a major
revamping  of  the  system”  (CAS  Colombia  2002:30).  The  Bank's  support  was
designed to help coping with the crisis and is advertized as such:
“Colombia  never  really  had  a  formal  social  safety  net,  something  that  became
painfully clear during the unprecedented macroeconomic crisis of 1999.  In response
to that crisis, a temporary  five-year  Social  Support Network was created to  fund
temporary  employment conditional  cash transfers to poor families and firm-based
apprenticeship grants for youth” (CAS Colombia 2002:15). 
Installing CCTs as a coping mechanism and to increase the resilience of a country in
times of crisis seems to be part of a larger and more often used argumentation. In the
follow up report in 2008 the program of 2001 is described as highly successful and
innovative. Positive evaluations of the countries CCT program help to increase the
attention Colombia receives by others. The country quickly could be established as a
central figure for horizontal diffusion:
“Colombia hosted a study tour to share the design of their Conditional Cash Transfer
program  with  countries  as  diverse  as  the  Philippines  and  Ecuador.  Similarly
Colombia’s Social  Targeting System is being replicated in the Dominican Republic
and Ecuador” (CAS Colombia 2008:27).
Another example is El Salvador where the World Bank already provided advice  on
poverty reduction according to three pillars: economic growth, better access to social
services (especially basic education), and social safety nets. The Bank’s priorities are
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already impressively in line with the expected effects of CCTs: Safety nets should
( first) alleviate the most vulnerable in the short-term, and (second) enable the poor to
take advantage of economic opportunities by improving the access to basic services
like  pre-primary  and  primary  education,  basic  health  and  nutrition  (cf.  CAS  El
Salvador 1997:41). The CAS for El Salvador in 2001 entails the same three pillar
strategy of 1997. Furthermore, the dominant topics are earthquakes and earthquake
emergency reconstruction. The CAS in 2005 clearly points out that in the aftermath of
the  earthquake  the  government  from El  Salvador  requested  technical  assistance
(AAA) from the World Bank. The Bank made a Poverty Assessment with two parts: 
“(i) analysis of poverty in El Salvador and policy advice on how to improve the impact
of social policy and social sector spending; and (ii) analysis of vulnerable groups and
of  existing  programs  to  confront  vulnerability,  and  recommendations  on  how  to
strengthen the country’s social safety net” (CAS El Salvador 2005:32). 
The first assessment puts El Salvador’s current programs to a test and the second
part basically suggests how to change policies and suggests what innovations might
be useful to be implemented. The Bank produced two policy notes called “Poverty
and  Social  Expenditures”  and  “Elements  to  Strengthen  the  Social  Safety  Net”.
Following in 2006 the Bank announced a “Social Protection and Local Development
Project” in order to implement a “social safety net targeted to the poorest and most
vulnerable families in the country” (CAS El Salvador 2005:47). The CCT program
“Red Solidaria” was implemented in the same year, 2005, and additionally supported
with a loan of USD 35 million. The Bank describes itself  as a key partner in the
design and implementation of Red Solidaria. The report indicates that evaluations
and  sharing  international  best  practice  have  contributed  to  the  programs
implementation as well (CAS El Salvador2009:41).
Both  examples  show  how  ongoing  technical  assistance  can  effectively
contribute to the introduction of CCT programs. A crisis can be the trigger that finally
translates  provided  advice  into  action.  In  a  next  step  I  show that  arguments  on
targeting can also be combined with monitoring, evaluations, advice and support on
scaling up of existing (pilot) programs. Assuring the survival of regional programs and
facilitating the programs extension and institutionalization nationally the World Bank
actively contributes to the global diffusion of CCTs.
In many countries, especially in developing countries, program implementation
can take several years and the extension and scaling-up of existing programs is far
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from sure. Thus, I found many activities of the World Bank directed to contribute to
the  implementation  of  program initiatives.  However,  it  is  dif ficult  to  provide  clear
examples showing only the in fluence of technical advice in this regard because in
many cases the technical advice comes in combination with financial support in form
of loans. After Turkey got its direct income pilot in 2000 and introduced a CCT in
2001 the Bank made several loans available as well. In 2003 the CAS highlighted
targeting  as  a  main  issue;  in  the  report  the  World  Bank  criticized  the  overall
performance of the CCT's targeting and offered support for the improvement of it.
Efforts on scaling-up and targeting go hand in hand: “A Conditional Cash Transfer
system has been tested and is ready to roll out, with a scoring formula for careful
targeting  to  the  poorest  6  percent”  (CAS  Turkey  2003:4).  Moreover,  improved
targeting  is  also  part  of  the  Bank's  call  for  a  more  substantial  reform  of  the
institutional framework. The evaluation of the institutional framework does explicitly
include the education and health sector, what shows that they are considered to be
part of the institutionalization of CCTs: 
“Substantial,  sustainable improvements have been made in basic education. Targeting has
improved for social welfare for the poorest, but the system needs more funding and a stronger
institutional  framework.  A second stage social  security  reform is  needed to rationalize the
institutional  framework,  extend  coverage  and  restore  financial  balance.  Health  outcomes
remain poor for  a middle income country,  particularly for  maternal mortality”  (CAS Turkey
2003:9). 
The quotation shows that institutionalization is important for the World Bank. Though
loans  do play a crucial role the Bank's activities of monitoring and advice can be
considered in fluential as well.  The Bank's instrument to provide technical advice is
called by the Bank itself 'Analytical and Advisory Assistance' (AAA). It shows that all
analytical efforts like monitoring and evaluations go together with activities to advice.
Providing advice of how to target a program or how to scale a program up is a form
of influencing; especially when countries are not yet decided whether to keep this
program or not. The provision of evaluations at this point contributes to motivate the
government or ministry to think about the further development of the program. When
advice on CCTs is coupled with advice to reduce subsidies, the advice suggests to
expand CCTs at the cost of other programs. In the following, I want to present some
country examples for the importance of technical advice for scaling-up and a better
institutionalization of CCTs. 
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I  already mentioned in the section about pilot projects that the World Bank
supported the 'pilot initiative' in Panama with technical advice. Advice on Panama's
overall development already  highlighted the importance of a continuous expansion
of education and health facilities in order to invest in human capital. Based on this
advice a CCT appears to be an appropriate policy choice. While AAA measures of
the Bank helped to design the program especially with regard to the targeting of the
program, technical advice played also a role for the continuance to the program: 
“The planned FY09 [Financial Year 2009] Poverty Assessment will help to  analyze
the  effectiveness of  interventions.  A  follow-on  project will  be  prepared  in  FY10
[Financial Year 2010] to further strengthen the program with the new Government and
broaden social assistance reform” (CAS Panama 2007:42; emphasis added)
Advice for the continuous improvement of the CCT and follow-on projects help to
expand and better institutionalize the CCT program. In the CAS some years later the
World  Bank  criticizes  that  the  actual  size  of  the  CCT  program  “is  limited  when
compared  to  the  amount  of  eligible  extreme  poor  households”  (CAS  Panama
2010:32).  Thus,  the  Bank  advices  to  build  a  'management  information  system
monitoring the CCT'. Moreover, the CCT program appears to be a support for the
country's  social  protection  framework  because  CCTs  are  so  connected  with
education and health. Those two issue areas are not just prerequisites. Due to the
Bank's  advice  CCTs  also  appear  to  be  a  contribution  to  improve  targeted
interventions in the education and health sector: “The support in health and nutrition
is  utilizing  the  CCT  infrastructure  to  better  target  interventions”  (CAS  Panama
2010:74). In sum, the World Bank  is very clear about its influence stemming from
technical advice:
“In Panama, the World Bank Group can be very effective when it concentrates on the
delivery  of  a  mix  of  lending,  technical  assistance,  private  sector  support  and
knowledge products. The experience in Panama shows that the Bank’s relevance is
ampli fied  when  the  delivery  of  lending  operations  is  supported  by  knowledge
products. In turn, technical operations must continue to strengthen their focus on the
development  of  high quality  designs that  incorporate lessons from experiences in
other countries, as has been done in the CCT where Panama absorbed lessons from
other programs and went on to build one of the best targeted programs in the LAC
region.  […]  A  strong  AAA  program  has  also  helped  contribute  to  the  design  of
88
Development Policy Lending which has proven to be a useful instrument in Panama
in support of key Government priorities” (CAS Panama 2010:16).
The quotation not only shows that the World Bank considers technical assistance as
an important and effective instrument to in fluence, it also shows that the delivery of
'lessons' and 'best practices' from other countries play a role like I have found several
examples of the importance of South-South-Cooperation which in many cases was
facilitated through the World Bank's activities of technical assistance. Examples of
South-South-Cooperation facilitated by the World Bank include for example Brazil,
Colombia, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Together with other development banks the
World  Bank  actively  supports  South-South-Cooperation  to  stimulate  CCT
implementation:
“The Bank and IDB have also been jointly providing technical support to the social
program  'Mi  Familia  Progresa,' and  plan  to  maintain  the  usual  cooperation  and
coordination arrangements used in the past,  i.e.,  financing different activities or  in
different geographic areas. South-South cooperation has been and will be promoted
through sharing of experiences (including visits to successful programs in the region).
Signi ficant  examples  include  conditional  cash  transfers  and  fiscal  reform”  (CAS
Guatemala 2008:50). 
Event though I present much more examples of the Bank's influencing via technical
assistance. I want to point out that technical advice not necessarily is successful.
Pakistan is an example where advocacy for CCT via technical advice fizzled out over
the years. In 2006 the Bank offered to assist Pakistan to develop safety nets and “to
help the poor  escape poverty,  e.g.  via  conditional  cash transfers”  (CAS Pakistan
2006: 31). Therefore, the Bank delivers technical assistance for policy formulation as
well as for policy implementation: 
“Technical assistance will include support for strategy development, design of new
social  protection  interventions  (workfare,  demand-side  incentives  for  health  and
education [CCT],  etc.),  program implementation,  e.g.  improved targeting  methods,
administration, and evaluation” (ibid).
Though Pakistan received so much technical assistance the country only renewed its
already existing stipend program and introduced some new stipend programs only as
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a pilot project. In 2010 the CAS reports that “the Government has already piloted
several  CCTs  to  improve  schooling  outcomes  of  primary  and  secondary  level
children” (CAS Pakistan 2010:28). Though this is not no success at all, it falls behind
the  World  Bank's  suggestion  of  a  CCT  program.  The  next  report  on  Pakistan's
development in 2011 does not even mention CCTs any more. Instead the Bank re-
focused on the education sector. In Morocco the World Bank also merely focused on
the education  sector  and supported  the development  of  an 'Education-CCT'  with
evaluations. Despite its effectiveness to stimulate CCT implementation the Bank is
very clear about its usage of  'Analytical and Advisory Assistance' as a 'vehicle for
advocacy':
“AAA. The importance of the knowledge role of the Bank to inform reforms and
the  accompaniment  of  reform  implementation  through  TA  [Technical  Assistance],
capacity  building  and  policy  dialogue is  a  key  aspect  of  the  partnership  with  the
country. The approach of the Bank has been to carry out strong AAA that underpins
dialogue and advocacy in many sectors, and then builds up the Bank's engagement
to DPL [Development Policy Loan] or investment financing once the sectoral reform
programs are well designed, fully costed and with relevant objectives and indicators in
place.  In  several  cases,  the  Bank's  AAA program has encompassed cutting-edge
work and  provided an excellent vehicle for advocacy of critical issues - addressing
youth  exclusion,  social  protection  reform,  poverty  analysis,  governance  issues,
scaling  up  innovative  service  delivery  approaches  such  as  Conditional  Cash
Transfers (CCT), competitiveness, labor market issues - so the Bank is well placed to
partner with the Government in these areas” (CAS Morocco 2012:9; ).
The success of this influencing via AAA depends on many conditions but increases
the probability that national programs are scaled up and continued nevertheless. In
the case of Nicaragua which I already mentioned the delivery of AAA was left out
which  showed  the  effectiveness  of  the  CCT  program  and  argued  for  its
institutionalization. As a consequence political support was weak and with a change
in government the CCT program was discontinued. As described above the World
Bank  reacted  with  the  support  for  several  pilot  projects  which  were  than
accompanied by evaluations. The Nicaragua case shows how important the Bank's
activities  on  monitoring,  evaluation  and  advice  can  be.  Thus,  it  is  not  to
underestimate that in cases like Peru the World Bank began activities on monitoring
and evaluation because the extension of the national CCT program stagnated. In
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Peru for example the Bank decided seven years after the programs introduction to
support  the  implementation  process  with  technical  assistance.  After  the  CCT
introduction in 2005 the Bank criticized the low level  of  social  protection and the
inadequate access to public services such as health care and education (CAS Peru
2006:4).  The  Bank  offered  technical  assistance  and  long-term  plan  in  order  to
improve  public  services.  In  2012  the  Juntos CCT program was  still  criticized  its
incoherence and ineffectiveness with low coverage and spending levels (CAS Peru
2012:10).  Thus,  the Bank decided to  support  the impact  of  the  program with  an
overall  monitoring  and  evaluation  system for  Peru's  social  programs  (CAS  Peru
2012:20).
The  examples  show  how  technical  assistance  of  the  World  Bank  is  a
connection  of  monitoring  mechanisms  with  the  delivery  of  advice  which  either
criticizes the current state of the CCT implementation and encourages to improve the
program's performance, or the advice of the Bank praises the effectiveness of the
CCT program and encourages to scale the program up and better institutionalize it. 
Conclusion
In this chapter I showed that the World Bank's policy model of CCTs is a normative
and cognitive model.  The basic  parameters  of  this  model  –  the conditionality  on
school attendance and health check-ups – are dif ficult to modify, so either a countries
implements a CCT or not. Yet, the Bank can still include some modi fication of the
model  and  make  some  kind  of  a  low-budget  version  out  of  it  by  designing  the
targeting more broadly or more focused on the poorest of the poor. The latter version
would target only certain areas of a country when the number of people living in
extreme poverty is high and schools and hospitals are available. Another strategy is
the Bank's 'development approach' which is an underlying strategy of the World Bank
to approach developing countries and advocate CCTs only if a country has reached a
certain development level. As a consequence the World Bank is rather silent about
CCTs  in  African  countries  because  most  of  those  countries  still  have  particular
dif ficulties to offer suf ficient public services like schools and hospitals. 
With  most  of  the  countries  the  World  Bank  has  established  longer-term
relations via country dialogues. This dialogues keep the Bank up-to-date about the
countries development,  plans and priorities. The Bank can follow its development
approach and make suggestions accordingly. The World Bank can criticize the lack
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of adequate education and health-care facilities or the performance of those sectors
and  engage  in  longer-term  projects.  If  the  country  has  already  established  the
preconditions for a CCT program the World Bank can continue to criticize poorly
performing social  protection programs. If  the the first  step is done and a country
introduced  a  CCT  social  protection  program,  the  Bank  tries  to  get  the  program
institutionalized and supports  it  in  order  to  guarantee the  programs survival  in  a
fragile  context.  The  Bank  considers  CCTs  to  be  the  flagship  social  protection
program of  a country and expects smaller already existing programs – especially
subsidies – to be phased out in favor of CCTs.
The process of in fluencing is accompanied by technical assistance and advice
services of the World Bank which help the country to implement a CCT program. If
the country agrees to invest in social protection programs that fight poverty and are
an investment in human capital at the same time but not necessarily to CCTs the
Bank can make a start by offering support for the implementation of a pilot project.
Often a (economic or natural) crisis hitting a country is a good entry point for the
implementation of pilots. The necessary of monitoring and positive evaluations by the
World  Bank  of  the  effectiveness  of  programs  is  crucial  in  order  to  mobilize  the
political support for the scaling up of the program. The same is important for already
implemented CCT programs because such programs can remain rather small and
underfunded  for  quite  some years  in  developing  countries.  Technical  support  for
scaling up the program is often an important measure. However, in most cases it is
not technical support only that convinces policy-makers but the Bank offers cash via
loans  as  an  additional  incentive.  In  the  next  chapter  I  provide  more  details  on
incentives used by the World Bank in order to facilitate national institution-building. If
finally a CCT project is introduced and on its way to be the main social protection
program of the country as part of a social protection system including education and
health, the Bank mobilizes evaluations which are coupled with advice as a strategy
used  by  the  Bank  for  advocacy  on  CCTs  in  order  to  facilitate  the  process  of
institutionalization  and to  share  the  positive examples  and evaluations with  other
countries.  South-South-Cooperation  becomes  an  interesting  additional  tool  for
in fluencing, because the World Bank can guide a process of learning from a peer
group  and  use  first  successes  with  a  CCT  policy  elsewhere  to  advocate  the
implementation in further countries.
In  sum,  the  three  approaches  to  national  institutionalization  and
implementation add up to the World Banks's construction of CCT as a global model
as well as an encompassing strategy that harnesses the normative in fluence of the
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CCT model and the Bank's ability to in fluence via financial incentives. Especially the
long-term  relations  and  the  ongoing  country  dialogue  helps  to  translate  policy
suggestions to national contexts.
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2.4. Incentives for National Institution-Building:
       Loan Provision 
Despite its global advocacy, country dialogues and technical advice, the World Bank
has  the  ability  to  influence  and  motivate  countries  to  take  up  a  certain  policy
innovation by offering large amounts of money in form of loans. The World Bank's
loans are an offer that countries might take or reject according to the country's own
priorities. Thus, receiving a loan is considered to be an incentive for countries and
not to be means of coercion like some scienti fic literature might suggest. For some
developing  country  which  depend  on  the  acquisition  of  new  funding  in  order  to
ensure the countries survival the option to reject a loan might be remote and though
policy  suggestions  by  financial  institutions  may  appear  as  quasi-compulsory.
However, the World Bank only provides loans to countries that are credible and able
to pay back the loan in the forthcoming years. Those countries are potentially in the
position to reject a loan offer. Latin American countries which where able to benefit
from the economic growth are good examples of  how fast  the self-confidence of
governments in the Global South can grow. For countries with tight public budgets
and a low level of development the IDA of the World Bank provides loans. Those
loans are smaller than the loans of the IBRD but they have no interests and allow
countries to pay back the loan over a long time period. With this double-structure the
Bank can provide funding for a range of countries as an incentive to implement or to
extend social protection programs according to the policies advocated by the World
Bank. In the following I will shed some light on the World Bank's lending activities to
support CCT program development.
Most interactions between the World Bank and countries start and end with
the Bank's lending activities. Lending is important for the start of country dialogues. In
most  cases  the  interactions  do not  end quickly  but  continue  over  years  of  even
decades. Moreover, often policy-making in one area involves other areas as well, so
that  a  reform might  be  in  fact  the  trigger  for  a  bunch  of  follow-up  reforms.  The
Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) are a good example for this kind of long-term
cooperation and it becomes clear in these CAS that all other activities of the Bank
circle around the Bank's lending activities. However, that does not necessarily mean
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that lending is the most in fluential instrument of the World Bank, even though it is an
important one.
It is dif ficult to trace in each CAS report in how far the World Bank supported
CCTs and how much money the Bank made available for policy-making on CCTs.
Due to the Bank's development approach the World Bank often provides most of its
funding for the education and health sector. Like in the case of Turkey where the
Bank first introduced a pilot project for direct income support in order to eliminate
credit subsidies. The Bank advised to expand this program and combined that advice
with proposing large investments for education and health. The Bank provided USD
100 million for health, USD 300 million for basic education, and USD 175 million for
secondary education. These loans came together with a USD 112 million loan for
social assistance. All this support in the year 2000 and in the following years mark
the start  of Turkey's CCT program which of ficially started in 2001. In the case of
Guatemala  the  Bank  also  continued  its  financial  support  for  investments  in
infrastructure measures in order to support the implementation of the CCT program.
This  example  makes  also  clearly  visible  the  connection  between  funding  for
infrastructure measures and CCT development. The Bank made a loan of USD 220
million available for 'Rural Infrastructure and Expanding Opportunities: CCT' (CAS
Guatemala  2012).  Loans  are  also  a  tool  for  the  Bank  to  purposely  change  the
priorities of the government. In the Dominican Republic the Bank provided loans over
the years primarily for the education sector. Already in 1995 the Bank criticized the
Dominican Republic for the low enrollment rates of children in primary schooling and
engaged  in  a  ten-year  plan  for  education  providing  a  loan  of  22  million  (CAS
Dominican Republic 1995). In the next period from 1999 on the Bank provided USD
67 million for education. The focus on education might be explained by the World
Bank's concern that the Dominican Republic is “very far from developing an adequate
safety net system” (CAS Dominican Republic 1999). In 2001 the country introduced a
scholarship program and in 2005 a full-fledged CCT with an education and health
condition. In 2005 the World Bank provided a USD 50 million loan to support the
introduction of the CCT. The money was considered to be for household surveys and
the development of a database that would support the targeting of the CCT. While
the Bank concentrated on CCT development other donors continued the support for
the education system. While the World Bank provided a USD 42 million loan for early
childhood  education,  the  European Union continued  the  support  for  the  ten-year
education plan with USD 54 million and the IDB invested USD 200 million for primary
and secondary education. Although it is not speci fiable how the support of the World
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Bank continued  I  found a clear statement that the World Bank used its loans to
continue its advocacy for CCTs. The Bank devoted the largest share of its lending in
2011 of USD 370 million for a 'development policy loan' which “seeks to promote and
consolidate  a  major  shift  in  government's  social  sector  priorities  and  capacities
towards human capital formation” (CAS Dominican Republic 2011:1). The examples
highlight the importance of the education sector because often a scholarship program
precedes the introduction of a full fledged CCT. Moreover, the loans can be important
for the introduction of a CCT as well as for the expansion and scaling-up of them.
In countries like Honduras the World Bank supported the new set-up of a CCT
from its inception. The Bank's 'Social Protection Project' built on experiences such as
Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil and helped to develop the CCT
of Honduras. For this purpose the Social Protection Project included a loan of USD
43 million. In Chile the Bank also provided a 'Social Protection Adjustment Loan' of
USD 200 million and an additional 'Social Protection Technical Assistance Loan' of
around USD 11 million. According to the World Bank this might have helped to get
the CCT program approved by the Chilean congress in 2004. In the following the
Bank combined this support with continued impact evaluations of the CCT program
Chile  Solidario (CAS Chile  2007:39).  In  other  cases the  Bank contributed  to  the
scaling-up of existing pilot programs facilitating the introduction of a proper country-
wide CCT. In the Philippines the World Bank extended its support for the CCT pilot
dramatically:  “The  planned  loan  amount  in  support  of  the  CCT  program  was
increased  from  US$50  million  to  US$405  million”  (CAS  Philippines  2009:16).
Furthermore,  the Bank planned to  improve the targeting and design of  the CCT.
Again the combination of loans and technical expertise is noticeable. 
Also major country examples that served in the decade from the year 2000
onwards as lighthouse examples, like Brazil, were massively supported financially by
the World Bank. The short story would be that the Brazilian government introduced
its CCT program Bolsa Familia in 2003 while the World Bank provided a supporting
credit of USD 570 million and additionally the IDB provided a credit of USD 1 billion.
All  this support  was for the new sector-wide approach of the World Bank for the
Brazilian social assistance. However, Brazil's CCT program had precursors in 2001
with an education CCT and health CCT in parallel and a scholarship introduced in
1996. For the lending period after 1996 the World Bank already made a loan of USD
1.5  billion  available  for  human  capital  and  infrastructure  measures  (CAS  Brazil
1995:13). As already mentioned this loan went along with strong criticism of Brazil's
education system. Like in other  countries the Bank made a ten-year plan for  the
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development of the education sector. In the year 2000 the Bank financed the scaling-
up of Brazil's Bolsa Escola with USD 1.3 billion. It becomes visible that before every
major reform in Brazil the World Bank made several hundreds of millions available.
The World Bank rarely engages in Africa with high financial investments. Many
African countries have dif ficulties to take up the idea of  CCTs, either  for  cultural
reasons  or  because  the  country  cannot  meet  the  necessary  infrastructural
preconditions. Kenya is one of the few examples were the Bank was engaged. In the
CAS of 1998 the Bank criticized the “lack of broad-based safety net programs for
vulnerable groups” (CAS Kenya 1998:3) and mentioned that Kenya is characterized
by a communal self-help system called Harambee. The CAS in 2004 mentioned that
the World Bank supported the education and health sector massively together with
the UN, EU, and DFID. In the same year Kenya introduced a CCT for orphans and
vulnerable children (OVCs). In 2010 the CAS suggested to scale the CCT program
up and the IDA of the World Bank provided a loans of USD 50 million for the 'Cash
Transfer for OVCs': 
“[Kenya]  recently  developed  cash  transfer  programs  for  orphans  and  vulnerable
children, the elderly, and the chronically food-insecure in the arid lands and in urban
slums as well  as  targeted programs for  the disabled and unemployed youth.  […]
Scaled-up and coordinated, these programs can provide a comprehensive system of
social protection” (CAS Kenya 2010:26).
Yet, the report indicates that policy-making in favor of CCTs is dif ficult even when
funding is available. The program in Kenya remained so small covering only 12.500
beneficiaries in total so that as a consequence only half of the loan was used in the
end. The Bank's in fluence remains the strongest in middle-income countries. 
 
Conclusion
This section showed that in most cases the World Bank is involved financially as well.
To discover the financial engagement of the Bank for CCT development I followed
the development  approach of  the World  Bank and also took the investments for
infrastructure measures, and the education and health sector into consideration. In
many  cases  the  Bank  was  financially  active  during  the  years  when a  new CCT
program was introduced or older programs were going to scale. Especially countries
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that receive most attention in the CCT community like Brazil have received financial
support in extraordinary amount. Moreover, it is not just the World Bank providing
loans. Especially in Latin America the Inter-American Development Bank was active
with high loans as well. In cases like Argentina the World Bank supported merely a
pilot project and a workfare program which the Argentine government rejected. The
funding supporting the policy-making in this country came primarily from the IDB,
which provided USD 1.2 billion for conditional subsidies targeting poor and indigent
families around 2004 when Argentina introduced its CCT program. It shows that the
Bank is not the only and maybe not even the most important player providing loans.
Instead  it  seems  like  the  World  Bank  is  providing  money  more  selectively  and
strategically  in  combination  with  technical  advice  (AAA)  according  to  its  own
priorities. 
In short  the following three priorities of the Bank are also reflected in their
approach to funding: first, the development of infrastructure measures for education
and health  should be maximized;  second,  a CCT program should be introduced;
third, the social protection of the country should be coherent and systemic at its best
with CCT as the country's flagship program for social protection. 
Since 2010 the latter point is called by the World Bank the systemic approach.
“During this period [2000-2010], the Bank began to make an important shift from
an  approach  based  mainly  on  projects  that  emphasize  delivery  of  social
assistance benefits to helping countries build SSN [social safety net] systems
and institutions that can respond better to various types of poverty, risk, and
vulnerability within a particular country context. The systemic approach involves
developing various capacities, such as data to identify vulnerable groups, targeting
systems to ensure the right groups receive benefits, payment mechanisms to channel
resources  to  beneficiaries,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems  to  measure
program  implementation  and  impact,  as  well  as  a  set  of  coordinated  programs
appropriate for different groups of poor and vulnerable people. Only 14 percent of the
30  case  study  countries  that  IEG  examined  embraced  a  systemic  approach  to
addressing different types of risk in the first half of the decade, but 46 percent did so
by the second half of the decade” (IEG 2011: xi-xii; original emphasis).
Coming back to the example of Argentina – mentioned above – in the period from
2004 to 2010 the World Bank criticized in 2004 the workfare program 'Jefes y Jefas
de Hogar'  because it  failed to  stimulate long-term effects.  The Bank advised the
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government  to  move  away  from  social  emergency  programs  to  medium-term
programs  and  provided  USD  30  million  for  a  pilot  project  in  this  sense  (CAS
Argentina 2004). In 2010 all efforts of the World Bank focused on the development
and implementation of a “Universal Social Protection Strategy for the most vulnerable
groups”  (CAS Argentina  2010:23).  For  this  purpose  the  Bank  provided  technical
assistance (AAA) and funded a 'Basic Protection Project' with USD 450 million and
additional USD 480 million one year later. In 2009 the government introduced new
CCT programs. While the first CCT in 2004 was funded by the IDB the second one
was supported by the World Bank but according to systemic approach of the World
Bank. 
2.5. Conclusion: 
The World Bank's advocacy, advice and incentives
To make sense of  the  World  Bank's  activities  on  policy  in fluencing  I  used three
categories: advocacy, advice and incentives. While one would expect the World Bank
to use money as a strong incentive to in fluence policy-making, I found that advocacy
and  advice  have  played  an  important  role  as  well.  The  activities  on  all  three
dimensions  have  been  so  rich,  that  it  is  hard  to  say  which  has  been  the  most
dominant mode of in fluencing.
With regard to advocacy, I gathered information on the World Bank's activities
with regard to the diffusion of social cash transfers (SCTs) and found that the Bank
does not support all kind of SCT models equally. Besides social pensions, which the
Bank has advocated with muss less activities, I showed that the Bank supports one
model in particular: conditional cash transfers (CCTs). CCTs are not simply a policy
but clearly advocated as a policy model. The acronym CCT is well known within the
developing community, and the World Bank published flagship publications about it,
held  international  forums,  conferences  and  workshops  devoted  to  CCTs,  and
measures and describes countries'  policies  in  terms of  CCTs.  Those events and
publications increase the attention of this policy model and present this policy to be
part  of  a trend.  This 'trend towards CCTs'  is debatable.  The publication of  maps
where mere scholarship programs have been suddenly described as CCTs is  an
illustrative  example  of  how  strong  the  World  Bank  advocates  CCTs  in  global
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publications. Yet, one might ask if this advocacy for a particular policy model is a
coincidence or if it actually make sense for the World Bank to support CCTs. This
model is so attractive for the World Bank because it combines several aspects that fit
perfectly to the Bank's logic and sets of policies which the World Bank has supported
and established in the previous decades. 
According  to  a  neoliberal  ideology a  cash transfer  to  the  poor  should  not
create  dependency  and  disincentive  to  work.  But  the  World  Bank  has  come  to
ascribe  rationality  to  the  poor  –  making rational  use  of  cash transfer  –,  but  this
rationality is seen to be bounded, legitimizing the conditions of benefit take-up (von
Gliszczynski 2015). In the World Bank's view, a small cash transfer is supposed to lift
the  poor  out  of  the  most  devastating  state  of  poverty  with  the  effect  to  enable
effective self-help. Above all,  CCT are considered to be an investment in human
capital  (healthy  and  educated  workforce)  of  the  future  working  generation  –  the
children – because the cash transfer is conditional on the children's regular school
attendance and regular health check-ups. While this argumentation fits very well to
the Bank's logic, it, furthermore, fits to their preceding policies. The World Bank has
supported the education and health sectors in developing countries for a long time. A
cash transfer,  which is designed in such a way that it  is  dependent on suf ficient
hospitals and schools in place does make sense for the World Bank because it is in
line  with  its  previous  policies.  A  country  which  follows  the  World  Bank's
argumentation has to continue its investments into infrastructure measures in order
to implement a CCT in a second step.
Having shown that the World Bank engages in global advocacy based on the
promotion of a particular policy model, I found that advocacy as well as advice at the
local  level  is  sensitive  to  the  developmental  state  of  the  particular  country.  The
circumstance that the implementation of a CCT is dependent on an infrastructure of
schools and hospitals allows the World Bank to promote a wide range of policies
from their agenda in a developing context. In least-developed countries (LDCs) the
Bank has to continue and strengthen its support for infrastructure measures, while for
other countries the main policy suggestion is focussed on CCTs. Because CCTs are
the flagship SCT program of the World Bank, it seems to me that the World Bank
would like to see the CCT model implemented throughout the Global South, but for
countries that do not have the preconditions in place, the Bank focusses its advice
and  critique  on  infrastructure  measures.  This  kind  of  sensitivity  to  the  individual
development state of particular countries is what I call the development approach of
the World Bank.
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While the effect of advocacy in global discourses is rather diffuse and hard to
measure, the advice tailored to the national level is much closer to most decision-
making. All developing countries are in one way or another connected with the World
Band because they receive or have received some kind of lending. To ensure that
the  loans  are  used  for  the  purpose  as  originally  intended  the  World  Bank
accompanies  national  policy-making with  advice  and review papers  while  on  the
other hand hand the countries publish strategy papers for the World Bank. This is a
continuous country dialogue driven by the World Bank. The injection of advice and
knowledge to national policy-making is not the exception but a common and rather
normal mode. One central document in this regard are Country Assistance Strategy
Papers  (CAS)  published  by  the  World  Bank for  national  policy-makers.  CAS are
published  almost  annually  and  have  existed  for  decades,  which  makes them an
excellent tool to evaluate what kind of advice the World Bank tailors to domestic
politics. Here I found two kinds of advice: the World Bank advises countries either to
pick up and test the model of CCTs, and the World Bank follows up on this  and
advises countries to prolong the test phase and to scale-up the pilot projects. While
the global policy model of CCT entails ideas about how a CCT is an investment in
human capital and how social indicators like school attendance and health check-ups
can be improved, such arguments can be found as well in the World Bank's advice in
the CAS. The CAS criticize social indicators, such as low school attendance, and
suggest that a CCT might be tested in form of a pilot project in order to evaluate in
how far  it  would  improve  these  social  indicators.  Based  on this  critique  and the
presentation of CCTs as a simple and viable solution one can find in later CAS that
countries have taken action and introduced pilot projects to test the positive impact
on social indicators. Even thoug this could be considered to be a quick win for the
World Bank in terms of in fluence, the “impact” is fragile and prone to be washed
away at the end of the pilot period. Therefore advice remains a critical instrument.
Policy  development  at  national  level  is  accompanied  by  monitoring  and  advice
measures,  which  seem  to  be  crucial  to  convince  the  decision-makers  of  the
effectiveness  of  CCTs.  Only  if  evaluations  about  the  CCT have been conducted
during the pilot period and constantly mentioned within the country dialogues, it can
be assured that the CCT model receives the attention it needs to go to scale instead
to be phased out. In short: the World Bank's advice aims equally at the introduction of
a CCT pilot as well as the institutionalization of CCTs and CCT pilot projects. 
The third analytical category refers to the kind of incentives the World Bank
can make use of. In case of this organization the usage of money via loans seems
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obvious.  The  Bank's  loans  seem to  be  an  important  stimulus,  and  a  method  to
overcome political doubts and implementation barriers. The in fluence of the World
Bank via loans does not seems to be the strongest driver, because there are other
players in the game, like the regional banks which often have provided much larger
sums than the World Bank. Moreover, the mere availability of loans is not suf ficient to
motivate countries in the Global South to introduce CCTs, because lending means
new debts  for  the  country,  which  the countries  not  always  seem to  welcome so
willingly as a decade before. The program has to be appealing and desirable – which
is why the Bank's activities on global advocacy are so important –, as well as political
motivation  has  to  be  assured  for  the  policy  adoption  as  well  as  the  period  of
implementation which can take several years.
I  found that  advice  is  a  strong component  within  interactions  between the
World  Bank  and  national  governments.  The World  Bank  monitors  and  evaluates
country programs and injects its advice in the political process. Country dialogues
with the national government are a tool of critically analyzing particular developments
and  to  offer  support  and  expertise  for  counter-measures  to  undesirable
developments. I see the particular combination of advocacy, advice and incentives as
a favorable precondition for an organization to stimulate global policy diffusion.
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Chapter 3: HelpAge International
and Universal Social Pensions
HelpAge International (in the following referred to as ‘HelpAge’) is the leading global
organization with a mandate to advocate the rights and needs of older people. On
HelpAge’s website its mandate is described as follows: “HelpAge International helps
older people claim their rights, challenge discrimination and overcome poverty, so
that  they  can  lead  digni fied,  secure,  active  and  healthy  lives”  (HelpAge  Website
2013a). In terms of size and global outreach there is no comparable organization for
older  people.  It  describes  itself  as  a  “global  network  striving  for  the  rights  of
disadvantaged older people to economic and physical security” (Walker Bourne et al.
2011). HelpAge is a remarkable case because it is one of the few international non-
governmental  organizations (INGOs) that have been in fluential  on national policy-
making  in  the  Global  South  for  social  cash  transfer  (SCT)  programs.  It  is  an
interesting research puzzle to find out how an INGO has been able to contribute to
policy diffusion. Moreover, it seems to be peculiar to the self-description of this actor
that  its  mission  includes  –  among  other  things  –  the  advocacy  of  social  cash
transfers,  intending  to  in fluence  global  policy-making  as  well  as  national  policy-
making. The slogan on HelpAge’s website in the ‘social  protection’  area explicitly
state: “Find out how we're in fluencing policy makers to ensure a secure income for
older  people”  (HelpAge  Website  2012).  This  ambition  is  the  first  feature  which
highlights HelpAge’s distinctiveness from those of many other INGOs in the field of
global social policy.
103
3.1. How HelpAge differs from other INGOs
In order to better understand the distinctiveness of HelpAge it might help to contrast
this  organization with another  INGO. Many INGOs follow a classical  approach of
direct service provision as many national non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
do. The involvement and cooperation with the government can also become pretty
intense in this case. Governments tend to rely more and more on the contributions
provided  by  non-governmental organizations.5 The  difference  between  national
NGOs and INGOs might by less the way of engaging nationally than the fact that
INGOs simply provide services and emergency aid in multiple countries in the Global
South  instead  of  just  in  one,  and  have  more  possibilities  to  raise  funds  across
countries.  To  illustrate  how  exceptional  HelpAge’s  focus  on  advocacy  and  on
influencing national policy-making is, I contrast it with the activities of the German
INGO “Kinderhilfswerk Global-Care”  (KHW) which supports  the  needs of  children
worldwide. 
In 2011 the INGO ran 442 projects in 17 countries mostly in the Global South,
while spending EUR 2.3 million on its projects (KHW 2012). The objectives the INGO
pursues  at  national  level  differ  in  so  far  from  the  international  development
community that the promotion of social cash transfers and social protection is less an
issue for the Kinderhilfswerk. Instead the INGO focuses on emergency assistance,
building schools, supporting the construction of houses, and food supply.6 This is not
to say that the KHW is not recognizing that national programs of social assistance
are missing; but what kind of consequences does it represent for the INGO? How
does  the  organization  intend  to  react  to  this  recognized  ‘grievance’?  Whereas
HelpAge tries to push for the introduction of national social protection programs (i.e.
social  pensions)  as  a  consequence  of  incomplete  national  systems,  the  KHW
5 The appearance as a service provider is also recognized at national level by other IOs. The
World  Bank  describes  that  in  Bangladesh  the  involvement  of  NGO  in  service  provision  grew
extensively at the end of the 1990s: “Five years ago, almost no IDA-assisted projects in Bangladesh
relied on substantial NGO involvement. Today almost all do. Government programs that collaborate
with NGOs are often more successful than those that do not” (World Bank CAS Bangladesh 1998:6).
6 The delivery of services and emergency aid is what INGOs are known for in most cases, and
are either praised for their contribution to fill a vacuum within the national service infrastructure left by
the  government,  or  they  are  criticizes  for  their  lack  of  coordination  among each other,  and their
patchwork assistance have been condemned as unsustainable and contradicting the credo of “help to
self-help”  which  e.g.  the  German  government  continuously  emphasizes  as  the  guideline  for
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illustratively reports about their activities in Uganda: in order to help the people not
being  covered  by  pension-  or  health  insurances,  or  child  allowances,  the  KHW
intends to build three houses so that the people can find shelter. Direct aid provision
might be some kind of a natural response for INGOs. In its early days HelpAge has
started with such a focus itself by providing eye surgeries to people in rural areas. 
To  switch  the  focus  of  their  operations  towards  in fluencing  national
governments is described by HelpAge as a result of a learning process by having
realized that  an INGO can implement one, two or hundred single projects,  and it
would  be  still  rather  a  “drop  in  the  ocean”  (HelpAge  Interview  No.6),  and  less
effective than having stimulated a commitment of the national government which is
able to devote unequally more resources to people living in need and poverty than
patchwork country projects could provide:
“HelpAge started in the early days trying to directly improve the lives of older people
through project programs, direct service delivery, and addressing concrete needs. We
might be able to reach kind of one thousand older people with your programs, but
then the structural causes of poverty would still remain. And what about the people
that would become older some years later down the line? With such an approach you
would never be able to change structural causes” (HelpAge Interview No.1).
To tackle the structural causes is an immense undertaking that is rare and differs
from the  work  of  other  INGOs.  That  might  be  the  reason  for  the  fact  that  most
literature  ignores  the  in fluence  of  INGOs  and  concentrates  on  governmental
organizations instead, based on the assumptions that they have stronger means to
'enforce'  policy  suggestions.  As  noted  above  the  World  Bank  can  motivate  the
adoption of policy suggestions with large amounts of cash in form of loans, whereas
the ILO can set standards and pass recommendation through the ILC as a highly
legitimized body. An INGO that is for the most part relying on soft power as means to
in fluence  makes  it  puzzling  of  how  this  might  work  and  casts  doubt  in  its
effectiveness. I found that in limited contexts HelpAge can become highly effective in
in fluencing national policy-making. 
In  a  nutshell,  my  analysis  found  that  HelpAge's  in fluence  is  due  to
considerable activities on multiple levels making use of normative in fluencing on the
global and regional level, cognitive in fluencing at national level, accompanied by an
own  speci fic  mode  of  in fluencing  stemming  from  its  unique  network  structure
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enabling HAI to set up grassroots movements at local level which can strategically
unfold political pressure.
What is HelpAge? Actor, network, or both?
Before I  start  with  the  analysis  of  the organizations activities  of  in fluencing I  will
explain what kind of actor HelpAge actually is. Through discussions with scholars
from other disciplines I have experienced that for some this is dif ficult to understand
HelpAge's nature at first glance. Is HelpAge a global actor like a single organization,
or is it a broad network with a secretariat to represent the network? To answer this
question is not as easy as one might assume. I argue that what makes HelpAge so
interesting is that it is both at the same time, namely, a network-based global actor. 
Let me posit just two basic principles connected with global actors: first the
ability to act as one (coordination), and, second, that its entities have the same core
mandate (uniformity). According to those criteria both can be confirmed for HelpAge.
All  parts  of  HelpAge’s  network  share  the  same  core  mandate  focused  on  the
advocacy  for  older  peoples’  rights  and  needs,  and  coordination  is  ensured  and
realized  through  highly  visible  global  campaigns  design  by  HelpAge’s  central
secretariat  in  London (more below).  On the other  side,  I  posit  the organizational
decentralization through independence of its units as the main criterion of a network.
The units within the HelpAge network indeed have a high degree of independence
because most of the HelpAge network consists of national NGOs that have joined the
network. One of HelpAge’s of ficers wrote: “Wherever possible and appropriate these
tasks and technical support areas are located in regional and country of fices” (Walker
Bourne et  al.  2011:  410).  The organization’s  guiding principle  to  make decisions
according  to  national  and  geographical  environments  automatically  decentralizes
parts  from  the  internal  decision-making  structure.  Whereas  the  main  directives
comes from the secretariat, all other decisions are made at the lowest level possible.
This is a first important strategy to maintain good working relations with the national
governments. HelpAge rarely appears to be an 'external' actor that tries to 'impose'
some ideology. As I will  show, this 'bottom-up' structure is accompanied by many
further strategies that build up on the guiding principle of processes being ‘country-
led’. 
A further explanation of why HelpAge has such an interesting network-based
character can be found in the history of HelpAge’s development. A brief overview of
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HelpAge’s origin shows that, on the one hand, it was born as an INGO and grew to
an independent organization in the early 1990s out of the British organization ‘Help
the Aged’7 which is a highly centralized national  organization with the purpose of
organizing charities for fund-raising within the United Kingdom foremost for the needs
and interests of older people directly in the UK. On the other hand, Help the Aged
has set up HelpAge as a branch organization for international projects, which means
that networking has been from the beginning on a major part of HelpAge’s activities.
The  organization  was  founded  as  a  network  connecting  five  (independent)
organizations around the globe: Help the Aged UK, Help the Aged Canada, HelpAge
India, HelpAge Kenya, and Pro Vida Colombia. In the following decade the network
increased  to  a  total  number  of  34  organizations  in  2011 with  an outreach to  41
countries.  With  the  years  the  network  constantly  improved  and  strengthened
coordination, while at the same time not impeding the organizations ability to act
independently.
In order to visualize HelpAge’s setup, ' figure 3' (see next page) shows in red
all the units of this actor that have been set-up by HelpAge International and, thus,
are  more  tightly  coordinated.  Furthermore,  units  colored  in  green  represent  the
national NGOs which are af filiated organizations of the HelpAge network. The main
coordination  is  executed  by  the  HelpAge  Secretariat  in  London  from  where  the
organization  sets  up  new  country  of fices  whenever  it  has  funding  for  country
missions  available.  Even  though  these  country  of fices  highly  depend  on  project
funding HelpAge actively works towards making these of fices stay by attracting new
projects  before  the  precursor  ends.  This  strategy  seems to  work  because,  as  a
HelpAge of ficer told me, until  now no country of fice ever had to be closed. More
direct responses and coordination in detail is ensured through regional development
centers.  As  a  basic  principle  the  HelpAge  secretariat  provides  funding  and,  if
requested or necessary, expertise to the regional development centers as well  to
country of fices. In return, the regional development centers are responsible for the
activities  carried  out  in  speci fic  regions  and  can  inform  the  secretariat  about
encountered  problems  and  concrete  needs  and  opportunities  for  successful
advocacy. With this information flowing to the secretariat, it has an advantageous
position in designing strategies and coordinating campaigns executed around the
globe.
7 ‘Help the Aged’ merged with ‘Age Concern’ and is known since 2009 as ‘Age UK’.
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Additional to the units which are genuine to HelpAge, the INGO was able to almost
double  its  outreach  to  countries  by  spanning  a  network  of  associated  national
af filiates,  and ensuring  coordination  through communication  between the  national
af filiates  and  HelpAge’s  regional  development  centers.  The af filiates  are  national
NGOs that can look back to its own history which is usually deeply rooted in national
origins.  They  became  af filiates  of  the  HelpAge  network  because  they  share
HelpAge's intention to engage in advocacy and support for the well-being of older
people  and  broader  sets  of  issues  important  to  aging.  Before  incorporating  an
organization HelpAge engages in a longer dialogue in order to ensure that certain
Figure 2
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principles are met, which foremost means to prove if the organization agrees upon
HelpAge’s values and its mission to support older persons. Yet, HelpAge welcomes a
high  degree  of  its  af filiates'  autonomy  and  respects  national  peculiarities.  One
example stems from the Asian context where even the term 'older person' or 'elderly'
is regarded as being too offensive. Therefore, HelpAge af filiates rather choose to use
the term 'senior citizens' instead. Moreover, HelpAge af filiates do not even have to be
named as HelpAge. In most cases they keep their own name and appearance.
Summed up, I have argued that HelpAge is a network-based INGO. It can be
seen  as  a  single  INGO because  it  can  act  as  such  on  the  global  level  and  is
coordinated through campaigns in regions and nationally. Of fices of HelpAge around
the globe resulted from HelpAge’s activities, and belong either directly to HelpAge or
are part  of  its  network.  The secretariat  is  key for  coordination of  campaigns and
representing the actor’s interests. Moreover, the network character is clearly visible
as well through its af filiates which enable HelpAge to act with high responsiveness
according to national contexts.
A final aspect of the network structure is its global spread. I found that most
country of fices and af filiates are located in the Asian region (47%), followed by the
African region (35%) and Latin America (18%). Without going into detail, one can see
that HelpAge’s activities directly take place in the Global South in low- and middle
income countries where the share of older people living in poverty is particularly high
(HelpAge 2004). This feature makes HelpAge eminently relevant for an analysis of
policy  diffusion  in  the  Global  South.  In  the  following I  present  the  results  of  my
analysis of strategies HelpAge is using in order to contribute to the diffusion of social
cash transfer programs, i.e. social pensions.
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3.2. Advocacy via Global Models and Conferences: 
 Translating down the Idea of “Social Pensions”
As a first aspect I analyze to what extent norms, values and policy models exist as
guidelines and motivation for the actor’s actions. The second aspect is if the INGO
has strategically made use of the global environment in order to establish its model
as a normative template, such as 'best practices', and in order to 'deliver' the model
to national governments. For the identi fication of HelpAge's strategies I conducted
multiple interviews in London with policy of ficers from regional development centers
in Asia and Latin America, HelpAge staff from the secretariat ,as well as with the
policy of ficer for strategic planning who is responsible for the global missions and
was also involved in advocacy in the African region.
Are HelpAge’s actions guided by a policy model?
I begin by analyzing if HelpAge’s activities on in fluencing have been motivated by an
underlying policy model or particular norms, values and concepts which were carried,
implicitly or explicitly, to countries in the Global South. In a nutshell, I argue in the
following that HelpAge’s activities in the field of social protection are driven by the
idea  of  'social  pensions'  as  a  particular  policy  model  seen  as  a  component  of
development strategies. That an IO is driven by a clear policy it has set for itself to be
'best  practices',  which guide the IO's behavior  in  many ways,  is  not  self-evident.
World  society  theory  posits  that  IOs  often  portray  themselves  as  some  kind  of
unambitious when it comes to policy suggestions. They appear to be rather interest
free  or  “disinterested”.  In  the  same  way  HelpAge  also  talks  about  bottom-up
approach  and  support  of  governmental  ambitious.  In  many  cases  NGOs  are
regarded  as  service  providers  at  national  level  and  not  understood  as  agents
involved in strategic in fluencing. Especially strategically coordinated activities on the
global  level  are rather  unusual,  and deserve some explanations of  how HelpAge
expects to use a global normative mode for in fluencing national policy-making. I start
with a brief explanation of the policy model HelpAge advocates.
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At the beginning of the 2010s the term of 'social pensions' and reference to
this model started to spread among actors at the global  level.8 The origin of this
model  is  hard  to  determine.  The idea of  having  a  non-contributory  pension was
prominently advocated by the World Bank at the beginning of the 1990s (World Bank
1994).  The so called  'zero  pillar'  (Holzmann and Hinz  2005)  was designed as a
residual  program  complementing  the  World  Bank's  advocacy  for  pension
privatization. The term 'social pensions' however was not a famous concept in the
international development community at this time. I found this term being first used in
academic analysis of the pension system in South Africa at the beginning of  the
1990s (cf. Lund 1993;  Ardington and Lund 1995; Møller 1996). It was a term used
with regard to South Africa and not used in a broader way or to describe a general
type  of  pension  or  model.  This  changed  at  the  beginning  of  the  2000s  when  it
became part of HelpAge’s agenda. At first introduced as a working paper in 2002 for
the ILO, the author's analysis of non-contributory pensions by Armando Barrientos
and Peter Lloyd-Sherlock became known to HelpAge as well and their results an
of ficial  HelpAge paper  in  2003 authored by  the same scientists  (cf.  Barrientos &
Lloyd-Sherlock 2002; 2003).  Barrientos' and Lloyd-Sherlock's paper was important in
this  regard  because  it  showed  HelpAge  what  a  prominent  role  non-contributory
pensions systems can play in developing countries. This was especially relevant for
Africa where due to HIV/AIDS basically one generation of people is missing and,
thus,  older  people have to care for  children.  Moreover,  the report  mentioned the
repercussions globalization can have for developing countries: 
“In countries affected by the pandemic, many traditional multigenerational households
have  become  missing-generation  ones,  with  the  responsibility  for  sustaining  the
household falling squarely on older people. Rapid economic and social  change in
developing  countries  is  having  similar  effects,  and  migration,  unemployment,  and
globalisation, have further implications for intergenerational support. Pensions for the
poor are therefore an urgent issue for developing countries” (Barrientos and Lloyed-
Sherlock 2002:1). 
However, this studies included the term 'social pension' only with reference to South
Africa  and  Brazil  while  maintaining  the  self-explanatory  term  'non-contributory
pensions'.  Stephen  Devereux  of  the  British  think  tank  'Institute  of  Development
8 For more information on the usage of particular terms on social cash transfer see Gliszczynski
2015.
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Studies' (IDS) was among the very first scholars using this term more extensively and
broadly  (Devereux  2001).  HelpAge  in  the  year  2002/03  was  in  the  position  of
choosing which term to pick up and to advocate. HelpAge deliberately choose social
pensions in order to get away from the technical discussions that seem too much to
discuss the necessity of contributions or where the financing for a non-contributory
pension should come from (HelpAge Interview No.7). The term social pension was
suppose to have a totally different perspective on such issues clearly indicating that
this kind of pension is part of social policies in order to mitigate poverty for people in
old age. HelpAge emphasized in the following years two aspects in particular. First,
that countries have in some way the responsibility to care for older people by means
of social policies; and second, that the ful fillment of this social policy is functional
because it comes with a multitude of positive effects.
HelpAge's flagship publication “Age and Security” of 2004 provides a good
basis  for  analyzing  how  the  INGO presents  and  frames  social  pensions.  In  this
publication  HelpAge argues the case for  social  pension in  general  and universal
social  pensions  (USPs)  in  particular,  and,  therewith,  records  a  clear  policy
preference.  The  distinctive  feature  of  USPs  is  –  as  the  name  indicates  –  the
component of  universality.  The only criterion for the disbursement of the pension
should  be the  age  of  the  recipient.  Means-tests  are  not  part  of  this  model.  The
rational  behind  the  decision  to  advocate  USPs  takes  the  context  in  developing
countries in consideration where the governmental capacity or available data that
would be necessary to implement means-tested pensions is low. So called 'exclusion
errors' even in large and established programs like  Bolsa Familia in Brazil remain
high.  Estimations  state  that  about  70%  of  eligible  people  that  would  meet  the
conditions  of  a  means-test  are  excluded  (HelpAge  Interview  No.5).  Moreover,
corruption still is a widespread phenomenon in developing countries. To let of ficials
at local level decide whether an applicant meets the preconditions for a means-test of
not is prone to be matter of corruption. The report in 2004 argues as advantages of
USP programs their administrative simplicity, the advantage of having a clear target
group,  and  the  increase  in  popularity  due  to  the  universality.  Further  arguments
characterize USPs as stigma-free, transparent and easy to understand, and gender-
neutral  (HelpAge  2004:39ff).  There  are  no  negative  implications  mentioned  or
described. The only critical point discussed is the affordability. Are social pensions to
expensive?  HelpAge  argues  that  this  is  not  the  case.  It  refers  to  countries  that
successfully have implemented social pensions, and describes several strategies to
lower the costs. 
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However, the report is ambiguous and does not consequently operate with the
term of universal social pensions. The argumentation of HelpAge oscillates between
universal  and  means-tested  non-contributory  pensions.  The  usage  of  the  more
abstract term 'social pensions' makes it often hard to distinguish what kind of social
pension the argumentation refers to. The same ambiguity can be found all over in
HelpAge's  efforts  on  advocacy.  As  the  next  sections  will  show,  this  is  less  a
coincidence as of  strategic  value  because it  allows to  make compromises at  the
technical level without loosing USPs as the ideal model. So HelpAge does advocate
USPs but does also enforce any kind of policy-making that includes social pensions
in  any  way.  This  approach  might  be  due  to  HelpAge's  focus  on  country-led
development which  respects national peculiarities and tries to offer support in the
way needed from the country, but can also simply be due to the limited capacity of
the organization to enforce their policy models in national contexts. While the latter
aspect  might  be  relevant  so  well,  the  following  section  shows  that  country-led
development is at least important in this regard that the integration of countries is a
good strategy to create ownership for policy innovations at national level.
Does HelpAge attempt to establish 
social pensions as a normative model?
Even more important than having a policy model in place is the ability to charge a
topic with a normative impetus. In this section I argue that HelpAge has done that by
arguing for the importance of social pensions and, thus, proving reasons why this
policy suggestion  should be implemented, and by connecting the policy model  to
other  issues  and  topics  that  are  already  equipped  with  normative  imperatives.
Moreover, HelpAge shows trends of popularity towards social pensions by providing
a comparisons among countries. This is a technique which as well  can have the
potential to increase global normative in fluencing.
With  the  2004  flagship  publication  HelpAge  provides  an  impressive  list  of
normative as well as cognitive arguments in favor of social pensions. I already stated
the particular arguments for USP above, but additionally to that one can find half the
report arguing for social pensions in general by providing arguments of economic
benefits (because social pensions tackle national poverty), social benefits (because
older  people  are  more  independent;  can  better  ful fill  their  role  as  caregivers  for
children; and get a higher social status), and health benefits (because older people
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can  afford  to  pay  for  food  as  well  as  for  necessary  medical  treatments).  This
arguments  open  new  possibilities  of  connecting  social  pensions  to  further  issue
areas. The arguments for economic benefits allow to argue in the language of and
with  reference  to  the  World  Bank.  Thus,  HelpAge  can  profit  from the  economic
credibility  of  this  institution.  Further  arguments for  social  pensions describe  older
people  as  caregivers  for  children.  This  argument  has  also  made  possible  some
cooperation  and  joint  publications  with  in fluential  and  financially  well-equipped
organizations such as UNICEF and 'Save the Children'.9 Finally, the argumentation
for health benefits connects the topic of pensions with health as one of the strongest
and most visible topics in the international community. By connecting social pensions
to new issues the normative value of the policy model can be increased as well as
new possibilities for cooperation are built.
In addition to the creation of linkages to other organizations HelpAge embeds
its policy model in general themes, like 'social protection' and the 'human rights', and
even actively pushes those themes presented as being closely related to aging. The
main achievement of this endeavor is that HelpAge's policy claim for social pensions
is not just a claim for older people as a small minority group, but it is a functional
policy suggestion in order to establish social protection systems that reduce poverty
and,  thus,  are  functional  in  order  to  achieve  the  Millennium Development  Goals
(MDGs).
“[The report] Age and security shows that establishing, or extending, non-contributory
pension programmes in other developing countries could have a signi ficant impact on
reducing poverty  and vulnerability  among households with older people (and their
dependants).  If  international  poverty  reduction  targets,  such  as  the  Millennium
Development Goals, are to be achieved, urgent consideration must be given to the
establishment  and extension of  social  protection mechanisms in the form of  non-
contributory pension programs” (HelpAge 2004:2).
Being part of such a broad agenda like social protection has the advantage that this
normative  agenda  reinforces  the  policy  model  by  increasing  its  legitimacy.
Connecting  their  policy  model  to  other  agendas  enabled  HelpAge  to  establish
9 A common publication of the IDS (Institute of Development Studies), HelpAge International
and 'Save the Children' in 2005 was conducted as part of a UNICEF-commissioned review of social
protection and gives proof of this newly established relations of those organizations (Devereux et al.
2005). Moreover, HelpAge's eyeopening discovery that older people have to care for children because
the  middle  aged foremost  died  on  HIV/AIDS is  captured  in  a  short  policy  note  that  appears  on
HelpAge's  as  well  as  on  UNICEF's  website  (HelpAge  2007;  UNICEF  website:
www.unicef.org/mozambique/activities_1906.html).
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strategic cooperation with policy experts of other institutions. The acknowledgment in
the  foreword  of  HelpAge's  flagship  publication  of  2004 already indicates  existing
relationships with the ILO (Michael Cichon), the World Bank (Anita Schwarz, Robert
Palacios),  and British  academia  (e.g.  Armando Barrientos,  Peter  Lloyd-Sherlock).
The closest working-relationship is between HelpAge and the ILO because HelpAge
welcomes and supports the social  protection floor concept of the ILO. The social
protection frame has become a main reference for almost all  global actors in the
decade since 2000 (Gliszczynski  2015).  A small  but  interesting indicator  that  the
concept of social pensions is tightly connected to social protection is the fact that
during my interview with the HelpAge of ficer the pension often was called 'social
protection pension' instead of social pension (HelpAge Interview No.1).
Besides good arguments and strategies of embedding the policy models in
global  agendas  in  order  to  charge  the  policy  model  with  legitimacy,  I  wanted to
investigate if HelpAge uses techniques that contribute to establish social pensions as
a norm itself. Indeed, I found techniques similar to those of the World Bank (provided
in  their  2009  publication);  namely  the  provision  of  comparisons  and  overviews.
Therefore,  HelpAge  describes  several  country  examples  and  provides  tables
comparing multiple countries by their pension programs. With more data available
HelpAge has intensi fied this technique by providing larger tables and a global map on
its website. In 2011 HelpAge provided an overview of 50 countries and their pension
programs  (HelpAge  2011b).  The  key  message  of  this  overview  emphasized  the
feasibility of USP:
“The cost of a universal pension appears to be affordable in all of the 50 countries
surveyed, both relative to the economy and to government spending. For example, in
all 50 countries a universal pension for everyone over 65 would cost less than 1.8 per
cent  of  GDP. In no country would these costs make up more than 8 per cent of
current government expenditure” (HelpAge2011b).
I emphasize that this is not just a technique to provide an evidence-base but that
those techniques are can also create an impression of a global trend towards social
pensions. Based on the assumption that visualized popularity of a policy model can
facilitate that policy makers at national level take this model in consideration, this
technique can be considered being a tool for policy diffusion. A further and similar
technique can be the creation of maps. 
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Figure 3 “HelpAge's Global Overview of Social Pension Programs”
Source: http://www.pension-watch.net/pensions/country-fact-file/ (accessed in May 2013)
HelpAge provides  an interactive  online  map showing the  global  spread of  social
pensions ( figure 4). It meets the eye that again USP and means-tested pensions are
displayed  together  and  indistinguishable.  Countries  without  a  social  pension  are
colored in grey; countries with a social pension are colored in red; and  countries with
programs covering a high number of beneficiaries are colored in deep red. According
to HelpAge's policy preferences one might rather expect a distinction between USPs
in deep red and means-tested pensions in red. However, the impression of a trend
towards social  pensions appears to be much larger in HelpAge's current version.
Furthermore, a map has two aspects: 'naming and praising' (“look what is already
there!”) and 'naming and shaming' (“look what is missing!”). By showing in colored
the programs in place according to the size of the system, HelpAge has chosen a
form of positive and motivational statements that I found as characterizing for this
INGO. In this case the strategy is explicitly normative because social pensions are
presented in such a way – making use of the technique of global comparisons – that
social pensions rather appear to be a desirable norm with grey areas of countries
that have not yet reached a state were this policy model is nationwide implemented.
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Advocacy between means-tested Social Pensions 
and the Idea of Universal Social Pensions 
In summary, presenting and arguing for a policy model in publications, showing a
trend in comparative maps and tables, and establishing relationships to other policy-
makers as well as embedding the policy model in large normative agendas is the
groundwork in order to establish a policy as a normative model. I want to point out
that, though non-contributory pensions are on the rise for many years, this purely
technocratic term has been replaced in the last decade by the term and model of
'social  pensions'  which  is  nowadays  widely  recognized  by  most  international
organizations  (Gliszczynski  2015).  This  is  at  least  an  indicator  for  HelpAge's
successful  advocacy.  However,  the  claim  I  make  in  this  section  is  much  more
modest.  I  describe  that  HelpAge  has  with  USPs  a  clear  policy  preference  it
advocates; yet, this model is somehow in the back of HelpAge activities and rather
instructive  for  the  INGO.  Though it  is  as  well  matter  of  active  debate,  the  more
general and flexible model of  social pensions is much more visible. This might be
somehow a natural outcome for an organization operating with an evidence-base
approach, and, thus, tries to operate more with a model that can adapt to different
realities at national level. Before I describe how HelpAge is working at national level I
present different strategies of the INGO of how it strategically is making use of the
global environment to increase the awareness of national policy makers for social
pensions. 
A final aspect about HelpAge policy model directly leads to an explanation of
why  HelpAge  is  engaging  within  the  UN  system.  In  their  advocacy  for  the
implementation  of  social  pensions  HelpAge  does  not  prefer  to  have  the  policy
implemented as any kind of program, because that is not a sustainable way to set up
a program in developing countries where programs can be closed as easy as they
can be opened simply depending on the resources available through the national
budget. Thus, the INGO emphasizes that implemented social pensions should follow
a rights-based approach. Its 2006 publication “Why social pensions are needed now”
clearly emphasizes this rights-based approach and indicated what additional aspects
HelpAge's strategic in fluencing has to care about:
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“Social  (non-contributory)  pensions  are  a  valuable  and  strategic  element  of  a
minimum  social  security  package that  supports  the  realisation  of  rights,  via
implementation of the right to social security for all and furthering state provision of
social protection for vulnerable people. Social pensions support commitments made
by governments in the Madrid International Plan of Action on aging 2002 [MIPAA] to
halve the numbers  of  older  people  living  in  extreme poverty  by  2015.”  (HelpAge
2006a:1).
This quotation shows 'social protection' is an important frame for HelpAge because
with  the  help  of  that  the  INGO  can  argue  for  social  pensions  as  an  important
instrument  within  the social  protection framework.  Moreover,  already the first  line
emphasizes  the  social  pensions  are  understood  to  be  an  instrument  for  the
realization of human rights as well. The policy of social pensions is understood as “a
valuable  and strategic  element”  to  implement  the  “right  to  social  security  for  all”
(art.22  UDHR).  In  order  to  make  the  link  between  social  pensions,  and  global
agendas (social protection) and human rights more visible HelpAge needs to make
further use of the global environment.  In the following, I  investigate deeper in the
activities of HelpAge in this regard. A good start are HelpAge's activities with regard
to the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA) which – as indicated
above – played a central role in committing countries to goals that are in particular
related to aging.
HelpAge's strategies to diffuse 
social pension in the global community
As argued before, HelpAge's actions are led by more general norms as well as a
concrete policy model. I already showed a couple of arguments and issues attached
to the policy model of social pensions in order to establish it globally and to make it
normatively appealing to national policy-makers. This kind of normative in fluencing
would stem from the the policy model itself. Above that I was interested in analyzing
if HelpAge uses global institutions and further strategies in order to in fluence national
policy-making.  A starting point for  this analysis was the rights-based approach of
HelpAge. HelpAge criticizes the absence of a global rights agenda for older people,
and,  thus,  pushes  this  idea globally.  In  this  sense HelpAge was involved  in  the
preparations of the the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA) behind
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the  scenes.  Moreover,  I  found  that  HelpAge  organized  many  conferences  with
governments as participants and referring all to MIPAA. In the following I argue that
those activities  are  part  of  a  strategy I  call  'translating  down'.  With  this  strategy
HelpAge  manages  to  bring  abstract  global  conventions  to  life  by  specifying  its
content and committing countries to more concrete action plans. By doing so the
INGO can in fluence normatively in order to directly have an impact because counties
follow  the  commitments  they  made  or  indirectly  by  having  crafted  normative  a
framework HelpAge can refer to with further advocacy at national level. Furthermore,
I  found that  already the development of  normative framework involves strategies.
HelpAge is making use of the global level and other international organizations in
order to shape a cooperative environment for common projects at national level or
common advocacy  at  global  level.  I  refer  to  such  a  state  as  futile  grounds  and
explore in detail the strategies involved to reach such a state. 
The strategies to stimulate global cooperation:
'mainstreaming' and 'packaging' 
Before  investigating  in  the  global-to-national  interactions  of  the  'translating  down'
strategy, I want to emphasize that HelpAge does as well consider global-to-global
in fluencing  as  being  part  of  it  activities.  I  brie fly  sketch  HelpAge's  strategies  of
'mainstreaming' and 'packaging' in order to establish positive preconditions. First, I
describe the reasons for those strategies and the expected effects of them, then I
argue that  those strategies are part of HelpAge's actions and describe in what form
they are applied.
In what way are 'positive preconditions' important for shaping global agendas
and  being  part  of  an  indirect  strategy  of  in fluencing  the  national  level  as  well?
Establishing positive preconditions within  the international  community  is  important
because influencing global agendas is a highly cooperative act. Single actions would
hardly  be  in fluential.  The  more  other  actors  of  the  global  community  can  be
convinced to support an agenda, the more likely it is that this  agenda can be crafted
as a global one. Networking and influencing global debates is key for HelpAge. The
same is valid for in fluencing national policy-making. HelpAge does understand that it
has not the resources to be in fluential solely on its own. That other actors include
aspects of aging or policy models related to aging into its own policies is important for
HelpAge because it enables cooperation among global actors at national level and
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forges a constructive environment of policy harmonization so that contradicting policy
advocacy can be avoided. For the advocacy of SCTs the important frame that builds
such positive preconditions for HelpAge is 'social protection':
“The international  debate and global  actors have a signi ficant  in fluence on policy
developments  at  a  national  level.  We  therefore  work  to  in fluence  and  share
experience of social protection schemes with key players such as the World Bank,
academic institutions, donor agencies and UN agencies” (HelpAge 2012:3).
In the following I argue that HelpAge tries to facilitate positive preconditions with the
strategies of 'mainstreaming' and 'packaging'.
I  define 'mainstreaming'  as the attempt of an actor  to add a new issue to
general and legitimate knowledge by framing and presenting the issue in such a way
that  it  is  easy  understandable  for  others  because  it  is  connected  to  already
established frameworks of ideas. In this case HelpAge would like to see issues on
aging as being part of general knowledge and to be considered by further actors.
Thus, the INGO picks up already established topics and argues and advocates that
aging is an important aspect of that issue as well. In fluencing is a matter of delivery,
and, thus, HelpAge has to develop new expertise to have a saying in those new
areas.  HelpAge  is  broadening  its  evidence  base  to  be  able  to  advocate  more
effectively for aging with regard to issues like health, rights, livelihoods and work, and
social protection. These topics correspond with the internal divisions of the INGO.
Each  division  takes  care  of  a  particular  topic  and  holds  contacts  with  major
international  organizations  of  this  field.  The  strategy  of  mainstreaming  was
incorporated  in  HelpAge's  structure  in  2001  when  HelpAge  discovered  the
connection between older people and children (HelpAge Interview No.1). Supporting
older people means supporting children simultaneously, because in Africa in most
cases  older  people  are  the  main  caregivers  to  children  because  the  middle-
generation foremost  died on HIV/AIDS.  The 'HIV/AIDS'  division was the first  one
established in 2001/2. Moreover, HelpAge was able to build further divisions and to
argue that aging is a crucial  aspect the particular issue. HelpAge build the 'older
people'  rights'  divisions in 2006/7 conceptualizing older people as rights-holder.  It
build  in  2007  the  'social  protection'  division  advocating  old  age  as  a  targeting
mechanism for people living in extreme poverty and social pensions as being part of
social protection approaches. 'Health' became an own division in 2010 arguing for
health  as  a  crucial  precondition  for  physical  and  mental  well-being  in  old  age.
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Recently in 2012 'livelihoods and work' got its own division trying to sensitize the
development community for a broader understanding of the live-cycle concept. Due
to this broader concept people not simply enter a stage of being old but run through
several  stages  including a stage called 'active aging'  where older people are still
active elements of the informal economy. Moreover, HelpAge still is very active in
emergency aid and has reacted to the prominence of the climate change  topic as
well.  With  regard to  climate change HelpAge tellingly  stats  on its  website  “Older
people are affected by climate change and the increase in natural disasters. They
want  to  be  included  in  the  climate  change  and  disaster  risk  reduction  debate”
(HelpAge  Website  2013b).  The  gradual  expansion  of  such  divisions  and
mainstreaming activities indicates that this strategy has turned to be functional for
HelpAge to prepare futile grounds. As a result of HelpAge's activities it holds working-
relationships with many UN organizations like UNICEF, ILO, WHO, UNDP, and many
more, and can distribute arguments and policy suggestions much more effective than
without those. 
In the following I explain the strategy of 'packaging' which shows in what way
most of the organization's activities of mainstreaming are in particular supportive for
HelAge's SCT model of social pensions. I define 'packaging' as the framing of an
issue as  being connected with  further  issues that  built  a  package of  interrelated
ideas. As a consequence, the advocacy for one issue can be used for advocacy for
another  issue  as  well.  I  found  roughly  three  kinds  of  packaging.  First,  HelpAge
orientates along the ILO's social protection floor model10. This model knows a life-
cycle approach, which is a set of policies that try to protect the individual in different
phases of its life with different sets of policies. It is simple to include social pensions
into  this  approach  as  the  main  cornerstone  for  the  protection  of  older  people.
However,  the  social  protection  floor  model  itself  does  mention  social  pensions
directly  only  very  scarcely  like  in  its  affordability  studies  (ILO 2008c).  The  ILO's
of ficial  recommendation  codi fies  –  in  general  –  the  'right  to  social  security',
universality of protection and a guaranteed minimum of income security and essential
health care over the life cycle, and – in particular – nationally de fined minimum levels
of basic income security for older persons (ILO 2012). Such a strong consideration of
the  topic  of  aging  within  ILO's  policies  seems  to  be  due  to  working-relationship
between ILO and HelpAge for already over a decade. Since 2009 it is easy to argue
for social pensions by using the social protection frame in order to argue that USPs
are part of a social protection package.
10 In 2009 the ILO's model became UN policy in form of the social protection floor initiative 
(UNCEB 2009) and in 2012 it became an of ficial ILO Recommendation (ILO 2012).
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Second, HelpAge makes policy packages that are in particular useful for the
support of older people but are much broader so that many other global actors can
engage within those issue areas as well. As argued above, HelpAge is able to claim
that social pensions are part of a social protection package. The other way round,
can HelpAge advocate its own package while advocating social protection: “Universal
social  pensions,  universal  basic  education  and  universal  health  care  should  be
incorporated  as  a  single  social  protection  goal  in  international  development
agreements” (HelpAge 2004:10). The topics of income security, health and education
might be all focused on the needs of older people, yet, it allows many other actors to
include  their  particularly  favored  policy  models  as  well,  and  to  cooperate  with
HelpAge  in  particular  settings.  Thus,  this  kind  of  openness  of  HelpAge's  social
protection  package  is  very  functional  to  prepare  positive  preconditions  for
cooperation within the global community.
Third, the mainstreamed topics of HelpAge's agenda are all interrelated with
each other, so that it is possible to refer from each topic to social pensions. Here are
some brief examples: A. Health and HIV/AIDS theme: the health of older people can
be increased by providing a social  pension; HIV/AIDS has almost eradicated one
generation and has put older people in the position to be the main caregivers for
orphans (childcare); thus, social pensions protect older people and children at the
same time (household approach). B.  Social Protection  theme:  poverty reduction
can use social pensions as a targeting mechanism because targeting solely on the
condition of age is simple and surveys show that older people are disproportionally
stronger  effected by poverty.  C.  Global Rights theme: the implementation of  the
'right to social security' should encompass social pensions as well in order to protect
a particular vulnerable group of people. D.  Livelihoods and Work theme: having
worked in  the  informal  economy a life-time around 70% of  older  people have to
continue working even in old age in order to survive and support the family; a social
pension could take some pressure from older people enabling digni fied aging. 
Even though each of this mainstream topics has its particular focus and aims
at protecting older people and raising awareness for their particular needs, I argued
that it is possible that all those themes can be packaged in such a way that social
pensions are part of it. Thus, activities in each of these themes contributes to prepare
positive preconditions for social pensions as well. Indeed, cooperating with a country
for one of these themes in order to bring in social pensions later, is one of HelpAge's
in fluencing strategies (HelpAge Interview No.1).
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I argued in this section that HelpAge is using several strategies to be part of
the further normative frameworks. The INGO puts a lot of effort on mainstreaming its
issues, and due to the strategy of packaging the organization can advocate social
pensions from different angles. By doing so HelpAge is raising awareness and can
set global and national agendas. Some indicators that HelpAge has been successful
in  doing  so  are  that  many  organizations  have  included  issues  on  aging  in  their
agendas,  and  that  they  hold  ongoing  working-relationships  with  HelpAge.  Such
positive preconditions allow HelpAge to better advocate social pensions at national
and global level.
The strategy of 'translating down': 
motivating countries to make commitments
HelpAge understands that global agreements not automatically turn into effect. While
it is rather dif ficult for HelpAge to enforce global agreements by means of sanctions
or strong incentives, HelpAge chose to continue advocacy and engage in agenda-
setting. The strategy of putting abstract global agendas into effect at national level by
means  of  attention  raising  via  conferences  and  workshops  as  instruments  of
in fluencing is what I elaborate in the following as a strategy called 'translating down'.
Through this strategy abstract norms come to life and global agreements increase
their  normative value because follow-up events reemphasize those values. As an
effect the probability that governments pick up policy innovations stemming from this
agendas  goes  up.  In  the  following,  I  exemplify  the  usage  of  this  strategy  by
discussing the processes that took place in the African region.
The starting point is the 'UN Second World Assembly on Aging' which was
held  in  2002  in  Madrid.  It  was  held  to  adapt  the  agreement  of  the  preceding
conference held in 1982 in Vienna to the social, cultural, economic and demographic
realities of the new century (UN 2002). Moreover, the first UN plan was never really
recognized by the Global South because it was felt as an agenda that was designed
by the Global North for the Global North. It might surprise that HelpAge as an INGO
was heavily involved in the second UN conference. The organization contributed at
highest  level  to  the design and content  of  this  agreement at  UN level.  It  was of
particular importance to HelpAge to bring in the perspective of the Global South, and
to emphasize the importance of the 'social protection', the Millennium Development
Goals and HIV/AIDS, which at this time where all missing an age perspective. 
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“The first plan in 1982 was more the developed-world thing, whereas this time it was
for the developing world. We [as HelpAge] worked very hard to push in our previsions
into the plan which were relevant for the developing countries, both government and
citizens. So, things like the issues around of the MDGs, the speci fic mention of the
MDGs, speci fic mention of social protection, and HIV for example; they were there
because, we put them there“ (HelpAge Interview No.8).
The outcome of  this  conference was the  ‘Madrid  International  Plan  of  Action  on
aging’  (MIPAA)  which  was  adopted  by  159  countries  in  consensus.  The  former
Secretary-General  Kofi A.  Annan points out  that  MIPAA “represents the first  time
governments agreed to link questions of aging to other frameworks for social and
economic  development  and human rights”  (UN 2002:foreword).  As argued in  the
section above, having the topic of aging as an integrated component of social and
economic  development  helps  to  include  aging  into  other  policies  more  easily
(mainstreaming & packaging). Furthermore, MIPAA raises awareness for the growing
share  of  older  people  in  society.  According  to  prognoses the  proportion  of  older
people is going to quadruple within the next 50 years. This demographic change will
hit  developing countries the hardest,  and with most  people having worked in the
informal  sector  a life-long not  being able to  make any contributions to  insurance
based  social  protection  older  people  are  in  particular  affected  by  poverty.  I  also
noticed that MIPAA reestablished governmental responsibility as a norm, which has
been  questioned  by  the  World  Bank  in  the  former  global  wave  of  pension
privatizations  by  praising  the  strength  of  the  market  and  warning  to  shift  “more
responsibility  to  government  than it  can handle”  (World  Bank  1994:3).  Moreover,
MIPAA  encourages  governments  to  take  action  in  order  to  implement  social
protection/social  security  systems where  they do not  exist  to  ensure  a  minimum
income  for  the  countries'  citizens.  The  plan  considers  further  non-contributory
pensions  as  the  number  one  recommendation  of  how  to  achieve  this  aim  (UN
2002:31).  That is no claim for universal systems but the implementation guide of
2008  considers  universal  pensions  and  means-tested  ones  as  the  two  models
available  (UN  2008:40-4).  In  sum,  MIPAA  is  of  major  importance  for  HelpAge
because it is: first, a general framework for actions on aging that is also recognized
by the Global South; second, useful for mainstreaming aging into social protection,
development  and  human  rights  agendas;  and  third,  an  acknowledgment  of  a
common problem definition, of governmental social responsibility, of non-contributory
124
pensions as a policy prescription. Against such a backdrop HelpAge can now state
that:
“There is growing recognition of the contribution older people make to development
and  agreement  that  the  neglect  of  older  people  is  unacceptable.  There  is  also
increasing interest in social protection, with social pensions as a key element in old
age” (HelpAge 2004:23).
However, HelpAge has not considered 'growing recognition and increasing interest'
simply  as  an outcome following  automatically  by  having  passed  MIPAA.  Instead
HelpAge began in 2002 to increase the importance of MIPAA by referring to this
agreement wherever it can. MIPAA  served to be a global governmental declaration
of  intend to better protect  older  people.  It  legitimized for HelpAge to take further
actions. The strategy to organize conferences and workshops in order to translate a
policy to a context is exempli fied in the following for the African region. It is one major
principle  of  HelpAge's  strategy  to  transfer  ownership  to  the  African  countries.
HelpAge did that by doing all the preparatory work in the background (including the
initiation and organization of the workshops) while letting the governments from the
African region and the African Union take the lead, and appear to be the of ficial
initiator and host of the events. 'Table 2' provides a chronological overview of the
events that took place in the African region with regard to aging which finally became
part of the African Union's 'Social Policy Framework'.  In the following I show that
HelpAge was involved in each of those events. Moreover, I argue that those activities
can be seen as part of a strategy called 'translating down' by narrowing down the
content from more abstract and general policy frameworks to concrete workshops
recommending USPs as a policy model.
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'Translating Down' of the Policy Framework on Aging
2002 Madrid International Plan of 
Action on Aging (MIPAA)
AU Policy Framework and Plan 
of Action on Aging
2006
2008
 Livingstone - Call for Action 
Yaoundé - 
Call for Action
       Social Policy Framework for Africa
In the same year than MIPAA was negotiated the African Union (AU) approved the
‘African Union Policy Framework and Plan of  Action on Aging in  Africa’  in 2002.
HelpAge was involved in this process from the beginning on starting to draft  the
framework  on  aging  in  1999  in  cooperation  with  the  Labour  and  Social  Affairs
Commission of the ‘Organization of African Unity’,  now ‘African Union’. HelpAge's
involvement is clearly visible by having published the framework's report  together
with the AU with a HelpAge logo on its cover as well as in the header of every page
(cf.  HelpAge  &  African  Union  2003).  Both  agendas  (MIPAA  and  the  Policy
Framework on Aging of the AU) emphasized the importance of aging with regard to
multiple issues. HelpAge used a lot of the expertise gained during the preparation of
this framework which it used for the organization of MIPAA. Though both plans were
adopted in the same year, they are not linked with another. HelpAge chose not much
to mention the UN agenda MIPAA within the AU Policy Framework on Aging or to
present the AU framework as a realization of MIPAA. In terms of world society theory
one could expect to see MIPAA in particular emphasized because MIPAA is a UN
document and, thus, highly legitimized. HelpAge turns this perspective partly upside
down. The AU Policy Framework on Aging mentioned the Madrid conference just
Table 2
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once and not as working on its implementation but, the other way round, by claiming
to have successfully in fluenced MIPAA:
“The International Plan of Action on Ageing agreed upon in Madrid during the Second
World Assembly on Ageing in April 2002, borrowed signi ficantly from the AU Policy
Framework, as the concerns of Africa’s older people are, therefore, well outlined in
the International plan” (HelpAge & African Union 2003:5).
This statement points out the ownership the African countries have with regard to the
international agenda MIPAA. Moreover, one could say that the INGO does not solely
rely  on  one  kind  of  legitimacy  but  is  using  the  legitimacy  stemming  from global
agendas as well as legitimacy that emerges when national governments and world
regional  institutions  develop  ownership  for  agendas.  On  the  one  hand,  HelpAge
refers  continuously  to  MIPAA  in  all  follow-up  conferences  and  workshops  it
organized, though, one the other hand, it was of major importance for HelpAge to
transfer ownership to African institutions. The statement above could be read as a
signal  to  the  African  countries:  “Be  proud  to  have  contributed  to  MIPAA  and
understand that  due to  these contributions MIPAA is  in  particular  addressing the
African needs and concerns!” In sum, the AU Policy Framework on Aging and MIPAA
mark the year 2002 as a turning point emphasizing the topic of aging at the global
level and in the African region. Some authors confirm the thesis that those agendas
can b understood as a starting-point for further activities at national level: 
“MIPAA and the AU Plan, together with ensuing NGO and UN advocacy work, have
clearly heightened an awareness of issues of aging among national governments and
have  prompted  a  readiness,  at  least  rhetorically,  to  develop  national  policy
responses”(Aboderin & Ferreira 2008: 56).
Building on a common understanding concerning aging HelpAge made a strong call
for social protection and social cash transfers in the African region by organizing a
follow-up event  reconfirming MIPAA four  years later  (HelpAge 2006b).  HelpAge’s
capabilities to organize this follow-up event in the region seem to be due to informal
contacts  to  African  government  of ficials  which  HelpAge  has  made  during  the
negotiations in 2002 making it  easy to send around information and invite policy-
makers to events (HelpAge Interview No. 1). In March 2006 the ‘Intergovernmental
Regional Conference on Basic Social Protection in Africa’ took place in Livingstone
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(Zambia), and resulted in the ‘Livingstone Call for Action’. The event was initiated,
organized  and  managed  by  HelpAge  and  funded  by  the  United  Kingdom's
Department for International Development (DFID). However, HelpAge was not the
one  inviting  the  participating  African  governments.  Instead  HelpAge  asked  the
African Union and the Zambian government to hold the conference, which seems to
me as an important strategy to transfer ownership to the African governments. As
one of HelpAge’s policy of ficers said:
“We had massively negotiations we the Zambian government. We didn’t wanted it to
be HelpAge’s conference. […] So the president of Zambia opened the conference;
not HelpAge International. HelpAge International was at the conference fairly invisible
though we organized the conference” (HelpAge Interview No.1).
The conference seemed to be part of the African Unions efforts to develop a concept
for  social  protection.  The  preparation  of  the  social  policy  framework  of  the  AU
(adopted in 2008) was already in preparation at this time so that the discussions at
the  Livingstone  conference  fed  into  the  social  policy  framework.  At  Livingstone
HelpAge  managed  to  narrow  the  broad  discussion  on  aging  within  the  social
protection frame down to a strong emphasize of cash-based solutions. The SCTs
encompassed in particular older people, and social pensions as a concrete policy
model. How did HelpAge manage to do that? I argue that HelpAge used a normative
mode of in fluencing by mainly relying on arguments referring to former conferences
and  agreements.  Moreover,  the   impression  that  the  implementation  of  norms is
urgent  was  reinforced  by  learning  effects  stemming  from  intense  and  direct
experiences from a field trip to the SCT pilot project in Kalomo (Zambia).
A  closer  look  at  the  conference  document  revealed  the  following
argumentation of HelpAge: HelpAge emphasized the mandate of the African Union
making  the  AU  responsible  to  care  for  older  people  as  a  group  of  particular
vulnerable people. According to the Livingstone report the AU came into being to free
Africa from its colonial legacies and building independent nations, and to tackle the
continent’s greatest challenges: poverty,  inequality and promoting the rights of all
Africans (HelpAge 2006b:2). According to the Livingstone report the AU has pledged
to draw up strategies and policies to face those challenges, and place people at the
center of development, in particular, to support marginalized and vulnerable groups
(ibid.).  The norm to take special  care for  vulnerable groups within  social  policies
directly  took older  people on board,  even though in a row with  children,  women,
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unemployed, families, and people with disabilities. HelpAge managed to  bring in
older people directly by emphasizing that:
“among others, member states committed themselves to improve the living conditions
of  older  persons,  through  better  social  protection  services  including  improved
pensions, health and other social security schemes” (HelpAge 2006b:2). 
As a result the 'Livingstone Call for Action' highlighted explicitly social cash transfer
programs including “social pensions and regular cash transfers to vulnerable children
and households, older people and people with disabilities” (HelpAge 2006b:5). In this
regard, the emphasis of social pensions is noticeable.
Next  to  the  emphasize  of  the AU mandate  and the commitment  made by
countries to improve the living conditions of  older people, HelpAge made several
connections to normative agendas. On the one hand, HelpAge brought in the rights
perspective by emphasizing that the development programs of the AU Commission
adopt  a  rights-based  approach  and  human  security  (HelpAge  2006b:2)  an  by
referring to the Human Rights Declaration of 1948 (HelpAge 2006b:4) with the 'right
to social  security'  (art.22 UDHR) and the right to an 'adequate standard of living'
(art.25 UDHR). On the other hand, the Livingstone conference was presented as
being part of a legacy of the 'African Union Policy Framework and Plan of Action on
Aging'  (2002)  and  the  'Ouagadougou  Declaration  on  Employment  and  Poverty
Alleviation in Africa' (2004). Both aspects do not come with technical advice as part
of cognitive in fluencing but raise the normative account of the 'Livingstone Call for
Action'.
Apart  from increasing  the ownership in  the African region,  and committing
countries in particular to SCTs and aging, the Livingstone conference increased the
normative effect of the argumentation by providing vivid learning effects. The ‘Pilot
Social Cash Transfer Scheme’ in Kalomo District (Zambia) of the German GTZ (now
GIZ) started in 2003 and had a strong impact on HelpAge's own thinking because it
was a vivid example that demonstrated that social cash transfers are doable in low-
income countries. 
“The fascinating thing about Kalomo was that a lot of the people that the community
identi fied  with  cash  transfer  ended  up  being  older  people.  70%  to  80%  of  the
beneficiaries in Kalomo were older people. […] It had such a stimulating and thought
provoking impact on us as an organization, because there were different opinions in
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HelpAge around whether we can or should argue for universal pension, or not. […]
We thought: ‘wouldn’t it be great if we could bring together government and other key
stakeholders to have a similar learning process?! Let’s expose them to the project.
Let’s bring them to Kalomo, let’s bring them together, and let’s talk about it’” (HelpAge
Interview No.1)
Indeed the cash transfer project in Kalomo itself had two main objectives: to test a
targeted social cash transfer to the poorest 10% living in Kalomo to “reduce extreme
poverty, hunger and starvation”, and to “generate information on the feasibility” in a
low  income  context  (MCDSS  &  GTZ  2006:7).  To  enhance  the  learning  effect
HelpAge  organized  field  trips  for  the  African  Ministers  and  other  governmental
participants which directly met the people living in poverty but benefiting from the
SCT pilot project in Kalomo (HelpAge 2006b). The impression of this experience was
rather intense as most policy makers even in Africa are not confronted with poverty in
their  everyday  life  (Consultant  Interview).  The  learning  effect  was  supported  by
country examples presented at the conference showing a lot of countries from the
African context as already having several social programs in place. Some countries
appear  as  pioneers  and provide  lessons learned  whereas  others  show room for
improvements. The provision of regional examples seems to be important for inner
regional comparability in order to stimulate competition, mutual learning and making
certain country examples prominent for policy-making in Africa.
Though  the  Livingstone  conference  was  not  about  social  pensions  but
generally about social cash transfers targeted to the poorest of the poor, I argue that
it aimed at creating learning effects to set the stage for universal social  pensions.
Having  emphasized  cash-based  social  policies  for  most  vulnerable  groups,  and
having provided practically vivid examples of older people representing the majority
of the poorest of the poor in Kalomo, helps HelpAge to refer much easier to social
pensions in national contexts.
In  a  final  step  HelpAge  provided  a  more  concrete  account  of  what  it
understood by cash-based social policies in Africa. The INGO organized a follow-up
workshop  in  Yaoundé  (Cameroon)  just  half  a  year  after  Livingstone  in  order  to
emphasis in particular the policy model of universal social pensions (USPs). Again,
HelpAge made sure to invite the Government of Cameroon and the African Union to
open the workshop. With slightly more than hundred participants from eleven African
countries the workshop was again a huge event which resulted in the 'Yaoundé Call
for Action'. Together with the 'Regional Center for the Welfare of Older People in
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Cameroon' as a main driver of this event Yaoundé was foremost focused about older
people and criticized “the absence of  social  protection measures to  protect  older
people  in  their  advance  age,  especially  those  without  access  to  formal  social
pensions” (HelpAge, Government of Cameroon, AU 2006:2). Thus, as in Livingstone,
this  call  for  action  asked for  the  development  of  national  action-plans.  This  time
USPs were explicitly mentioned as a policy model to be placed in “comprehensive
social protection schemes” in a “national coordination framework” (ibid.). Moreover,
this event reconfirmed the global and regional normative frameworks by referring to
MIPAA and the AU  Policy Framework on Aging in 2002. Continuous reference to
abstract agendas and policy frameworks in different contexts is a method to enrich
them with further details and policy suggestions with each conference (focused on
'social cash transfers') and workshop (focused on 'universal social pensions).  
Finally, I brie fly want to sketch the 'Social Policy Framework for Africa' passed
by the AU in 2008; not because it is in particular relevant for the description of the
'translating down' strategy, but to show how the topic of aging finally was represented
within the regional African policy framework which is suppose to be an orientation for
African policy-makers. The social  policy framework for Africa aims “to provide an
overarching  policy  structure  to  assist  African  Union  Member  States  in   the
development of their national social policies to promote human empowerment and
development”  (AU 2008:5).  The main topic  of  this  framework  is  social  protection
introducing a perspective that is tackling poverty and securing people's lives directly
instead of relying on economic policies that might only indirectly contribute to poverty
reduction through 'trickle down' effects: “The framework moves away from treating
social  development  as  subordinated  to  economic  growth,  but  justi fies  social
development as a goal in its own right” (ibid.). This is a very fruitful policy framework
for HelpAge's advocacy on social pensions; however, as social protection is such a
broad frame aging is  just  one issue among many others.  The framework  knows
fourteen more topics as part of the social policy framework and each one builds on its
own set of agendas. The topics of health, children, and gender encompass by far the
most agendas. It meets the eye that aging in Africa builds merely on one agenda
which is the 'AU Policy Framework and Plan of Action on Aging' developed in 2002
by HelpAge with – and for – the African Union. However, it shows that aging finally
has a standing in social policies and that it was due to HelpAge which invested a lot
of effort and expertise to the design of African policy frameworks.
Even though the examples were stemming from the African region I wouldn't
be surprised if HelpAge would use the strategy of 'translating down' in other world
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regions as well. Without having all the details about the conferences in the Asian
region, the sequence of events looks very similar to the example I presented from the
African region. In Asia HelpAge held regional conferences of considerable size, and
made  income  security  a  prominent  topic  in  2006.  The  policy-makers  on  this
conference agreed to take “further steps to advocate for income security in old age”
(HelpAge 2006c: 21). One year later in 2007 HelpAge organized the ‘Asian Meeting
on Income Security’ (UNESCAP 2007) as a ground breaking event at world regional
level,  held  together  with  UNESCAP  (United  Nations  Economic  and  Social
Commission for Asia and the Paci fic) which was calling for national follow-ups of
MIPAA. Following to this event HelpAge organized a workshop with patronage of
government  of ficials  of  the  Asian  region  where  social  pensions  were  presented.
“From  there  on  there  were  more  speci fic  workshops,  trainings,  and  events  in
Indonesia, in Thailand, in Vietnam, and other countries” (HelpAge Interview No.6).
This brief overview showed that the main features of the strategy of 'translating down'
can be confirmed. HelpAge set up regional events in order to raise awareness on
issues already part of abstract agendas and bringing in the policy model of social
pensions through more action orientated follow-up workshops.
The main argument presented in this section is that HelpAge is using regional
conferences  and  workshops  translating  abstract  agreements  from global  level  to
regional contexts. Based on the assumption that global agreements do not turn into
effect as an automatism and it is  unclear what elements of a global agreement are
prioritized  global  conferences  are  a  method  to  add  this  focus  later  on  and  to
condense vague norms so much that in final workshops HelpAge's concrete policy
model  of  universal  social  pensions  can  be  presented.  As  an  outcome  these
conferences help to shape a mutual understanding of the issues that are important to
HelpAge so that it is more easy to advocate USPs. Above that these events can be
seen as giving HelpAge the mandate and legitimacy to be active at national level and
to approach the policy-makers with particular concerns on aging and social pensions.
Finally, this strategy includes attempts to stimulate learning effects that are not based
on 'teaching' (telling countries what to do) but 'learning' by sharing experiences and
examples. Experiences made in field trips can raise the account on particular issues,
and  sharing  country-examples  from  the  region  can  make  certain  policy  models
cognitive available to policy makers. This rather indirect form of advocacy based on
learning together with the ability to create a mandate and get commitments seems to
be valuable  enough for  HelpAge to  engage  at  the  global  level  in  an  in fluencing
process that takes several years.
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Conclusion
In this part I highlighted HelpAge's policy models and strategies of how to make use
of global institutions and norms and how to cooperate with the global community. Of
particular interest have been the strategies of how policy ideas can have an impact
on national policy-making via policy models and conferences. Far from being self-
evident I found that HelpAge's operations on in fluencing policy-making are inspired
by an ideal model of 'universal social pensions' (USPs); though more often HelpAge
does not insist on the universality component, and rather speaks of 'social pensions'. 
This  model,  as  being  pushed at  first  solely  by  some individuals within  the
organization, became of ficial HelpAge policy and explicitly advocating as a model
from the year 2004 on. Main elements of this model is that social pensions should be
government-led,  non-contributory,  nationwide  and  appropriate  with  regard  to  the
eligibility age and monthly benefit level. The reason for governments to implement
this  policy  is  argued based on the assumption that  older  people are a particular
vulnerable group that deserves social  protection as a matter of the human rights.
Instead of arguing that social cash transfers to older people are some kind of an
investment that pays-off through macro-economic effects, HelpAge emphasizes that
it simply is a human right and, therefor, governments should implement it. 
The INGO is active at global and regional level to increase awareness for the
importance of social  protection in form of SCTs to older people by crafting global
agendas, committing national governments to it, and translating the abstract norms of
those  agendas  down  to  regions  via  conferences  and  workshops  where  national
governments  learn  about  the  importance  of  social  protection,  of  cash-based
assistance,  and  of  social  pensions,  as  well  as  of  HelpAge's  preferred  model  of
universal social pensions. Moreover, HelpAge mainstreams the issue of aging into
many different global issue areas, like health, education, rights, livelihoods and work,
emphasizing the need to take older people in those areas as well in consideration.
With regard to social pensions HelpAge has set this policy model as a centerpiece
within packages that highlight the link between each issue area and social pensions,
so that HelpAge can advocate this policy model from very different angles. The main
function  of  mainstreaming  as  well  as  of  translating  down  seems  to  be  to  raise
awareness for social pensions and to legitimize a mandate for claiming a national
implementation.  I  conclude  that  due  to  its  rights-based  approach  HelpAge's
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interactions  with  the  global  community  and  its  usage  of  norms  from  the  social
protection agenda is particularly strong.
3.3. Advice on National Institution-building:
 Becoming a 'Hub of Knowledge' 
Policy-making  is  much about  technical  details.  Normative  pressure  can  stimulate
policy-making but the process itself is driven by expertise. Thus, advice can become
an effective tool  to in fluence policy-making.  HelpAge uses particular  strategies in
order to stimulate that national governments take social pensions in consideration for
policy making.  This  is  not  about  governments to understand that  social  pensions
might be a good thing which is desirable and legitimate, and thus, prioritize this policy
model. That would be the effect of global norms and normative agendas. Advice is
about governments to understand and learn about the technical aspects of the policy
that enables them to better implement this policy. 
In this section I present the main findings indicating that the INGO does not
insist on a one-to-one translation of the normatively advocated model but advices
countries on the different components and how these components are modi fiable
according to national budgets. As the main strategy of HelpAge I identify that the
INGO tries to establish itself as a 'hub of knowledge' by being close to policy-makers
and earning reputation of being an expert in the field of age-related social policies. In
the following I  explain  the adaptability of  HelpAge's policy model  and of  how the
INGO is making use of its hub-function to 'deliver' advice about the implementation of
its policy model to the national level.
What are the arguments behind HelpAge's technical advice?
I already explained that HelpAge's activities on in fluencing are inspired by a policy
model  of  universal  social  pensions  (USPs)  which  serves  as  an  ideal  model.  In
concrete HelpAge rather speaks of social pensions blurring the line if it talks about
universal or means-tested pensions. It is one important argument for social pensions
to argue its feasibility because its introduction is supposed to be affordable also in
low income countries. 
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Affordability.  Though  HelpAge's  arguments  are  focused  on  USPs,  the
argumentation about affordability always refers to means-test ones. That seems to
be due to the fact that HelpAge tries to argue evidence-based whenever it can and
references to already implemented USPs are hard to find. Moreover, affordability is
argued in terms of total costs of the program as a share of the national GDP. It is
tempting to take means-tested programs for the calculation because they appear to
be  much  less  costly  than  USPs.  HelpAge's  2004  flagship  publication  on  social
pensions  mixes  its  arguments  for  USPs  and  the  affordability  of  means-tested
programs in an interesting way: 
“The experience of existing schemes demonstrates that universal provision of social
pensions to older people is administratively simpler and less expensive than means-
tested provision.  Evidence from countries that are already implementing large-scale
social pension schemes indicates that the overall cost of these schemes, in terms of
GDP, is relatively low. In Namibia, the social pension programme costs less than 2
per  cent  of  GDP.  South  Africa’s  scheme,  funded  through  general  taxation,
represented 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2000. The Mozambique targeted programme is
scheduled to be US$13 million in 2005, or 1.4 per cent of the government budget”
(HelpAge 2004:9; emphasize added).
Although it seems that this section of the report argues in favor of the affordability of
universal  provision of social  pensions the country examples are all  about  means-
tested pensions without  saying that  at  any point.  Many more examples from the
report provide evidence that HelpAge's favored policy model of USPs is charged with
good argumentation partly stemming from means-tested pension programs. 
That  is  not  to  say  the  INGO cannot  argue for  a  reasonable  price  without
reference to means-tested programs. It can and it does; however, the wish to present
evidence-based examples seems to be rather strong. In favor of those examples a
lack of precision in argumentation is accepted. The examples above estimate costs
for a social pension of less than 1,5% GDP. Social pensions as being affordable is an
argument that HelpAge has confirmed in later publications by listing 50 countries and
calculating the costs for a social pension of about 1.5% GDP with 65 as the year of
eligibility (HelpAge 2011c). At its website on affordability in 2013 HelpAge estimates
the cost between 0.7% and 2.5% GDP for each and every over 60 years11. In the
2004 publication HelpAge shrunk the target group by rising the age of eligibility to 75
11 http://www.pension-watch.net/key-debates/key-debates/affordability/
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years. As a result the average costs for a social pension are less than 0.5% of GDP
(HelpAge 2004:45). 
Variability of  the  eligibility age is a component HelpAge has used from the
beginning on in order to respond to national contexts. Instead of advocating means-
tested  pensions  HelpAge  continues  to  advocate  USPs  and  prefers  to  allow  that
compromises are made with regard to eligibility age (e.g. 60, 65, 70) to shrink the
target group and with regard to the benefit-level (e.g. starting at 5 dollar a month). On
its website the organization has made available a simple tool for cost calculation that
can display the costs of a USP for each country according to the age and benefit-
level chosen12. What meets the eye is that the calculation is always and only for a
universal social  pension and – though changeable – the default  age is set at  60
years. It seems that the most preferred option for modi fications is the benefit-level.
HelpAge upholds the norm that every citizens above 60 years deserves at least any
kind of a pension.
Targeting mechanism.  Having  explained  that  HelpAge  has a  clear  policy
preference also with regard to the parameters of the policy model I also explained
that HelpAge often calculates with the means-tested version of social pensions and is
also  flexible  with  regard  to  the  parameters  of  implemented  social  pensions.
Moreover, HelpAge has not only normative arguments in place like their preferred
rights-based approach and a globally legitimated social protection agenda speci fied
in UN conventions, or the  MDGs' focus on poverty reduction. Above that HelpAge
tries from time to time to  just  show the  practical  aspects of  social  pensions with
regard  to  poverty  reduction.  It  was  an  insight  that  HelpAge  gained  through  the
previously mentioned SCT project in Livingston which focused on the poorest of the
poor. It turned out that most of the very poor where older people (also called 'poorest
of  the  poor'  or  'ultrapoor'  in  the  global  development  community).  Thus,  social
pensions  become  a  simple  targeting  mechanism for  the  mitigation  of  extreme
poverty. Here social pensions are not presented as normative content that countries
should take on board because it is a right in its own, but they are presented as a
technique or a tool in order to achieve a very different aim, like poverty reduction.
And because policies for the 'poorest of the poor' enjoy much legitimacy in the global
development community the argument of social pensions as a targeting mechanism
is well-suited in order to make governments prioritize social pensions above other
kinds of policies. As a the policy of ficer for strategic planning at HelpAge told me: 
12 http://www.pension-watch.net/pensions/about-social-pensions/about-social-
pensions/pensions-calculator/
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“We would  not  tell  governments:  ‘You  need  to  do pensions first  of  all,  and then
everything else.’ But we would say to governments: ‘You have huge poverty rates
across households, and you need to start somewhere’” (HelpAge Interview No.1).
HelpAge advocates social pensions as among the best policy options to start with
because they don't cost much, implemented as a universal program they are very
simple and cost-effective to  be administered, and they are effective in order to target
the poorest of the poor. 
The two points  of  HelpAge's  argumentation,  which  I  want  to  highlight  with
regard to their policy model, are flexibility on components like age and benefit level in
order  to  argue  for  its  affordability  even  in  a  low-income context,  and,  secondly,
flexibility on the purpose of the policy introduction, which can be part  of  different
topics (compare 'packaging' in the previous section) or – in a very technical sense –
simply a targeting mechanism for poverty reduction. 
The next section shows how HelpAge tries to become a hub of knowledge in
order to be in fluential  with advice at national  level  with the provision of concrete
advice for policy-making.
Hub of Knowledge: 
1. Entering the political arena
HelpAge does understand in fluencing as a long term process that can take several
years. Under the buzzword 'political economy' the INGO considers that its efforts on
influencing are not simply about the delivery of the best argument but about the right
timing as well. Windows of opportunities, such as elections, global crises or national
public debates, are important to win the support of a political majority on particular
issues. Therefor, the INGO engages in a constant advocacy processes feeding the
political process with knowledge in order to change cognitive patterns for program
introductions. HelpAge's country of fices play a key role in this process. Even though
these of fices are dependent on funding for projects HelpAge manages to retain a
permanent presence by making sure that follow-up projects are available. The INGO
tries to establish personal long-term relations to policy-makers based on some kind
of professional friendships. Meeting a minister for dinner and discussing particular
issues is one example (HelpAge Interview No.6). This is network-building based on
trust and credibility as the main resources which can grow over time. To get a first
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contact to a ministry is crucial. Often it is fairly simple to contact the ministry of social
affairs in developing countries because those ministries are among the weakest with
low budgets. Any help and support – like coming from a large and credible INGO – is
very welcome. 
Yet,  to create a critical  momentum is more dif ficult.  An example stemming
from Peru shows that HelpAge uses multiple stages of influencing in order to gain
access to the political  arena (HelpAge Interview No.2). The first phase was about
finding opinion leaders, which are people like for example popular academic writers
for  columns  in  newspapers.  In  this  way  the  topic  receives  public  attention  and
becomes a matter of national debate. In a second phase HelpAge was looking for
allies  among  organizations  working  in  that  country.  International  partners  like
UNFPA, UNDP and the ILO have helped a lot in the case of Peru. Supported by a
national debate, and expertise and support  of  other global organizations the third
phase targeted the political system in order to gain political support. Especially with
the ILO the collaboration was tight because of the ‘Social Protection Floor-Initiative’.
As HelpAge said: 'the ILO turned out to be a door-opener to work with the parliament'
(ibid.). After convincing the parliament it was possible for HelpAge to start working
with the senators in a fourths phase. When the media, other global organizations,
and parts of the parliament are on board and the ministries still cannot decide on the
implementation, in a fifths phase, HelpAge tries to increase public interest by carrying
out  public discussions on social  pensions in different parts of the country.  In this
example and with this strategy HelpAge was able to turn around the leading opinion
which initially  was against  social  pensions,  so that  within three years Peru got  a
means-tested pension.
Though HelpAge most certainly was aiming at the introduction of a universal
social pension (USP) the resulting social pension in Peru was a means-tested one.
The resulting  version was a result of a dialectic process that is conciliating diverging
positions; in other words: a compromise. HelpAge has to make such compromises in
order  to  get  the  policy  accepted and I  argue that  HelpAge also  can make such
compromises because the INGO follows a strategy of  gradual expansion. I explain
this strategy in a later section because HelpAge's ability to stimulate protest does
play a role here and support HelpAge's activities of delivering technical expertise.
Especially for the first phases the important methodology of HelpAge was to
identify champions, as HelpAge calls policy entrepreneurs (HelpAge Interview No.1).
Champions are people that are more open to the new policy prescriptions than others
and have the potential to convince others. Those persons are  crucial for alliance-
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building and, if the contact can be stabilized over time, they are valuable bits of an
informal network for advocacy. 
I  do  understand  policy  formulation  from  the  perspective  of  in fluencing  in
stages as described above as a dialectic process between policy suggestions made
by the INGO and the reactions of different stakeholders. The outcome of a dialectic
process in one arena is than carried on to the next one. That does not mean that
HelpAge is partly giving up its vision of introducing a universal social pension, it is
more acknowledging that compromises have to be made to open the door for further
suggestions  to  be  made  in  the  coming  years  and  opportunities.  This  is  gradual
expansion that is like the introduction of a program dependent on an appropriate
window of opportunity.
Hub of Knowledge: 
2. Sharing best-practices & delivering expertise
When access to the policy arena is ensured, the question arises of how HelpAge is
trying to inject relevant knowledge. The organization is using its established informal
network and tackles two challenges of which HelpAge is confronted with, that is the
general question of how to put social pensions higher on the governmental agenda,
and the speci fic question of how to in fluence the ministries of finance because those
are  the  ministries  that  in  developing  countries  have  to  be  convinced in  order  to
introduce policy innovations. I show that in each situation HelpAge is using a direct
and  an  indirect  strategy  of  knowledge  provision,  either  by  facilitating  learning  by
organizing  events  of  best-practice  sharing  or  by  delivering  expertise  enabling
ministries.
For HelpAge attempts to push social pensions higher on the political agenda
the  organization  is  using  its  informal  network  to  reach  national  policy  of ficers.
Nevertheless, this is a challenging task because governments are always subject to
multiple  demands  and  multiple  priorities.  Raising  awareness  and  continuously
engaging in advocacy is important to get topics higher on the agenda. HelpAge is
active at national level in a variety of ways:
“Our engagement with government includes  training on issues of social  protection
and social pensions, undertaking studies answering key questions on the feasibility of
social  pensions,  supporting government  players  to  strategize  on  building  broad
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governmental  support,  and  contributing to  frameworks,  policies  and  strategies  on
social protection” (HelpAge 2012:2).
The main strategy of those activities is to stimulate learning effects. It is not self-
evident  that  learning is  an effective strategy for advocacy.  Many issue areas are
ideologically charged in a way that policy prescriptions are dismissed even though it
might be rational to introduce them. However, making policies for older people is less
problematic because the topic of aging is widely seen as a non-confrontational issue
based on the broad consensus that aging is an issue everybody will be confronted
with at a certain time (HelpAge Interview No.6). Practical experiences of HelpAge’s
staff have shown that regarding the topic of aging governments are well intentioned:
“Even Myanmar in its worst times of dictatorship was willing to do something for their
population”  (ibid.).  That  allows  for  in fluencing  based  on  good  arguments  and
expertise. The necessity to create such learning effects is high with respect to the
challenge  influencing  national  policies  of  whole  countries.  Policy  implementation
cannot  be  realized  by  IOs  or  INGOs  but  national  governments  have  to  take
responsibility and ownership. 
“We understand that in a country like China or Indonesia you can implement one, ten,
or hundred projects and that is like a drop in the ocean, but what you can do is gather
lessons  from  those  implementations  that  can  be  expressed  in  policies  that  are
supported and funded” (HelpAge Interview No.6).
Practical knowledge and technical aspects for policy formulation become important
resources to create learning effects. Using its informal network and targeting national
governments  HelpAge  uses  cognitive  in fluencing  by  facilitating  exchange  of
expertise. Interestingly, HelpAge policy of ficers made the experience that it seems to
be that government of ficials accept knowledge better if it is stemming from empirical
examples from the region able to demonstrate impact (HelpAge Interview No.6). This
is why HelpAge has a chosen an indirect way of influencing. Like at global and world
regional level HelpAge took the approach to invite governments to workshops and
meetings where countries from the region can share their experiences.  An example
of such process can be found in Myanmar: 
“We had an event in the capital  of Myanmar, where we brought some NGO from
Thailand,  we  brought  some governmental  of ficial  from the  Philippines,  somebody
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from Vietnam also and one of us, and we met with the government to share how they
had developed policies on aging in different contexts, because Myanmar was starting
to  develop  their  policy  on  aging  and  they  weren’t  clear  how  to  do  it”  (HelpAge
Interview No.6).
The strategy used here is again the role of a facilitator. HelpAge rarely delivers know-
how  directly,  but  is  setting-up  strategic  workshops,  meetings  and  events  to  led
selected knowledge diffuse.  The role  to  select  who is  invited  gives  HelpAge the
possibility to determine what voices are heard and what expertise is shared. Though,
HelpAge has just the role of the facilitator it can in fluence the learning process. 
“It was a learning process. In that way you do two things, you build a legitimacy of
HelpAge, because we are not giving any bible, we are providing experiences, and at
the same time you provide knowledge, you provide more understanding of issues that
can be used for developing a better policy” (HelpAge Interview No.6).
This  interaction  is  described  as  an exchange process where  capacity  is  build  at
governmental ministries and HelpAge in return gains trust and credibility usable for
prospective advocacy. Being known for its capacity to provide practical knowledge
makes HelpAge a credible player government of ficials turn to when being in need of
advice. As one of HelpAge's policy of ficers from the Asian region summed it up:
“HelpAge can become sort  of  a hub of  knowledge,  hub of  understanding,  hub of
advice, hub of exchanges, hub of promoting best practices and I think that will be
more and more our work.” (HelpAge Interview No.6).
The  function  of  being  a  hub  of  knowledge for  government  of ficials  emphasizes
HelpAge's dual role of being, on the one hand, merely a facilitator, and, on the other
hand, an active player itself because of its outstanding role. Furthermore, this role is
emphasized by the fact that HelpAge is by far the biggest and almost the only global
actor working on aging globally as well as nationally and locally. Thus, it has a strong
standing  in  the  national  area  where  aging  is  a  niche  with  few  actors  involved
(HelpAge Interview No.1).
Besides  the  organization  of  workshops  and  events  as  an  indirect  way  of
in fluencing  where country  experts  from the region can share their  insights  about
social pension development there is also a direct delivery of expertise from HelpAge
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to national ministries in the Global South. For the delivery of expertise the ministries
of  finance do not  necessarily  need to  be approached directly.  Another  promising
strategy that HelpAge usually takes is to enable the ministries of social welfare to
argue the case for social pensions towards the ministries of finance. This approach is
taken because the ministries of social  welfare are the natural  counterparts of the
INGO. Moreover,  it  is  usually rather simple to establish contact to the ministry of
social  welfare  because those ministries  are  among the  weakest  in  the  set-up  of
national ministries and keen to get support of large INGO like HelpAge, which is
offering  support  (HelpAge  Interview  No.1).  The  most  important  resource  for  this
support  is  expertise about  the feasibility  of  social  pensions:  “Key to  our  work on
social  protection  is  convincing  government  players  of  the  feasibility  of  social
pensions,  and  supporting  allies  within  government  to  make  the  case  within  the
political system” (HelpAge 2012:2). This is why HelpAge included this aspect in its
2004 flagship publication and welcomes possibilities to refer to other studies (e.g.
DFID 2005) arguing for social pension's affordability.
To show the feasibility  of  social  pensions is  important  because convincing
ministries of finance is a challenging task. Every introduction of a new cash transfer
system  means  a  heavy  shift  in  resource  allocations,  even  if  just  10%  of  the
government  budget  is  needed.  It  is  not  likely  that  other  resorts  voluntarily  would
accept  cuts  in  their  budgets  easily.  Thus,  HelpAge  has  to  provide  convincing
arguments. In Latin America, HelpAge chose to invite the ministries of finance of
several countries. This is the most direct intervention of HelpAge that I could find at
national  level.  The  INGO  set  up  a  micro-simulations  training  in  2008  inviting
government of ficials from Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru and enable them to
calculate  the  costs  of  social  pensions  (HelpAge  2010).  HelpAge  initiated  this
undertaking by convincing the Bolivian government first suggesting free training for
micro simulations of cash transfer systems for older people. With the approval of the
government it was possible to invite the ministry of finance of the other countries. It
was an intensive training for just 10 participants with three teachers. The courses
were run with the expertise of the Economic Policy Research Institute, South Africa
(EPRI) and support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). HelpAge describes the
micro-simulations  training  as  a  very  costly,  intensive,  but  also  very  successful
method  to  in fluence  government  of ficials  (HelpAge  Interview  No.2).  HelpAge
organized a comparable event with EPRI in the Asian region as well, however, there
the focus was more on awareness raising, whereas for the Latin American region
HelpAge  just  wanted  a  concentrated  version  of  the  quantitative  facts  and
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calculations. It turned out that in the following two years the participants of the micro-
simulations  course  became key  figures  in  their  country  in  the  process of  policy-
making for  the introduction of  social  pensions,  like  Paraguay introduced a social
pension in 2008 and Peru in 2010. In both cases the year of introduction fell together
with an election and change in government. When in Ecuador social unrest emerged
around  the  discussions  of  a  new  constitution  it  were  the  policy  experts  which
participated in HelpAge's micro-simulations course that were in charge to redesign
the small  SCT program  Bono de Desarrollo Humano in order to make it  a social
pension. As a result the government pledged to scale this program up to make it a
universal social pension. The examples show that the mere delivery of expertise can
turn  out  to  be  really  in fluential.  Especially  the  approach  to  directly  target  the
ministries of finance has turned out to be influential.
Conclusion
Advice at national level easily can be considered to be important in order to influence
policy-making.  I  found  that  HelpAge  delivers  expertise  to  national  ministries  or
facilitates  direct  information  exchange.  However,  this  is  only  a  part  of  HelpAge's
activities  at  national  level.  Having  access  and  good  working  relations  with
governmental policy of ficers which are part of an informal network between HelpAge
and  the  ministries  is  not  just  functional  to  deliver  technical  know-how and  best-
practices as a hub of knowledge. Instead HelpAge is using as well its connections
and  relationships  to  governmental  of ficials  to  advocate  global  norms  and  raise
awareness (cf. HelpAge's activities on advocacy in the previous chapter). Moreover,
the informal relationships to governmental of ficials play as well an important role for
local campaigning (cf. HelpAge's activities on incentives in the next chapter). What I
want to emphasize is that in HelpAge's case all the activities are deeply connected
with each other. In a nutshell, HelpAge's delivery of expertise is essential advice in
order to increase the acceptance of social pensions. Moreover, on the one hand,
HelpAge being a 'hub of  knowledge'  allows to emphasizes the importance of  the
rights-based character of social pensions by referring to global rights and globally
made commitments of the government. On the other hand, HelpAge points out the
potential  of  a social  pension introduction for winning votes and responding to the
people's needs (cf. next chapter). Accompanying its activities on advice and delivery
of technical knowledge with global norms and policy models and making use of local
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campaigning  is  what  HelpAge  calls  the  twin-track-approach.  It  is  a  particular
emphasis of the interconnectedness of HelpAge's modes of in fluencing.
Policy-making can be stimulated by  global  agreements  and norms can be
translated down via conferences and workshops. However, global agreements and
norms do not automatically turn into effect. Without technical advice delivered directly
at national level it is much harder to in fluence the process of policy-making. Thus, it
might be no coincidence that organizations that turn out to be in fluential on policy-
making  tend  to  be  highly  active  with  the  delivery  of  advice.  I  have  shown  that
HelpAge  establishes  long-term  relations  to  policy-maker  and  tries  to  earn  a
reputation of being a 'hub of knowledge'. To do that HelpAge needs to find allies in
order to gain access to the policy arena.  'Champions'  within the government and
among  IOs,  INGOs  and  NGOs  which  are  open  towards  cash-based  policy
innovations of social protection become important door-opener allowing HelpAge to
in fluence in stages until a supportive alliance for social pensions can be formed. The
informal  relationship  to  policy-makers  enable  HelpAge  to  provide  expertise  and
stimulate policy-learning on a regular basis waiting for 'windows of opportunity'  to
pop-up. 
I identi fied two strategies in order to in fluence policy-making – a general and a
speci fic one. First, HelpAge used its function of being a 'hub of knowledge' to provide
evidence-based learning by facilitating that  countries share experiences and best
practices  with  regard  to  social  pensions  on  workshops  and  meetings.  Second,
HelpAge provides expertise for the social ministries in order to be argue the case for
social pensions trying to convince the ministries of finance, and HelpAge began to
target  more  directly  the  ministries  of  finance  enabling  them  with  courses  on
affordability to calculate the costs of social pensions. 
Finally,  I  would  like  to  emphasis  that  HelpAge's  focus  on  country-led
development and its pragmatism allows this INGO to be more in fluential by being
more directly connected with the national policy-makers. Instead of arguing purely
from a global-rights based position, HelpAge tailors its policy model in order to make
it fit to various national conditions and budgets. The model of social pensions can be
modi fied in order to make low-budget versions of it. This does not mean that HelpAge
is giving up on its ideal version of universal social pensions, but it gives proof of the
organizations ability to make compromises in order to be influential. 
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3.4. Incentives for National Institution-Building:
 Local Campaigning for Policy Implementation  
It is unusual to expect an INGO to have a mechanism that can represent a strong
incentive as money can do or activities which may have an impact on political power
relations. Most INGOs do not have that much funding to in fluence governments with
money or have not mechanism beyond lobbying that would be politically relevant.
Compared  with  organizations  (like  UNICEF)  working  for  issues  on  the  topic  of
children,  HelpAge  has  considerably  less  money  for  in fluencing  available.  Yet,
HelpAge has developed a strategy to provide a politically relevant incentive which the
INGO uses to in fluence the political system in order to facilitate the introduction of
(universal) social pensions. 
In this section I  present  that HelpAge is stimulating local  campaigning and
organizing local movements of older people which represent a growing share of the
population and become politically relevant; especially in democratic systems. Those
older people' movements claim rights deriving from global agreements which national
governments have signed. HelpAge can steer this political pressure via campaigning
organized  with  older  people  themselves.  By  doing  so,  HelpAge  can  gather
momentum for the introduction of programs. Continuous protests allow to pressure
for the gradual expansion of social pension systems. 
In  the  following,  I  explain  how HelpAge  managed  to  organize  those  older
people movements, how this process is organized and the function it  has for the
INGO. As a bottom-line I point-out that this process of in fluencing aims to facilitate
the  introduction  of  universal  social  pensions  through  continuous  advocacy  and
political pressure. A long and steady process of in fluencing is the key for HelpAge's
effectiveness on influencing because it  is  functional  to gather momentum and for
gradual expansion.
It all began with HelpAge's involvement in the development of the Madrid Plan
of Action on Aging (MIPAA) of 2002 which was a milestone for policy-making and
was  reconfirmed  as  such  a  milestone  through  further  international  and  regional
conferences.  While HelpAge was quite  satis fied with the development of  national
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action plans as a reaction to MIPAA, they were not with the implementation process
within the countries:
“Governments  where  beginning  to  put  in  national  action  plans  on  aging.  Many
countries have indeed national action plans on aging which relate to implementing
what’s being agreed upon. [...] The problem is that they are not being implemented,
because aging is a side issue in national debates and hasn’t got a seat at the table.
Like  I  was saying,  the  ministries  of  social  welfare  are  weak ministries”  (HelpAge
Interview No.1).
Because MIPAA was rather a declaration of intent than a legally binding standard,
the  instrument  to  enforce  this  plan  of  action  is  soft  pressure  stemming  from
monitoring  and  evaluation.  MIPAA  itself  just  mentions  the  ‘Commission  for  Social
Development’ (CSocD) as in charge of monitoring which is done by collecting governmental
reports  periodically.  However,  the  expert  group  meeting  on  modalities  for  review  and
appraisal of MIPAA emphasizes a  bottom-up approach (UNDESA 2003). It  is a very
unusual approach to include the target group of older people directly in the evaluation
process.
“The bottom-up approach to review and appraisal should be seen as an on-going
process rather than a product delivered at a certain time. In this sense, the bottom-up
review and appraisal should be seen as an innovative tool for social analysis, as it
promotes the inclusion of views from groups that may have been previously excluded
from traditional sources of information” (UNDESA 2003:6).
From interviews I know that HelpAge was among the group in charge of writing the
UN evaluation approach of MIPAA. HelpAge included the bottom-up approach based
on the common understanding in that committee that something new and innovative
has to be developed in order to be more effective than the provision of governmental
reports every five years would be (HelpAge Interview No.9). However, the bottom-up
approach  does  not  describe  how  this  bottom-up  approach  should  be  designed.
Instead the committee argues simply to be open minded and try new approaches that
incorporate information coming from other IOs, INGOs, or older people themselves.
By directly mentioning and emphasizing the importance of  civil  society  and NGO
involvement in this regard the UN agreement (UN 2002) provides HelpAge with a
mandate to implement new bottom-up approaches as shown in the following.
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Moreover,  the  importance  and  awareness  for  bottom-up  monitoring
mechanisms was heightened among African governments through the activities of
the African Union. In 2008 the 'AU Social Policy Framework for Africa' was developed
which put the African Union in charge of pushing social protection including advocacy
to spread the innovative monitoring mechanism based on a bottom-up approach. The
section on ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’ in the AU Policy Framework calls to “create a
network of civil  society organizations to support the dissemination, implementation
and monitoring of the SPF [Social Policy Framework]” (AU 2008a:44). It surely is no
coincidence that the African Framework echoed the UN agreement with regard to the
monitoring mechanism because in this case as well HelpAge was also involved in the
development of the AU Social Policy Framework: 
“The AU Commission, in close collaboration with HelpAge International, is organizing
three Regional Experts Group Meetings on Social Protection on the theme: ‘Investing
in  Social  Protection  in  Africa’,  to  cover  the  five  regions  of  the  Continent”  (AU
2008b:1). 
As a consequence, the AU Social Policy Framework and the UN agreement were two
central documents reconfirming HelpAge’s mandate for advocacy and evaluations of
the implementation process. HelpAge followed this approach and has been pushing
for  a  new  type  of  organization  called  ‘Older  People  Association’  (OPAs).
Furthermore,  HelpAge  organized  with  the  UN  Population  Fund  (UNFPA)  an
evaluation including group discussions and case studies around the globe (UNFPA &
HelpAge 2011). The results will be brought into an upcoming publication of the ‘State
of the World’s Older Persons 2012’,  which could be a fundamental document for
taking stock and generating comparability in the context of aging.
 After having described how HelpAge got its mandate for the initiation of their
bottom-up  mechanism,  I  describe  how  HelpAge  implemented  a  monitoring
mechanism as a reaction to the UN's monitoring guidelines called 'Older Citizens
Monitoring'.  The  above  mentioned  OPAs  are  the  structural  entities  for  this
mechanism and DFID provided the funding for the creation of OPAs over a four-
years-period. To initiate a OPA HelpAge is going to cities and villages and organizes
meetings for older people which often come together for the first time in their lives.
OPAs can be rather small encompassing some handful of older people. They meet
on a regular basis, discussion issues around aging and taking action. The strength
and activity level of those groups depends on the individual motivations of the people
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within the groups. Therefore, the status and the quality of OPAs are very different
within a country and especially  among world regions. Whereas in most countries
OPAs are informal small-size groups of older people, in some countries OPAs begin
to become legal associations with the right to have an own bank account. In Latin
America  the  formalization  process  continues  in  a  tremendous  way.  The  OPAs
organize and align with other OPAs to form larger representational bodies (HelpAge
Interview No.2). That has to do with the fact that the civil society in Latin America has
been organized for a longer time being able to look back at a longer history than
most OPAs in other world regions. 
In many cases HelpAge has to initiate OPAs almost out of nothing, because it
has very limited resources. In order to do that, HelpAge has a standardized process
of how to set up OPAs. The know-how of how to set up an OPA delivers HelpAge to
national governments as well, because the formation of OPAs is nothing that can be
organized solely by one INGO alone. Once OPAs had been established as a new
type of  organization it  spread globally at enormous pace, driven as well  by older
people themselves copying this idea by learning from neighbor cities and villages.
However, the expansion in many regions in large numbers was only possible with the
help and engagement of national governments which included OPAs in their national
action  plans  and,  moreover,  provided  funding  for  the  initiation  of  OPAs.  In  the
following I explain how useful and crucial OPAs are for HelpAge to in fluence national
policy-making. Thus, based on the assumption that government do not especially like
being confronted with strong civil movements interfering in policy-making, I found it
puzzling to hear that national governments massively support the process of OPA
development. Why do national governments do that?
As  a  HelpAge  policy  expert  from  one  of  HelpAge's  regional  development
centers told me, the motivation for governments to support this idea is that OPAs
appear as a cost  effective way to directly support  people living in poverty.  OPAs
represent self-organized service communities including healthcare, homecare, HIV
and AIDS treatment, social activities, disaster risk reduction, livelihoods and women’s
participation, in order to improve the well-being of older people which should benefit
the community as a whole (HelpAge 2009). In a context where the extension of the
national  education  and  health  infrastructure  to  all  parts  of  the  country  (with  the
particular dif ficulty to reach rural areas) is dif ficult, costly and can take several years.
Small investments in effective self-help groups appear to be a favorable way to go.
However,  HelpAge always made clear towards the national  governments that  the
creation of OPAs is about two aspects: to enable older people directly to establish
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community-based self-help, and to enable them to get involved in advocacy for their
rights and service provision.
The latter aspect leads my description to the explanation of the function OPAs
have for HelpAge. Next to the service- and self-help function OPAs were set up to
generate valuable information for the evaluation of the implementation process of
MIPAA. For HelpAge OPAs enhance the INGO's capacity for advocacy in two ways:
first, through the generation of information and, second, through the formation of a
grassroots movement campaigning for the implementation of social pensions. The
information gained through evaluations OPAs have conducted at  national  level  is
useful  to  make arguments  and to  gain  credibility  for  advocacy  in  favor  of  social
protection and social pensions. Increased credibility is an important resources for the
dialogues with national ministries of welfare and ministries of finance which usually
are of  technical  nature.  In  this  context,  evidence-based advocacy gained through
local expertise can be advantageous (HelpAge Interview No.1):
“We do not have millions of HelpAge stuff on the ground. The idea is to strengthen
national, local civil society organizations and older people. We work a lot with older
people associations which we have set-up on the ground. This is absolutely critical to
the work we do, otherwise we wouldn’t have the credibility” (HelpAge Interview No.1).
While the first aspect has some importance for cognitive in fluencing the evidence-
based credibility is also relevant for negotiations with the government in order set
new  impulses  for  policy-making.  The  second  aspect  of  how  OPAs  enhance
HelpAge’s capacities for advocacy is campaigning. The INGO introduced the 'Age
Demands  Action'  (ADA)  campaign  in  2007 with  the  purpose  to  get  older  people
people  directly  involved  in  advocacy  and  protest.  It  was  the  first  time  ever  that
HelpAge set up a campaign. The formulated goal of ADA campaign is “to support
governments  to  extend existing  or  put  in  place new social  pensions schemes in
developing countries and to enable civil society to campaign for pensions and hold
governments to account” (HelpAge 2012:1). ADA was evolving and quickly becoming
a  large  movement  where  huge  protest  marches  in  developing  countries  and
dialogues with local, regional and national policy-makers were organized in October
each year. At the beginning of the ADA campaign older people were protesting in 26
countries,  and  in  2011  HelpAge  was  already  able  to  organize  protests  in  a  59
countries. The 'UN international day of older persons'  at the first of October is the
day  when  the  protests  are  organized.  However,  the  ADA  campaigning  involves
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activities and lobbying throughout the year as well. Long before October HelpAge
begins negotiations with the national government about the issues older people want
to campaign about (HelpAge Interview No.1). 
A core element of OPAs is to enable older people to claim the realization of
existing  rights  through  programs or  better  access  to  those  already  existing.  The
strategy for that is to show older people what an entitlement concretely means, by
telling them what kind of governmental services exist and how to make use of them:
“OPAs [...] play a vital role in raising awareness of the rights and entitlements of older
people  and  improving  their  access  to  existing  services.  Linking  with  government
service providers enables OPA members to recognize that government departments
are resources for  them to utilize.  This builds confidence among older people and
articulation in expressing their speci fic needs” (HAI 2009:5).
If HelpAge manages to raise awareness for globally enacted agreements and right
charters (e.g. 'right to social security', art.22 UDHR) by teaching the thousands of
OPAs around the world in form of workshops, trainings and brochures what their
governments have pledged to do, it means that there is a massive infrastructure for
advocacy via campaigning for HelpAge available.
However,  even  though  the  OPA  movement  is  inspired  from  the  HelpAge
secretariat  in  London  coordinating  the  protests  around  the  world,  the  bottom-up
aspect of the OPA movement is not to underestimate. In most cases, older people
organize the protests themselves and in some cases HelpAge is supporting this with
further material and know-how. 
“This  campaign  is  driven  from  the  bottom-up.  We  are  not  telling  them  what  to
campaign about. It depends on what is hot on the national agenda. We are not telling
them what  to  do  and  how to  do  it,  but  facilitate  them in  the  process”  (HelpAge
Interview No.1). 
I  investigated in the question of how and to what extent HelpAge can guide and
influence the process of campaigning and the topics chosen by having a closer look
at the ADA campaigns list of 59 countries (HelpAge 2011d). It is remarkable that the
campaigns are monitored and evaluated from the London secretariat strictly in terms
of policy in fluencing.  The list  records the issues of  older  people in  the particular
country and the interaction and impact it had on politics. HelpAge does categorize
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the issues according to six predefined themes. This is a process of re-framing the
diversity on the ground. A closer examination reveals that the INGO is getting their
issues on the agenda even though this process of campaigning is led bottom-up by
OPAs.  HelpAge  has  successfully  developed  a  dialogue  with  local  OPAs  and
manages to educate older people to care about social protection and to take action
while the INGO is open for the issues of older people as well. As a result of this non-
authoritative guidance of the ADA campaign the ownership felt  by older people is
high.
Based on the analysis of the campaigning list of actions in 59 countries I can
describe two strategies of HelpAge: one aiming to get social pensions on the agenda
and a very similar one to ensure the proper implementation of social pensions. The
analysis revealed that OPAs consider the introduction of social pensions or even a
call for universal social pensions as important issues. 'Social protection' is next to
'age  and  development'  the  topic  OPAs protest  for  the  most  (HelpAge  2011d).  It
shows that HelpAge's policy model is very high on the agenda of older people. The
OPA  protest  pressure  for  policy  innovations  that  HelpAge  negotiates  with  the
governments. In order to raise the awareness of policy makers HelpAge organizes
the protests and gives older people directly a voice in front of the government. The
INGO  organizes  meeting  where  government  of ficials  directly  meet  older  people.
Educated and empowered by HelpAge older people can express their needs which
often  reflect  the  policy  priorities  of  the  INGO.  As  HelpAge  describes:  “the  Age
Demands Action campaign showed that older people have clear aspirations and can
present their issues effectively to governments” (HelpAge 2008:16).
However, governments do not always take action just because of a campaign
once  a  year.  HelpAge  considers  the  campaigning  as  an  ongoing  process  that
reaches its aim of being in fluential on policy-making in the long run: “we are using
them not once a year;  we are supporting them in an ongoing process” (HelpAge
Interview No.1). HelpAge calls the strategy attempting to convince a critical number
of government of ficials to take action: gathering momentum. 
The second aspect of the political pressure of campaigning is that the protests
are also an instrument allowing HelpAge to make compromises. The campaigning
lists shows that to another large share the protests are about the extension of already
existing programs by lowering the age for eligibility, for example, or increasing the
amount of money, broadening the coverage base (towards universal coverage), or
improving access. It reliefs HelpAge from the need to insist on the introduction of full-
fledged social pensions. Instead the INGO can follow a strategy of gradual expansion
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where OPAs monitor the state of implementation and push for the extension of social
pension programs in the subsequent years. Often policy-makers pledge to introduce
some  policy  innovations,  but  if  the  government  really  takes  action  can  only  be
measured in the following year,  where new campaigning engages in pointing out
shortcomings of the policy process. So, many issues of campaigning mostly have a
follow-up campaign in the next year: 
“The campaign does not end once a call for change has been made. It is essential to
develop a clear follow-up process to ensure that commitments become reality and
politicians are held to account. ADA partners for example in Bangladesh and Ethiopia
are  requesting  for  the  campaign  to  continue  throughout  the  year  to  ensure  that
commitments by governments are implemented” (HelpAge 2011c).
A prerequisite  for  the  strategy  of  gradual  expansion is  the  engagement  of  older
people over a long period and the monitoring of the implementation process. Often
people join these protests highly motivated in large numbers because the benefit
levels of social pensions are often much too small and age eligibility can be up to 85
years13 where most people die much earlier without ever being able to get a pension
(HelpAge Interview No.6).  The  monitoring function of  OPAs enabling to point  out
shortcomings of implementation processes is rather simple because older people are
the  direct  recipients  and  experience  in  their  everyday  life  the  consequences  of
national  policy-making.  HelpAge  facilitates  the  monitoring  process  with
questionnaires  and evaluation  sheets  and  support  to  fill  them,  because  in  many
cases older  people  are illiterate.  Sometimes people even have to  protest  for  the
ful fillment of existing programs because promised benefits simply have not been paid
out.  In  Ghana  for  example  the  government  withholds  the  money  from the  cash
transfer  program,  called  LEAP.  The  beneficiaries  had  not  received  money  for
months. Due to OPA protests the government release GHC 2.7 million (about USD
1.6 million). OPAs do not only push for the extension of programs but also ensure
that programs function as promised and designed on paper.  
13 It is not as rare as one might expect that life-expectancy is lower than the age of eligibility for an
old age pension. Nepal indeed is an exceptional example of a country that started its pension
program with a very high age of eligibility. The country introduced a pension for pensioners aged
90 or higher, and reduced subsequently the age to 85 and than to 80 years. In 2012 the country
has a pension for the people aged 70, and in certain regions the year of eligibility is even 60.
Nepal is as well a country where HelpAge focused its advocacy to facilitate pension reform in
order to make the program more accessible for people in old age.
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Conclusion
In  this  section  I  have  argued  that  the  UN monitoring  mechanism of  the  Madrid
International  Agreement  of  Action  on  Aging  (MIPAA)  provided  HelpAge  with  a
mandate to test new bottom-up mechanisms. As a result HelpAge invented 'Older
People Associations'  (OPAs) and spread this concept globally with the support  of
national  governments.  While  for  the  governments  the  community-based  self-help
function  is  advantageous  HelpAge  used  campaigning  to  create  political  protest
pressuring for the introduction or extension of social  pensions. In both cases the
INGO recognizes that a slow policy process demands to get involved in a long and
steady manner over years. HelpAge's strategy for the implementation of programs is
gathering momentum, while the organization's ability to make compromises is based
on the strategy of gradual expansion for existing programs.
3.5. Conclusion: HelpAge's Advocacy, Advice and Incentives
This chapter has shown that in the global diffusion of social cash transfer programs
an INGO has become an important  global  actor  for  Global  Social  Policy.  With  a
secretariat in London, the INGO has a centralized coordination unit that allows to be
active in lobbying issues of aging globally and promoting the INGO's particular policy
model of Universal Social Pensions. I have pointed out that this model is constantly
advertised by HelpAge and pursued as an ideal model. However, the organization
more often just uses the term 'social pensions' which allows HelpAge to be open to
non-universal  (means-tested)  pension  policies.  The  flexibility  with  regard  to  the
parameters of the policy model allows HelpAge to make compromises and to design
a  low-budget  version  of  their  policy  model  which  facilitates  the  probability  that
national governments pickup the idea of age speci fic social protection.
Analyzing HelpAge's strategies on advocacy, it  turned out that for HelpAge
policy models as well as global conferences play an important role. As a centralized
INGO HelpAge's engagement has a remarkably global scope. It is unusual to see an
INGO  so  deeply  involved  in  the  activities  of  the  UN  system,  stimulating  global
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agreements  that  emphasize  the  importance  of  aging  and  social  protection  and
organizing regional follow-up events that translate abstract agreements into regional
and national action plans. These activities reconfirm and increase the importance of
the UN agreement signed in Madrid (Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing -
MIPAA). Via advocacy HelpAge managed to mainstream issues on aging into other
domains such as global rights, healthcare and the social protection. By connecting
different  issue  areas  with  each  other,  HelpAge  arranged  packages that  allow to
advocate social  pensions from very different angles and issue areas. With global
conferences and workshops, HelpAge brought an UN agreement to life by raising
first  the  awareness for  social  protection  as  the  cornerstone  for  the  advocacy for
social pensions; by then advertising social pensions as the central policy, enabling
countries to ensure social protection for older people; and, finally, by anchoring the
concrete  policy  model  of  universal  social  pensions  in  national  action  plans.  I
exempli fied this  strategic  procedure  of  translating  down for  the  African  continent
where HelpAge was particularly active due to the organization's excellent working-
relationship with the African Union. 
Moreover,  HelpAge  has  a  remarkable  network  structure  which  allows  the
INGO to be in close contact with government of ficials around the world and even
directly  with  older  people.  Although  HelpAge  as  an  INGO  has  limited  financial
resources  and  lacks  other  means  to  create  strong  incentives  for  national
governments to pick up the organization's policy model, I found that HelpAge is using
political pressure via local campaigning. MIPAA allowed HelpAge to develop a new
kind of bottom-up monitoring mechanism. As a result, HelpAge began to group older
people  together,  explained the  relevance of  global  rights  to  them and organized
political protests once a year at older people's day and a dialogue involving older
people directly.
Next to advocacy at global and regional levels and advice delivered directly to
states,  the activities of incentive-based in fluencing take place at  national  or even
local levels. By identifying domestic actors who are in a favorable position to inject
the  policy  model  of  social  pensions  into  the  process  of  policy-making,  HelpAge
influences in stages and builds step by step cooperative relationships with different
ministries, other global actors and NGOs, scientists and the media (e.g. newspapers,
television) in order to get access to the political arena and establish contacts. Gaining
a reputation as a hub of knowledge through the provision of expertise for developing
social  pension programs and calculating the costs,  HelpAge can focus to  gather
momentum and  is  ready  to  become  active  when  an  appropriate  window  of
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opportunity  opens  up.  Moreover,  HelpAge  seems  to  be  particularly  effective  in
directly influencing the ministries of finance which are decisive player that have to be
convince in national settings.
All in all, I found that the interplay of advocacy, advice and incentives on all
kind  of  levels  –  multilevel-in fluencing:  global,  regional,  domestic  –  is  particularly
characteristic  for  HelpAge's  activities  in  policy  diffusion.  While  HelpAge  has
established  long-term  relationships  to  policy-makers  and  serves  as  a  hub  of
knowledge  for  policy-makers,  HelpAge  can  benefit,  on  the  one  hand,  from  its
advocacy  at  global  and  add  a  normative  emphasis  stemming  from  international
agreements where governments have pledged to take action and, on the other hand,
HelpAge can benefit from its local support of campaigning where it creates political
pressure though protests of older people. HelpAge focusses on direct influencing via
advice  and  calls  this  multilevel  interplay,  where  advice delivered  to  states  is
facilitated by advocacy (international  covenants and regional  and domestic  action
plans) and by political pressure stemming from people's movements, the twin-track-
approach (HelpAge Interview No.1). Advice is supported by activities at global and
local level.
It  is  not  just  remarkable  to  recognize  how complex  this  strategic  interplay
between the levels is; above that it is noteworthy that HelpAge's activities are driven
by  long-term  goals.  Influencing  the  UN  system,  organizing  large-scale  political
protests, and becoming a hub of knowledge for states based on trustworthy relations
to domestic policy makers takes time. A slow and steady process of diffusion based
on multilevel in fluencing seems to be characteristic of HelpAge.
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Chapter 4: Other Global Actors' 
Support of SCT Diffusion
After this extensive analysis of two major actors in the field of global social policy this
section gives me the opportunity to provide a brief overview of other global actors'
activities. HelpAge and the World Bank are by far not the only actors contributing to
the diffusion of SCT programs. They are in particular relevant for the analysis of the
particular drivers behind the models 'social  pensions' and 'CCTs',  but many more
actors contribute to the creation of an learning environment which establishes SCTs
as the current best practice as development policies.
I would not go so far to say that all global actors work together so that the SCT
diffusion is a global project with multiple actors working on it. Instead each actor is
first  and foremost focused on its own mandate and defines for itself  in what way
SCTs are part of its portfolio. Yet, it is remarkable that in less than a decade SCTs as
a  topic  have  become  a  key  policy  suggestion  for  most  actors  in  the  global
development community. Even by following primarily their own mandate, there is still
considerable  contact  between  global  actors.  They  work  together  via  temporary
coalitions and shared global events/meetings. The development community is indeed
a close community. Having attended several of global events makes clear that only
some handful of people take part in all the global discussions. Global actors know
each  other.  That  might  not  be  true  for  most  of  the  staff  working  for  global
organizations and institutions but it  is true for speci fic people of the organizations
which  usually  attend  global  conferences.  I  myself  have  met  a  large  share  of
representatives  of  global  organizations  at  conferences.  Certain  knowledge  is
discussed  among  those  actors  and  finds  its  way  inside  the  language  and  the
concepts of other actors. Some actors might  pick up some new ideas and terms
directly, while other 'translate' new approaches into their own language. Based on my
observations I choose to discuss in the following brie fly some other organizations in
order to give an insight into other actors' activities and to provide a sense for the
broader picture. This section shows that multiple actors contributed something  to the
general trend of SCT diffusion even though their activities where considerably fewer
than of the two cases I have presented above. In order to give an overview of the
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spectrum of activities I chose to select three different types of actors: one further
IGO, two regional development banks, and two national development agencies.
4.1. The International Labour Organization
The ILO is able to get easily in contact with countries as well as other global actors to
stimulate discussions. This is a privileged position to develop and spread new norms.
Moreover, the ILO can provide technical assistance to help countries to take action
and start  implementing programs which re flect  those norms. The idea to provide
cash-based social assistance to people in need regardless if these people have been
able make contributions or not is key to social protection. I understand the ILO as the
main driver of the new focus on social protection. Above that, the ILO addresses
primarily developing countries with this concept even though, as it is the character of
this  organization,  the  ILO  designs  concepts  so  that  they  are  applicable  to  all
countries  worldwide.  In  the  following,  I  argue that  the  ILO has been  tenaciously
pushing for social  protection as a new normative reference because it  gives new
responsibilities to the organization reconfirming its relevance. In order to achieve this
the ILO went new ways and were lobbying the United Nations and other global actors
in order to open their agendas for the idea of SCTs.
By  reading  into  the  literature  on  the  ILO  and  its  historical  development  I
realized that the survival of organizations is an issue, even for such big organizations
like the ILO. The realists' assumption that beyond all mandates an organization's first
goal must be to secure its own survival seems to hold true. The ILO was at certain
points  in  its  history  at  risk  of  loosing  its  relevance  and  successfully  claimed
responsibilities back. Let me make a brief historical excursion. The ILO as a child of
the Treaty of Versailles 1919 was restricted to a strict interpretation of the treaty's
articles and ran risk “of becoming a bureaucratic institution with no real authority”
(Hughes and Haworth 2011: 7). Due to the in fluence of the ILO's directors the ILO
was  able  to  claim  responsibility  for  a  more  abstract  vision  for  workers,  that  is,
“stability in daily life and security against the threat of war” (ibid.). The first part of this
vision legitimates ILO activities within nations and the second part legitimates to be
active to mediate tensions  between nations. After the Second World War with the
USA as a strong new member on board the ILO was able to gain new relevance as
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the  “main  forum  for  social  questions  associated  with  post-war  reconstruction”
(Hughes and Haworth 2011:  12).  Moreover,  the ILO were to  become a forum to
mediate tensions between communist systems and liberal democratic ones. During
the  1950s and 1960s the  ILO established technical  assistance programs for  the
newly independent developing countries supplemented by a network of regional and
field of fices “to address more readily the needs of the ILO membership and permit
the expansion of the technical assistance program” (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 15). 
Having overcome the threat of becoming a merely bureaucratic institution by
enlarging its agenda after World War, and stabilizing its relevance in a global arena
by picking  up the issues of post-war reconstruction after World War the Second, the
organization faced new challenges in the 21th century were economic globalization
became a dominating factor effecting the living conditions of workers. 
“The ILO's historical emphasis on trade unions, collective bargaining and freedom of
association had become irrelevant and anachronistic. [Instead] globalization, social
justice, and poverty reduction, became more prominent in popular discourse as social
division increased” (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 18 ). 
With the narrow focus on labor standards it seemed like the ILO were missing out on
many aspects of the conditions affecting workers.  Thus, the ILO reacted to that and
called for a strengthening of the social dimension of globalization.
“In the last two decades, however, the traditional cornerstones of the ILO's activities
have changed, shifted by the transformation of the economic and social environment
brought about by the emerging global economy” (ILO 1999: 3).
Moreover, the discovery of the fact that in developing countries the majority of people
works outside the formal job market and, thus, is out of reach for any kind of ILO
labor-standards hit the organization like a shock-wave. The 'Decent Work Agenda' of
the  ILO in  1999  introduced  this  new focus  on  the  informal  sector  particularly  in
developing countries.
“Because of its origins, the ILO has paid most attention to the needs of wage workers
— the majority  of  them men — in  formal  enterprises.  But  this  is  only  part  of  its
mandate,  and  only  part  of  the  world  of  work.  Almost  everyone  works,  but  not
everyone is employed. Moreover, the world is full  of  overworked and unemployed
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people. The ILO must be concerned with workers beyond the formal labour market —
with unregulated wage workers, the self-employed, and homeworkers” (ILO 1999: 6).
As a consequence one can see that the ILO's mandate broadened a lot so that the
organization describes its mission as follows: “the ILO's mission is to improve the
situation of human beings in the world of work” (ILO 1999: 5). This mandate is in
particular related to 'the social dimension of globalization. In 2008 the ILO set with
the 'Declaration of a Fair Globalization' this new course presented as a natural (and
necessary) development of its core standard.14
With this new vision in mind the ILO agreed to implement “initiatives to extend
social security to those who are not presently covered“ (ILO 2008b: preface). As a
result the ILO launch the 'Global Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for All'
in 2003 (ILO 2010: v). This was revolutionary in so far that the ILO has never before
launched a campaign. Based on ILO Convention No.102 “the Campaign focuses on
the fact  that  there  still  remain  many countries  in  the world  where  social  security
coverage is low or very low, particularly among those with low- and middle-income
levels” (ibid.). While this campaign to extend social security coverage addresses all
countries globally, the quotation above already indicates that low- and middle-income
countries are the primary targets.
At the level of activities the ILO describes that the first phase of the campaign
will last for five years, from 2001 to 2006. 
“During this period the objective is to place, in as many countries as possible, the
extension of social  security at the top of the development agenda and to support
national and international policy makers in developing strategies to extend coverage.
Such strategies will be inspired by values, such as solidarity and universality, and will
be  based  on  cost-effective  ways  to  extend  social  security”  (ILO  Website  2005;
emphasize added). 
The main aim the campaign was to get  as many countries and global  actors on
board. While countries were addressed directly the ILO chose to develop this idea of
extending social security to the informal sector with a working group with the telling
name 'World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization' (WCSDG) which
14 The ILO emphasizes the importance of this declaration: „This is the third major statement of 
principles and policies adopted by the International Labour Conference since the ILO’s 
Constitution of 1919. It builds on the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 and the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998. The 2008 Declaration expresses the 
contemporary vision of the ILO’s mandate in the era of globalization” (ILO 2008: 1).
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started in 2002 and released its final report in 2004. The WCSDG was set up by the
ILO  itself  but  tried  to  gain  a  wider  authority  and  legitimacy  by  incorporating
stakeholders from the “government, politics, parliaments, business and multinational
corporations, organized labour, academia and civil society” (WCSDG 2004: ix). The
final report 'A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities For All' was not just often
cited by the ILO, but managed to gain wider recognition from other actors like the
World Bank and the European Union as well. The EU played an active role in the
WCSDG and, thus, entered a 'Strategic Partnership' with the ILO after the release of
the report in 2004 (Orbie and Tortell 2009: 666). The report draws on the 'Decent
Work  Agenda'  of  1999  and  suggests  a  “minimum  level  of  social  protection  for
individuals  and  families  [...]  as  part  of  the  socio-economic  ‘ floor’  of  the  global
economy”  (WCSDG 2004:  xiii).  Both  elements  were  embraced  by  the  European
Commission (Orbie and Tortell 2009: 887).
The initial campaign for the extension of social security to the informal sector
got as a new element the idea of a minimum level – the social protection floor. The
ILO supported that this idea became an UN policy and managed to get the lead
agency for this framework together with the WHO. In 2009 the UN Chief Executives
Board published the paper 'Global Financial and Economic Crisis - UN system joint
crisis initiatives' (UNCEB 2009) where the 'Social Protection Floor-Initiative' (SPF-I)
was one out of nine responses to financial and economical crisis. While the WHO did
not  much  with  its  mandate  the  ILO developed  a  whole  framework  out  of  it  and
pushed to mainstream it in the global community and towards the nation states in
order to reach a new ILO standard or recommendation. Mainstreaming of the floor
concept was facilitated by the fact that several organizations have agreed to support
this UN initiative, as there are to mention: the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the  UN  (FAO),  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  the  United  Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA),
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP)
and  the  World  Bank.15 Although  the  ILO  received  its  new  instrument  (a
recommendation on the SPF) in 2012 the year 2009 can be seen as a marker where
15 A complete list of all organizations of ficially listed as 'supporting agencies' of the SPF-I are:
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Of fice  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  (OHCHR),  the  UN  Regional  Commissions,
UNAIDS,  the  United  Nations  Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs  (UN-DESA),  the  United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  the United Nations Educational,  Scienti fic and Cultural
Organization  (UNESCO),  the  United  Nations  Populations  Fund  (UNFPA),  UN-Habitat,  the  United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
the United Nations Of fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the
World Bank.
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the idea of cash-based minimal levels of social protection became common-sense in
the development community.16 
The crucial point is that the ILO with its campaign promoted rather an idea
with implications for policy models than a particular policy model itself. The floor is
open to several programs which provide a minimum level of social protection. Yet,
the life-cycle approach is a defining element which considers specialized programs
for particular age groups which is disturbing policy ideas of general social assistance
equally  for  all  age  groups.17 Moreover,  the  ILO  supports  the  idea  of  systemic,
institutionalized  and  government-led  programs  and  emphasizes  a  rights-based
approach which refers to the human rights charter. When it comes to policies the ILO
mentions social  protection for children, the working-age and older people without
specifying this more directly. This life-cycle approach might be due to the fact that the
many global organizations are already structured in a way that they support particular
social groups. The floor approach is so inviting for many organizations because they
can choose their own preferred policy model and push for it as part of a common
consensus  among  global  organizations.  The  common  nominator  is  cash-based
assistance for people in need in order to assure a minimum level of social protection.
The main achievement of the ILO is that is has been successful in opening
many other global  organizations for this basic idea to turn away from emergency
response and turn to support for systemic social protection programs that give people
in need access to social  services and financial  aid.  Even though the ILO is very
reluctant with claim to be in fluential  because of its deep respect for other actors'
autonomy the ILO says about its in fluence with regard to social protection:
“For ILO the SPF is a really big success because so many organizations are now
interested  in  social  protection  and  work  with  this  terminology,  present  their  own
activities as within this framework, and change their own terminology accordingly. A
very clear example is the World Food Programme which suddenly framed its own
activities as being part of social protection. That is new. For sure, it makes a lot of
sense to describe it  as such, because food security is an important aspect of the SPF
and the right to food is an essential right which clearly is part of social protection.
However, the World Food Programme has not described itself as a social protection
actor before. For example, the last publication of the World Food Programme has the
title “From Food Aid to Food Assistance”. Food Aid represents the old connotation of
16 More on that development of the SPF framework leading to a new ILO recommendation can
be found in Deacon 2013.
17 This observation was made by my supervisor Prof. Lutz Leisering. Many thanks for sharing this 
thought and allow me to share it here. 
161
'charity' and 'emergency response', while food assistance refers to more systemic and
institutionalized approaches. It is good to see that social protection has become a
higher  priority  for  many  organizations”  (ILO  Headquarter  Interview;  translated  by
author).
Even the World Bank embraced this new focus and began to focus its support more
on  systemic  solutions.  As  I  have  shown above  the  World  Bank  advocated  CCT
policies as the main social protection program which is supposedly the basis for the
development of social protection systems. Institutionalization of programs is the main
focus of the World Bank. The growing prominence of social protection as a reference
at  global  level  might  have been the reason to make this  focus part  of  its  of ficial
strategy and inter-agency communication so that in 2012 the World Bank published
its new 'Social Protection and Labor Strategy' (World Bank 2012) which the World
Bank presented personally with a presentation in every country worldwide, so that in
2012 the new focus on social protection and systemic solutions was impossible to
overhear for any development organization and agency.
The reason why so many organizations listened to the ILO's new framework
for development policies can be seen in the ILO connecting successfully the frames
of  a  'fair  globalization'  and  social  protection  as  an  effective  'crisis  response
mechanism'. Social protection can now be understood as normatively important in
order to reinforce 'fairness' and it  is a tool to increase a countries resilience after
economic  crisis.  The latter  has  particular  relevance for  developing  countries  and
global organizations which are more economically orientated like the World Bank.
This is how Michael Cichon – the ILO's Director of the Social Security Department –
puts it: 
“The exciting story is that we have a window of opportunity in the discussion on social
policy and development policy were for once social protection has structured a certain
focus of the political debate which it never had in the last years; and the reason to
some extend is the crisis because social protection systems have been observed as
being social and economic stabilizer in that process and become now a much more
accepted policy tool than they were five years ago” (Michael Cichon, Director of the
ILO's Social Security Department; ILO TV 2011).
Finally, I had not the opportunity to evaluate the ILO's activities for social protection
at the operational level in detail, but most of the technical cooperation between 2000
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and 2010 was in the Asian region followed by Africa and Latin America. It shows that
indeed developing countries are the focus of the ILO's activities. Yet, I would not
overrate the ILO's influence through technical assistance because the overall budget
for all global technical cooperation is with USD 1.3 million too small to have impact
on the program level (ILO 2011).
Thus, I argue that the main impact of the ILO was the development of the
social protection framework. Above that, on the operational level the ILO has a very
different approach than the two main cases of this study. The ILO focuses primarily
on  capacity  building  at  national  level  and  relies  on  its  standards  and
recommendations to turn into effect because countries have agreed to do so. In other
words,  the  ILO  invests  in  capacity  building  and  to  raise  the  account  for  social
protection  and –  at  the  same time –  leaves  enough  space  for  variation  so  that
countries  develop  their  own approach  and other  global  actor  can  distribute  their
models as part of the framework. For the ILO it has turned out to be more effective to
run in a cooperative mode which can be characterized by pragmatism and a focus on
outcomes. This what the Social Security Extension Of ficer in the ILO Headquarter
said about the ILO's approach to assist countries nationally:
“The ILO has become much more pragmatic than it probably was in the 1990s where
debates  were more ideology driven.  The ILO is  more focused on  outcomes.  […]
Questions concerning the particular design of policies are not that important for the
ILO. I am not sure if I can say that for the whole ILO but I am personally convinced
that  it  is  much  more  important  that  a  country  puts  considerable  efforts  into  the
implementation  of  an  ILO  standard,  has  enough  administrative  capacities  and
devotes  enough  funding  for  an  adequate  implementation  structure,  and  tries  to
prevent corruption etc. Even if the choice of design and program is not the optimal
choice but the program is properly implemented, it still can be successful in reaching
outputs. […] For the ILO capacity building plays an important role, because the ILO
simply would not have the capacities to assist the countries to design their policies.
The basic idea of the ILO's assistance is to build the capacities within countries in
order  to  enable  them  to  design  and  implement  policies  on  their  own.”  (ILO
Headquarter Interview; translated by author; emphasis added).
The impression of this Social Security Extension Of ficer that the ILO cares the most
about outcomes is substantiated by the fact that the Programme and Budget Report
(2012-13)  strictly  evaluates  the  programs  on  the  basis  of  outcomes.  And  the
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cooperative  mode is  visible   when looking  at  the  way the  ILO delivers  technical
assistance for the SPF. It is by far not that the ILO intends to deliver all the support
and expertise on its own. That would give the ILO privileged access to the policy-
making arena but as the ILO is very pragmatic and more focused on outcomes there
is no need for the ILO to do that. Instead the organization set up the SPF Advisory
Network  where  all  cooperating  organizations  can  deliver  their  expertise  and
knowledge.  Instead  of  in fluencing  directly  the  ILO  chose  to  rather  provide  the
platform for cooperation, and is monitoring in how far the countries make progress
with the SPF implementation. This is how the ILO has designed the SPF Advisory
Network:
“It is the network of the SPF-I and the headquarters of the cooperating actors. Every
participating organization has at least one focal person. It can be considered best as
a mailing  list  with technical experts  from all  the organizations active in technical
assistance. If countries have any questions, face problems or show that they have a
need for assistance it is a possibility to consult  this group of actors. According to
responsibility, expertise and capacity would an organization of the Technical Advisory
Network  respond  to  this  request.  The  support  for  countries  takes  place  on  very
different levels. On country-level exists the SPF task force or the social protection
joint UN groups – there are different labels –, and they can as well turn to the network
to request further expertise. On the other hand can they also forward their knowledge
and  expertise  to  facilitate  global  knowledge  sharing.  Its  the  idea  that  there  is
communication, on the one hand, between the inter-agency headquarters at global
level  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  country  groups  working  on  the  SPF-I”  (ILO
Headquarter Interview; translated by author).
The limited resources of the ILO do make this cooperative mode the best fit for the
organization in order.  Moreover,  it  is  also important to note that the ILO has the
national social security ministries as its counterparts, which – as mentioned in the
case of HelpAge International – are usually among the weakest in the arrangement
of  ministries.  While  HelpAge  has  also  not  the  strongest  financial  capacities  but
enough staff  and partners  to  lobby and deliver  expertise  and accompany policy-
makers  in  the  process  of  policy-making  on  a  long-term  basis.  The  ILO  can
compensate its own limitations by welcoming the support of other actors because the
ILO is not that much focused on any particular model.
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In  sum,  I  have  argued  that  the  ILO played  an  important  role  for  the  the
diffusion of SCT programs already by changing the priorities of other global actors
and by developing social protection as a new framework that can be an inspiration
and a reference to others.
4.2. Regional Development Banks: IADB and ADB
Regional development banks are another important type of actor which can influence
national  policy-making  by  providing  the  necessary  loans,  providing  technical
assistance and organizing regional conferences. The Inter-American Development
Bank is  the most  active one supporting social  protection,  closely followed by the
Asian Development Bank. The following sections reveal how those actors understand
social  protection  and what  role  SCTs play  for  them. Furthermore,  I  indicate how
active the banks have been in the last decade.
The Inter-American Development Bank
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)18 had social  protection as its main
reference  at  the  beginning  of  2000  which  is  visible  in  its  publications  “Social
Protection  for  Equity  and  Growth  (IADB 2000)  and  “Shielding  the  Poor  –  Social
Protection in the Developing World” (Lustig 2001).  The line of  thought developed
there is already pretty much the thought the ILO developed later. This reaf firms the
impression  that  the  Latin  American  region  was  earlier  than  other  regions  in  the
Global South aware of the importance to set up social protection programs to reach
the poor in the informal sector:
“Over  the past  20  years,  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  have faced recurrent
economic crises and natural disasters. The acceleration of market reforms and global
integration  has  expanded  economic  opportunities  while  increasing  country  and
individual  exposure  to  risk.  To  manage  these  risks,  people  resort  to  available
insurance markets or informal coping mechanisms. But the poor often have little or no
18 The IADB is also often called IDB or with the Spanish acronym BID (Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo), but I will stick with the more distinct acronym IADB.
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access to these instruments, and their incomes are too low to be allocated to anything
other than consumption of basic goods” (IADB 2000: v).
The IADB argues early that governmental programs are needed to 'shield the poor'.
Furthermore,  the  IADB  points  out  a  deficit  in  social  programs  throughout  Latin
American countries. As typically for a bank's rational the IADB points out that there is
a relation between social protection investments and economic growth. The idea of
'investment in human capital' was already present at the beginning of 2000:
“Latin  America does not  have adequate prevention and compensation systems to
reduce the impact of shocks on its poor. As a result, shocks not only have severe
effects on poverty and equity, but also diminish economic prospects for growth. In the
absence of reforms that address the needs of low-income households — that is, both
social protection programs and investment in human capital that can raise the future
earning capacity of the poor — shocks will  continue to have these dire long-term
implications for poverty, inequality and prospects for growth” (IADB 2000: 2).
On  the  program  level  the  IADB  publications  refers  to  Argentina's  employment
program Trabajar and the first CCT program, Progresa in Mexico, and argues for the
affordability of such programs by pointing out that the above mentioned programs
cost only a fraction of a GDP percentage (0.2%/0.3%). Yet, at this time the IADB had
no clear policy suggestion.  Instead the IADB discussed a whole set of measures,
such  as  unemployment  insurance,  employment  generation  programs public  work
programs and wage subsidies), short-term training programs, old-age security and
'social assistance on pensions', and 'microfinance for consumption smoothing' (Lustig
2001). Conditional child benefits were not a priority at the beginning of the 2000s. It
seems that regional examples have at least partly driven the popularity of CCTs.
The  IADB  contributed  to  policy  diffusion  with  regional  knowledge-sharing
among  Latin  American  countries.  Already  in  2001  the  bank  set  up  the  'Poverty
Reduction and Social Protection Network', which focused on technical cooperation
and best-practice sharing based on the criteria of impact evaluations.
“The objective of this Network is the creation of a forum where the countries of the
region can share experiences, learn about practices carried out outside the region
and explores opportunities for regional cooperation in the areas of poverty reduction
and social protection. The Network is made up of a government representative from
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each country of the region holding the highest technical rank and with experience in
the design and implementation of poverty reduction policies and programs” (IADB
2001: 1).
The effectiveness and in fluence of this networking activities is hard to measure and
would require an own case study. At this point I just point out that the stimulation of
networking among Latin American countries was early a priority for the IADB.
The topic of conditional cash transfers can be found in the year 2003 when the
Lead Human Development Specialist of the IADB held a presentation on “Safety Net
for the Poor - The Role of Conditional Cash Grant Programs” (Sedlacek 2003). The
presentation  speaks  of  programs  which  are  'broadly  targeted  to  poor  children'
providing 'grants conditional on school attendance' and 'visit to clinics'  and mentions
the programs in Mexico (Progresa) and Bolivia (Bolsa Escola) as examples (ibid.). In
general,  the  IADB has  the  same focus  on  human capital  creation  as  the  World
Bank.19 As I already partly showed in the World Bank case study the IADB is involved
in  most  of  the  Latin  American  countries'  activities  on  social  protection.  On  their
website  the  IADB  provides  a  map  which  shows  the  lending  activities  and  the
technical  cooperation missions in  Latin  America.20 The importance for  conditional
cash transfers and the IADB's involvement formulates the bank as follows:
“The most visible expression of this experience is the support that it  has provided
since the late 90’s via Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTP). Almost every
country in the region has used this type of  program as a pillar  of  its strategy for
alleviating poverty and inequality at some time in its development history, and the
Bank has had a role in just about every one of those programs. To a large extent, the
popularity of the CCTP is attributable to its effectiveness, which has been proven
through rigorous evaluation”(IADB Website 2013a).
Interestingly to note that the IADB is not precisely referring to the World Bank's CCT
model but tries to find with the term CCTP a more general description in its own
terminology. Yet, the close af filiation is visible as well. Moreover, the IADB claims to
be involved in every Latin American country for CCTPs. Even though the role and the
contribution the IADB played in each country might have varied a lot the extend of
19 In a video on the IADB's channel BIDtv the bank shows how the investment in childcare is so
important  because  it  is  an  investment  in  human  capital  which  is  suppose  to  contribute  later
considerably to a country's growth (cf. http://vimeo.com/57637293#at=0, accessed in November
2013).
20 Available  at:  http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/social-protection/social-protection-tc,2154.html,
accessed in November 2013.
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involvement seems plausible. The IADB maps shows that the bank is active in every
country  in  Latin  America  with  technical  cooperation  and  lending.  The  priority
countries  of  the  bank's  actual  involvement  are  Honduras,  Colombia,  Peru,  and
Uruguay. Furthermore, the activities are focused on El Salvador, Jamaica, Ecuador,
Guyana,  Brazil,  Mexico  and  the  Dominican  Republic.  Even  though  the  major
countries such as Mexico and Brazil don't seem to be priority countries any more
because the Bank has not as many missions and active loans with these countries, I
reported above that the IADB has supported those countries with considerably high
loans of about one billion US dollar. For Mexico there is still to find information on the
IADB's website about the actual financial involvement of the Bank in Mexico of about
USD 600 million. As the bank says:
“Ninety-eight  percent  of  the  loan’s  resources will  finance payments  to  beneficiary
households that receive transfers in exchange for meeting certain requirements, such
as  school  attendance  and  medical  checkups.  […]  Technical  assistance  will  be
provided  for  implementa-tion  and  evaluation  of  program  improvements”  (IADB
Website 2013b).
Obviously the IADB still supports the development and extension of CCT programs
and  accompanies  this  process  with  technical  assistance.  Cognitive  in fluencing
backed up by stron financial incentives seems to be also here the way to go for this
institution. The website even makes a clear statement about the banks support at the
introduction  of  Mexico's  program:  “The  IDB  has  supported  Oportunidades since
2002. During this time the Bank has provided financing for the program with five
loans totaling $3.8 billion” (ibid.). The IADB is an important player in this world region
and seems to have contributed to the fact that social protection programs (including
CCTs) have spread so much and so quickly in Latin America.
Finally, I think that it is interesting to see that very recently traces can be found
that the IADB also engages in spreading CCTs beyond the Latin American region.
The  organization  published  a  paper  in  2013  with  the  telling  title  “Conditions  for
Success in Implementing CCT Programs: Lessons for Asia from Latin America and
the Caribbean” (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).
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The Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank works on Social Protection since 2001 (ADB 2003).
Yet, the focus of the social protection agenda of the ADB is much more diversi fied
than it was the case with the IADB. The components of what the ADB understands
as social protection have not change since 2001:
“ADB defines social protection as a “set of policies and programs designed to reduce
poverty and vulnerability by promoting ef ficient labor markets, diminishing people’s
exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards
and  interruption/loss  of  income.”  Five  major  elements  comprise  ADB’s  social
protection  strategy:  labor  markets,  social  insurance,  social  assistance,  micro  and
area-based schemes, and child protection. Projects related to these five components
are spread fully or partly across several sectors of ADB operations” (ADB 2011).
While social assistance is part of the social protection agenda from the beginning on
the agenda is much larger.  The focus of the ADB becomes clearer when one is
looking at what the ADB listed as key priorities in 2001/3: improvement of the labor
market,  elimination  of  violations  of  Core  Labor  Standards,  expanding  the  role  of
micro-finance,  promoting  the  development  of  social  funds,  designing  disaster
preparedness programs, and increasing child protection programs (ADB 2003). With
regard to social assistance and other non-contributory cash transfers the ADB has to
admit: “Social insurance and social assistance are areas where the ADB has lesser
expertise and, if any, interventions should be developed in close collaboration with
strategic development partners” (ADB 2003: 56). In consideration of this openness
towards  programs the  ADB's  activities  seem to  be primarily  driven by  what  the
countries demand. Instead of promoting particular models or program ideas the ADB
focused  on  two  ares:  contributing  to  the  institutionalization  of  programs  and
monitoring the current state of activities within countries. With regard to the first focus
the ADB sees its role to contribute to a program development that ensures adequate
coverage  (i),  adequate  targeting  (ii),  a  sound  financial  management  and  good
governance (iii), and adequate institutional arrangements with consistent integration
among the programs (iv) (ADB 2003). The focus on the countries' own priorities is
explicitly mentioned:
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“ADB operations may appropriately include social protection lending and non-lending
activities  to  serve  country-speci fic needs.  The  proposed  social  protection  policies
should  complement  one  another  and  help  countries  to  meet  their  international
commitments for poverty reduction and social development” (ADB 2003: 54).
Additionally, the ADB refers to UN commitments and global standards such as from
the ILO. At all, the ILO represents an important partner of the ADB because of the
bank's strong focus on the labor market in their social protection strategy (ADB 2011:
27). In later years the reference to the social protection floor became more prevalent.
With  regard  to  the  second  focus  on  monitoring,  the  ADB  designed  a  'Social
Protection Index' for the Asian region (ADB 2013). As the Bank says this index is not
designed to rank the countries but to take stock of what is in place and what could
improve.  The  collected  data  shows  that  most  of  the  programs  in  Asia  are  child
welfare programs and social pensions come after disaster relief.
While this is the situation within countries, the ADB developed a strong interest
in social pensions in recent years (ADB 2009, 2012). This is how the ADB sees the
situation for older people:
“The  growing  aging population  in  developing  Asia  and the  Paci fic has  signi ficant
consequences for providing social protection to the elderly. Social protection in the
region has historically been weak and fragmented, and has mainly supported small
segments of the population in the formal sector. Many older people do not receive
pension support and rely on their families and informal social networks for survival.
Yet the support provided by such networks is becoming less dependable in the face
of rapid urbanization and modernization” (ADB 2012: xvi).
This was in so far not surprising to me that I know that HelpAge International has
been pretty active in this region in recent years raising the account of social pensions
and strengthening the perspective on the issues of older people.
Though it is not a particular focus of the ADB, the bank operates also with the
CCT model and embraces fully the rationality of human capital (ADB 2010a). Yet, the
institutions shows no clear preference for conditionalities on social cash transfers. If
conditionalities  are  welcome  then  in  most  cases  with  regard  to  an  educational
condition.  The bank  is  also  well  aware of  the  fact  that  conditional  programs are
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demanding with regard to necessary investments in schooling and health. In sum, I
could not find a clear preference of the ADB.
Even  though  the  statics  of  the  ADB's  lending  activities  and  technical
assistance seem to be very heterogeneous the bank claims to be primarily focused
on social assistance:
“Of the five SP components, social assistance is the most preferred in the ADB SP
portfolio. During the study period, the largest share of the total ADB lending, grants,
and TA for SP went to interventions for social assistance. The lending assistance
included welfare and social services to highly vulnerable sectors of the population,
and cash or in-kind transfers such as CCTs in health and education” (ADB 2011: 29).
Finally, the ADB hold as well a few large conferences in the Asian region. In July
2009,  the ADB held  the  Regional  Workshop on Social  Assistance and CCTs “to
explore the use of conditional cash transfers and other social assistance programs in
different country settings” (ADB 2010b: xxi). In April  2010, the ADB organized the
'Regional Conference on Enhancing Social Protection in Asia and the Paci fic'. While
the first  conference was more about  the World Bank's new model and described
CCTs as a powerful  tool  to invest  in  human capital,  the second conference was
broader and attended by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Paci fic (ESCAP), the ILO, the OECD and UNICEF. The ADB described the
2010 conference as “a venue for sharing ideas about, benefits of, challenges in, and
experience with developing and expanding social protection in Asia and the Paci fic”
(ADB 2010b: 1).
In sum, the ADB is another strong actor contributing to the diffusion of SCTs in
the Asian region. The ADB primarily reacts upon countries' requests and priorities but
also engages in the promotion of CCTs and social pensions, and puts with 2.3 billion
(lending portfolio 1996-2008) a considerable amount of money behind this support,
even though this lending is for a variety of measures and represent only 2.8% of the
total lending portfolio. The statics on the ADB's lending however show an increase in
2006  and  continuing  onwards.  This  might  represent  the  time  social  assistance
became more important to the ADB. The following conferences in 2009 and 2010 can
be seen as a contribution to raise the account for SCTs in the Asian region.
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4.3. National Development Agencies: DFID and GIZ
National development agency (NDA) like the German 'Gesellschaft für internationale
Zusammenarbeit” (GIZ) and the “Department for International Development” (DFID)
of the United Kingdom are additional player which can contribute to the diffusion of
SCTs. Their main contributions are evaluations and bilateral cooperation. The cases
have something in common: both were pioneers and at the forefront of SCT diffusion.
The major difference however is that DFID supports SCTs explicitly while the GIZ set
with the Kalomo SCT pilot project an early and well monitored example of SCTs in a
developing context but was no promoter of SCTs and supported SCT development
just  indirectly  via  managerial  support.  The further  analysis  shows in  more details
what kind of program ideas these NDAs work on.
DFID: Department for International Development
DFID21 is  one  of  the  most  active  NDAs  supporting  SCTs  globally.  The  agency
explicitly declares influencing as one of the NDA's main goals:
“DFID’s key objectives with regards policy in fluencing on ST/SP are to: 
– In fluence  international  partners  to  gain  greater  commitment  to  the  use  of  ST
[social transfers] in the poorest countries including the re-focusing of SP [social
protection];
– In fluence  national  governments  and  other  donors  to  support  ST  and  the
development of national strategic frameworks for SP” (Hickey et al. 2009: xii).
So, indeed DFID has two addressees: national governments and the international
community.  Especially  in  the  international  community  their  activities  are  widely
recognized.  As  a  global  actor  DFID  operates  around  the  globe  and  holds  and
participates in global conferences and is connected with other global actors in this
21 DFID is since 2009 also known under the label 'UKaid', which was designed as a name to
increase the visibility of the fact that the aid is payed and delivered by the United Kingdom.
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regard. A most recent discourse analysis highlights DFID's 2005 publication “Social
transfers  and  chronic  poverty”  as  an  important  milestone  for  the  international
community,  because  it  represents  the  first  encompassing  overview  on  SCTs
(Gliszczynski 2015).
Nationally,  DFID is  focused on low- and middle income countries in  Africa
(DFID has 17 country of fices in Africa), and partly in Asia (it has 5 country of fices in
Asia) (DFID 2013:2). It seems that this has to do with the former British colonies and
the continuing responsibilities and cooperation the UK has with those regions. DFID's
focus is interesting in so far that in the Latin American region where most of the
activities for social protection are located DFID is not present. DFID argues for Africa
as the main focus area because, first, after those programs become popular in Latin
America they began to spread in Africa as well, and, second, because DFID's main
business is evaluations and Latin American programs are already well monitored; the
need for evaluations seems to be much higher in Africa. This is what DFID stats in a
common project brief of DFID, UNICEF and the FAO:
“Why Africa? Until recently, most evaluations of such programmes have taken place
in Latin America. However, this is changing fast as CTs [cash transfers] gain traction
in  Africa,  where most  new CTs are accompanied by rigorous impact  evaluations.
Moreover,  poverty  reduction  and  inclusive  growth  strategies  in  Africa  will  require
engagement with rural and agricultural development issues” (FAO, UNICEF, UKaid:
undated flyer).
Additionally,  the  last  sentence  of  this  quote  indicates  that  specialized  know-how
about African countries and low-income countries in particular is needed in order to
design programs which reach rural  areas.  And,  in  this  context  DFID has already
acquired a considerable amount of expertise. 
When  investigating  in  the  question  since  when  DFID  engaged  in  the
discussion  on social  protection and,  even more  interestingly,  in  the promotion of
SCTs, then 2002 for 'social protection' and 2004 for SCTs can be found:
“Since 2002, DFID has made increasing efforts to in fluence many of the governments
who receive UK aid to adopt and implement social protection programmes, policies
and strategies as a means of reducing vulnerability and poverty. From around 2004,
this approach has come to focus on the speci fic promotion of social transfers, both as
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an  end  in  itself  and  as  a  means  towards  establishing  broader  social  protection
policies and strategies” (Hickey et al. 2009: xii).
While SCTs are a main component for DFID within the concept of social transfers,
this actor has a much broader understanding of social transfers including food or
asset transfers, public works, school feeding schemes, agricultural inputs packages
(Davies 2009). Working in an African context it seems that this NDA has to be quite
flexible on what to support and where to contribute know-how to. Of main interest to
me was how DFID in fluences and provides expertise in detail.
First of all, it is not just to my impression very dif ficult to provide information
about the amount of money DFID has in order to initiate pilot projects or to conduct
evaluations: 
“It is dif ficult to quantify in precise terms the resources that DFID has expended in
pursuit of policy in fluence on ST/SP. DFID’s financial commitment to projects varies
between £93m over 4 years in Ethiopia to £10m over the same length of  time in
Zambia” (Hickey et al. 2009: xiii).
The rough estimations show that the amount is considerably smaller than what the
World Bank can offer. However, this money can be used primarily for evaluations and
does not include any lending activities.
What is usually known from NGOs as a modus operandi does apply for DFID
as well: DFID has adopted a 'project-based' approach to its in fluencing work on cash
transfers and social protection (ibid.). In general, this is not a good precondition for
in fluencing activities on a long term basis. Fortunately, DFID sets up country of fices
which can maintain communication and in fluence from one project period to another.
The 2009 report claims that due to the work performed by the country of fices and
DFID's persistence with regard to social  transfers is a reason why DFID became
'alongside the World Bank as the most signi ficant player in this field':
“DFID country of fices and their advisors, with the support of other donors and DFID
headquarters,  have  directly  help  achieve  some  of  the  outcomes  listed  above
[development  of  national  strategies;  budgetary  commitments;  raising  awareness;
piloting ST schemes], most notably through strategically positioning itself as a lead
donor  in  this  field,  helping  to  establish  new  policy  spaces  through  which  social
transfers  and social  protection  could  be discussed and promoted,  providing high-
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quality evidence and technical assistance on critical issues relating to social transfers
and social protection in a timely and responsive manner, and through its persistence
with this  focus as a priority  area for  several  years.  High-calibre DFID advisors in
country of fices have been critical to this process” (Hickey et al. 2009: xi).
Here, DFID claims to be successful  on influencing national policy-making through
positioning itself, and by providing evidence and technical assistance. So, what kind
of evidence is DFID delivering through evaluations? DFID reports about four areas it
works on, which are targeting (to assure appropriate targeting minimizing inclusion
and  exclusion  errors),  implementation  (by  pointing  out  factors  important  for  the
development  of  an  appropriate  implementation  plan),  costs  (e.g.  to  calculate  the
costs per unit of transfer), governance (strengthening accountability and minimizing
leakages) (DFID 2012: 16). In understand the delivery of knowledge (evidence and
evaluations) as the main instrument to in fluence. Similar to HelpAge using cognitive
in fluencing  by  being  a  'hub  of  knowledge',  DFID  is  described  as  a  'knowledge
interface' what basically is a synonym.
“Acting as a knowledge interface: DFID has achieved its most signi ficant levels of
in fluence through acting as an interface between key stakeholders and the wider
evidence base on ST/SP” (Hickey et al. 2009: xvii).
What is DFID going to achieve with being a knowledge interface/ hub of knowledge?
As I mentioned, DFID is very ambitious with regard to in fluencing. Thus, it might not
surprise that one of the main aims of expertise delivery is to create political will and to
form a 'constituency for change':
“Building political support will require an analysis of the social and political forces for
and  against  change.  Based  on  this  analysis,  reformers  can  assess  any  existing
momentum for change and draw up plans to build support for  speci fic reforms or
initiatives, identifying allies and putting in place arguments and incentives to bring
opponents  on-side,  particularly  those  in  the  middle  class.  The  aim  should  be  to
construct a ‘‘constituency for change’’ in favour of social transfers” (DFID 2005: 24).
A strategy to better deliver knowledge is the combination of evaluations and pilot
projects:
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“One common means of creating a constituency for change is to build the evidence
base by implementing a small pilot programme. This was important in developing a
political consensus in favour of some of the Latin American conditional cash transfer
programmes. It is also a key motive behind the pilot cash transfer programmes that
have recently been initiated with support from UNICEF in Kenya and GTZ in Zambia”
(DFID 2005: 25).
In  some  cases,  like  in  Kenya,  the  pilot  projects  and  the  supporting  evaluations
speci fically aim at  replacing preexisting emergency food aid programs with social
cash transfer programs:
The Hunger Safety Nets Programme (HSNP) is a pilot social protection project. The
HSNP is  intended  to  reduce  dependency  on  emergency  food  aid  by  sustainably
strengthening livelihoods through cash transfers. Monitoring and evaluation aims to
inform programme scale-up as well as the government’s social  protection strategy
more generally” (DFID 2012: 6).
Pilot  projects  to  provide  good  examples  of  how  SCTs  work  and  look  like  when
implemented  is  one  strategy.  Delivering  support  for  reforms  through  know-how
accompanies  this  strategy.  As  I  described  above,  evidence  can  be  used  to  win
strategically relevant partners in order to form an alliance of supporters within the
government. A strategy to ensure that a country  continues its road towards SCT-
implementation is to develop with governments strategic frameworks and national
strategies:
“One way of setting out national commitments to social transfer programmes is within
a strategic framework – such as the national social protection strategies that many
countries are currently developing – which is then incorporated into the PRS [Poverty
Reduction Strategy].  Once plans for social transfer programmes are included within
national strategic plans, such as the PRS, donor funding for these programmes could
be most effectively provided through the national budget as poverty reduction budget
support (PRBS), as long as countries are deemed eligible for this type of funding”
(DFID 2005: 26).
What  becomes  even  more  clear  in  this  quotation  is  that  nationals  are  important
prerequisites  for  country  to  access external  funding from donors  which  in  recent
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years to a growing extend decided to deliver funding for projects rather indirectly
through  general  budget  support.  In  this  way  the  governments  ability  and
responsibility  to  take  care  for  the  implementation  of  the  program  should  be
strengthened ('country ownership'). Thus, it is an incentive for countries to develop
such strategies and to 'commit' themselves to achieve certain development goals.
For all this strategies DFID faces the same dif ficulties than HelpAge, which is
that it rather has the social ministries as its counterparts than the financial ministries.
In this regard DFID makes use of the fact that SCT implementation concerns not just
one but many ministries. DFID tries to target stronger ministries first:
“Since transfers cut across the work of various ministries – such as food security,
health, education, HIV/AIDS, and OVCs – good co-ordination among ministries, as
well as non-state actors such as NGOs, is essential. Often, the ministries responsible
for traditional social assistance programmes – such as ministries of social welfare –
are relatively weak, with little in fluence over other ministries. Given the cross-cutting
nature  of  social  transfers,  consideration  should  be  given  to  locating  strategic
responsibility in a more powerful ministry, such as finance, the presidency, or a major
sectoral ministry. Once established, responsibility could be transferred to a potentially
weaker ministry” (DFID 2005: 26).
What are dif ficulties DFID has to deal with when trying to apply those strategies?
Well, first of all it is interesting that DFID thinks about SCT implementation as a long
term project. That makes in particular sense with regard to the African context DFID
operates in:
“In poor countries with limited experience of social transfer systems, the capacity to
administer  and  deliver  transfers  is  likely  to  be  weak  in  the  early  stages  of
implementation.  A too-rapid  introduction  of  social  transfers  could  overwhelm local
capacity  and  undermine  broader  civil  service  reform  initiatives.  Many  large  and
successful social transfer programmes, such as Progresa and Bolsa Familia, started
as small initiatives in speci fic geographic locations. They were gradually expanded as
interest  was  generated  and  lessons  were  learned.  The  same  model  should  be
followed in weaker institutional contexts” (DFID 2005: 27).
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Another dif ficulty is the delivery of support for particular SCT programs through the
general  budget  which  strengthens  country  ownership,  but  includes  as  well
uncertainties how well the country might handle the implementation process:
“Even where donor support for social transfers will be delivered through the govern-
ment budget, it may be necessary to put in place a complementary programme to
strengthen the institutions that will manage and deliver the transfers” (DFID 2005: 27).
Finally, I found an interesting quotation which indicates that DFID did not so well with
its strategy to target ministries higher up the internal hierarchy of ministries. Instead,
DFID seem to still communicate primarily with the social ministries:
"DFID  has  been  less  successful  in  building  productive  relationships  with  more
powerful  political  and  policy  actors,  including  parliamentarians,  high-level  political
leaders,  and  those  within  the  more  powerful  ministries  of  finance  and  planning"
(Hickey et al. 2009: xvi).
This  casts  doubt  in  how  far  DFID  was  success  in  'coalition  formation'  for  SCT
implementation.  With  a  few  SCT  projects  in  Africa,  the  diffusion  process  can
assumed to be pretty dif ficult and  cumbersome.
In sum, this section shows that DFID is an ambitious actor with a clear focus
on the African and the Asian region. It supports SCTs since 2004 and has a strong
voice internationally able to spread knowledge among global actors and rising the
account  for  SCTs.  Nationally,  cognitive  influencing  is  the  dominant  mode.
Evaluations, with or without pilot projects, are used to convince policy-makers and to
provide them with the necessary knowledge to start implementing. Additionally, it is
seems to be DFID's main strategy to get SCTs into country strategy plans and to
initiate  a  tedious  political  process.  Yet,  DFID  seems  to  be  tenacious  enough  to
achieve results with this strategy on a long-term basis.
GIZ: Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit
After a recent change of the organization's name from 'Deutsche  Gesellschaft für
Technische  Zusammenarbeit'  (GTZ)  to  'Deutsche  Gesellschaft  für  Internationale
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Zusammenarbeit'  (GIZ)  I  use  both  acronyms  here  interchangeably  according  to
whether I  refer to a time before 2011(GTZ) or after (GIZ). 
The  German  NDA  was  one  of  the  pioneers  with  regard  to  social  cash
transfers. However, that does not mean that the GIZ is a particular strong advocate
of SCTs. In fact, it is not. Whereas other global actors have a policy preference in
favor of SCTs because they regard it a in particular effective to overcome 'chronic
poverty',  which  is  passed  over  from  one  generation  to  another  without  much
opportunities to change this vicious circle in  between; for the GIZ SCTs are one
instrument among others and not even among the most favored instruments. 
Interestingly, this actor shows that the description of NDAs as global actors is
not just a scienti fic one but part of the organizations self-description as well. With
about 90 of fices around the globe and more than 16.000 staff the GIZ operates in
about  130  countries  and  describes  itself  as  a  'global  player'  contributing  to
improvements  in  program  management,   know-how  provision,  and  solution
development (GIZ Website 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). The contributions this actor makes
are well re flected in its name as an actor for 'technical and international cooperation'.
Technical  aspects  are  of  main  concern  for  this  actor;  instead  of  advocacy  for
particular  policies.  Yet,  among many technical aspects the GIZ lists also 'political
support' within a country as a crucial precondition for program extension. Among the
instruments of the GIZ one can find also such which are especially used on order to
stimulate political  support.  The main instrument to achieve that are pilot  projects.
Nevertheless, I found no indicator showing that there is any main strategy behind
such  activities  of  advocacy,  or  that  any  policies  are  systemically  favored  above
others. It is important in this regard to mention, that the GIZ (like many other NDAs)
contracts  out  most  of  the  country  projects  and rather  provides  funding.  The GIZ
mentions  on  its  website  that  70%  of  its  staff  are  employed  locally  as  national
personnel  (GIZ Website  2013b).  Individual  policy consultants applying for  funding
from the GIZ can in fluence quite a lot how particular programs can look like. This
takes away quite some agency from the GIZ, but is an interesting mechanism which
allows  new policy  ideas  to  emerge  and  become  an  element  of  the  organization
portfolio of supported policies.
The  GIZ's  support  for  SCTs  began  as  a  pilot  project  in  Zambia  (Kalomo
District)  developed  by  a  single  policy  consultant,  Bernd  Schubert  (cf.  Von
Gliszczynski 2015: 55-60). This was one of the very first SCTs and the Kalomo pilot
project marks a starting point in the global policy diffusion wave of SCT programs.
Yet, this program is a speci fic type of SCT which fits very well to the GIZ in so far that
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it focuses on the 'poorest of the poor'. A program with such a focus fits very well to
the GIZ's human rights approach which is a systemic approach committed to fight the
worst forms of poverty. Bernd Schubert developed a SCT model which focuses on
the poorest  10% in a developing country.  Working primarily  in the African region
Schubert  was  well  aware  that  countries  in  this  region  have  very  high  levels  of
poverty. According to him a full-fledged SCT program would overburden the country
with costs (Schubert Interview). Thus, the 10% approach is designed on the basis of
food poverty measured in calorie intake. He discerns four groups: (A) those people in
poverty who can afford two meals a day and are able to work (called 'viable poor'),
(B) those who can afford two meals a day but are unable to work (called 'unviable
poor'), (C) those how can only afford one single meal a day but are able to work, and
(D) those who only can afford a single meal a day or less and are also unable to work
(GTZ 2005:  17).  SCTs according to  this  10% approach are  supposed to  a cash
benefit to lift the people in category D from a 1.400 calorie-intake a day (or less) up to
a 1.800 calories-intake a day. 
This is a low-budget-program to prevent just the worst forms of poverty. The
GIZ embraced this model also because the German development aid is pretty strong
guided by the credo 'providing help for self-help'. The direct provision of benefits was
at the beginning of the 2000s considered to contradict this credo because a direct
delivery  of  benefits is  prone to  create dependency of  the recipients and being a
disincentive  to  work.  Only  support  for  the  'unviable  poor',  who  cannot  help
themselves and suffer of starvation, can be considered to be a help for self-help.
Independent  from  the  GIZ  Bernd  Schubert  visited  many  countries  in  Africa  and
convinced the governments to implement this 10% approach.
The GIZ can hardly be considered to be a major supporter of SCTs because it
has not pushed or advocated this 10% approach as a model. Yet, retrospectively the
GIZ is well aware and proud of the fact that in 2002 with the Kalomo pilot project the
NDA pioneered cash-based social protection programs:
“The  design  of  basic  social  protection  programmes  is  a  relatively  new  area  for
international  development  cooperation  that  has  gained  momentum  through  the
initiatives of the World Bank, ILO and DfID. GTZ, as one of the pioneers, decided to
acquire expertise in this largely unexplored field.” (GTZ 2007: 1)
Due to the fact that the GIZ is a well respected actor in the development community
the early support for a SCT program might have contributed to the consolidation of
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SCTs as  a  potential  program innovation  that  could  be used  to  tackle  poverty  in
developing countries.
As already mentioned, the emergence of the topic SCTs was due to Bernd
Schubert. All  the reports after the introduction of the Kalomo pilot  project in 2002
were written by him (Schubert 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2004a; 2004b). And even in
2005 the GIZ commissioned reports which showed no clear direction to go. Bernd
Schubert continued to a advocate SCTs (GTZ 2005a), and provided an overview in
what other global actors do in this regard (GTZ 2005b). At the same time the GIZ had
staff working with the World Bank and, therefore, has a report on CCTs as well (GTZ
2005c).  An  another  report  of  the  GIZ  discusses  under  the  title  'social  protection
systems' exclusively programs in the health system (GTZ 2005d). All this is far from
any clarity about the direction to go in the field of social protection. 
Instead, the GIZ is much in fluenced by the policy ideas and rationalities of
other global actors; mostly the ILO and the World Bank. Therefore, it is not puzzling
to  find  the  German Ministry  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (BMZ),
which funds and awards contracts to the GIZ, saying that “at multilateral level, it is
above  all  the  International  Labour  Organization  (ILO),  the  World  Bank  and  the
regional development banks that play a decisive role in promoting social protection”
(BMZ 2002: 4). 
The GIZ follows basically the World Bank's neo-liberal rhetoric conceptualizing
SCTs as an investment in human capital. With reference to the World Bank the GIZ
report of 2005, which is a feasibility study on CCTs in Madagascar, emphasizes “high
cost-effectiveness”, the “stimulation of the local economy”, “growth promotion” and
“the  combination  of  reducing poverty  in  the short  run  while  building  a  long term
human capital” (GTZ 2005c). The report is very positive about the CCT model and
does not critically reflect on it. The core problem that CCTs might not be transferable
to low income countries because basic infrastructures, such as schools and hospitals
are not in place, and the bureaucratic costs for the monitoring of the compliance with
imposed conditions are high, have not been discussed. Additionally, the GIZ shares
with the World Bank the focus on the mitigation of 'extreme poverty'.  Further fact
sheets and summary paper in the years after 2005 almost exclusively refer to CCT
programs as envisioned by the World Bank. CCTs are the type of SCT programs the
GIZ supports the most.
Furthermore, one can see the in fluence of the ILO when the GIZ speaks “a
basic  floor of social protection” which seems to be “affordable not only in middle-
income countries, but also in low-income countries”. The ILO's floor concept comes
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handy for the GIZ because it re flects the same variety of policies that is supported by
the GIZ.
“Basic social protection is not a static construction, but is tailored to the individual
needs  of  a  country  and  can  consist  of  various  instruments: [1]  social  cash
transfers such  as  social  pensions,  social  assistance  transfers,  child  grants  and
conditional cash transfers tied to school attendance, vaccination of toddlers etc. [2]
in-kind transfers such as free waivers for health services, scholarships and waivers
for school fees, food aid, school-meal programmes, free health checks for infants, etc.
[3]  public works such as cash or food for work programmes for households with a
degree of self-help potential.” (GTZ 2007: 1; original emphasis).
As shown above the GIZ works on several issues concerning social protection. With
the increasing prominence of SCTs for other global actors the importance of SCTs
increases  accordingly  for  the  GIZ.  So  crucial  questions  remaining  are:  In  which
regions has the GIZ been active? And, what is the GIZ's contribution with regard to
SCTs?
Fortunately  the  BMZ  showed  in  a  presentation  in  2012  a  map  with  the
information in which countries the Germany contributes to the development of social
protection  programs  ( figure  5).  The  figure  shows  that  the  GIZ  is  active  in  Sub-
Saharan Africa and parts in Asia. However, due to the many issues the GIZ works on
with regard to social protection, the majority of programs might not be about SCTs.
Furthermore, the map does not show all of those activities which date back further.
For  example,  in  two  cases  the  GIZ  has  supported  the  implementation  of  CCT
programs in Latin America – in Paraguay and in El Salvador (GTZ 2008a; 2008b).
Those  two  cases  show that  the  GIZ  contribution  is  not  a  strictly  goal-orientated
process  in  order  to  achieve  the  implementation  of  SCTs.  Instead  the  GIZ  is
contributing to certain  aspects of  SCT program development and implementation.
While in El Salvador the GIZ has organized a conference to stimulate South-South-
Cooeration, the organization has in Paraguay supported the training of national staff
and  optimized  operational  planning.  In  the  following  I  explain  on  what  general
aspects the GIZ works.
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Figure 4 “Global GIZ Operations on Social Protection”
Source: Attachment in BMZ Protocol 2012 (BMZ 2012)
In general, the GIZ numerates three preconditions for SCT policy implementation at
national level: 1. political will, 2. administrative capacity, 3. financial resources (GTZ
2005a: 3). The GIZ however seems to contribute mainly with regard to point number
two, because despite a few pilot projects I haven't found many indicators that the GIZ
much involved in advocacy, and with regard to financial resources the GIZ points out
the  importance  of  having  programs  payed  out  of  the  general  national  budget.
Technical assistance for capacity building is the main business of the GIZ. Thus, I
see the GIZ's contribution more in the expansion and scaling-up of already existing
program projects. This is were the GIZ's know-how would be needed most. As said
by the GIZ: “Such ambitious expansion of the programmes over just a few years calls
for a well-developed system of implementation, effective monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms,  and well-trained experts”  (GTZ 2008c:  2).  For this  process the GIZ
contributed the following support services within the scope of technical consultancy
and capacity development: “process-oriented programme-expansion, establishment
and development of decentralized monitoring and evaluation capacities, promotion of
regional  exchanges, and strengthening of South-South cooperation in the area of
basic social protection” (ibid.). 
In sum, the GIZ was an important pioneer for the global discussion on SCTs
in 2001 and after. From the year, 2005 onwards the GIZ became most in fluenced by
183
the World Bank's CCT model. Without any own ambitions the GIZ supports certain
aspects of SCT implementation at national level. Instead of pushing for any kind of
model, the GIZ supports managerial aspects as well as South-South-Cooperation.
Conclusion on Other Global Actors' Support on SCT Diffusion
Different world regions have been influenced by different global actors. While the
World Bank and HelpAge International have truly worked in all regions of the Global
South, other actors have been more focused to particular  regions. While in Latin
America  the  World  Bank  and  the  IADB  have  been  strong  promoters  of  SCTs
(primarily CCTs), which provided funding and facilitated exchange of ideas within the
region,  in  Asia  the  ADB supported  this  process  and  in  Africa  it  was  a  national
development  agency,  namely  DFID,  which  is  also  active  in  parts  of  Asia.  The
German GIZ has not promoted SCTs but contributed to the process of exchange of
ideas  (South-South-Cooperation)  and  the  managerial  aspects  of  scaling-up
processes in Africa as well as in Asia. All of these organizations were intrigued by the
World Bank's CCT model. Just in Asia I found the organizations more critical and
flexible on the conditionality aspect and promoting social pensions as well. In this
regard, I want to reiterate that HelpAge is very active in the Asian region and held
large regional conferences. In the same way the ILO has a strong presence in the
Asian region. This IGO framed the social protection floor concept which anchored
SCTs within a global framework in 2012 and is since used as a reference for many
global actors. I would go so far to say that the ILO managed to establish a new world
cultural norm, which summarizes the global consensus among IOs that had emerged
during the 2000s..
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Part III 
Discussion of the Results 
and Conclusion
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Chapter 5: Discussion of the Findings
This  chapter  highlights  the  findings  of  this  study  from  two  perspectives:  one
perspective uses research and research design (policy-cycle  model)  and another
perspectives compares the findings to empirical  quantitative data (global  diffusion
waves). 
Concepts  highlights: The  study  has  employed  three  basic  categories  of
diffusion activities of IOs: a)  advocacy – with policy models and conferences at its
heart, b) advice – which basically is technical advice, and c) incentives – which are
non-knowledge-based  'carrot  and  stick'  instruments,  such  as  money/lending  and
political in fluence. These instruments and categories have turned out to be relevant
for this study and can serve further actor-centered studies on policy diffusion as well.
Chapter 5.1 applies these instruments to the concept of the policy cycle, in order to
show what  policy  stage the  instruments  are  part  of.  Similar  to  the  notion  of  the
domestic  policy  cycle  policy  diffusion  can  be  conceptualized  in  different  phases.
Mitchel Orenstein uses a basic distinction of three phases: policy development, policy
transfer  and  policy  implementation.  Only  if  IOs  are  involved  into  all  these  three
phases a diffusion process would qualify as a case of  global social policy diffusion
(GSP). This chapter shows how the instruments I found fit  such cycle of a policy
diffusion model to demonstrate how the findings here can be used in the light of other
concepts such as the policy cycle, which was designed to bring conceptual clarity to
rather complex and intertwined processes.
Quantitative  empirical  highlights: This  analysis  has  focussed  on  the
activities of global actors without having shown in how far these activities have led to
real change in national policies. It  has been mentioned that in many cases policy
change has taken place, and that global actors have been involved in the process,
but causality in a strict sense has not been shown. Many factors play a role in policy-
making so that it is dif ficult to identify causal factors. Often the success of a diffusion
process is dependent on reaching a tipping-point, and on the opening of windows of
opportunity, like economic crises or a public uproar in the media or in the society. By
taking quantitative number on the introduction of SCT programs I can contextualize
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the qualitative findings of this study and see in how far global actors' activities have
accompanied processes of policy-diffusion.
Global policy diffusion is not about single events taking place in one particular
country. Instead policy diffusion becomes most obvious when multiple countries at
different stages of economic development implement a similar policy in a short period
of  time.  A global  trend usually  is  visualized by  graphs  that  show the  number  of
adopting countries in a wave- or a S-pattern (see figure 5). This wave- or S-pattern is
determined by  a few innovative early-bird-countries,  by more and more countries
joining  in  as  followers  and  some  late-comer  countries  which  had  hesitated  to
implement the policy. Chapter 5.2 takes into account the number of countries which
have adopted CCT or social pensions policies in each year between 1950 and 2012.
The trend pattern and the tipping points of each wave have been indicated.
    Based on Rogers, Everett (1962) Diffusion of innovations. Free Press, London, NY, USA.   
Type a) bell-shaped trend pattern >> non-accumulated numbers
Type b) S-shaped trend pattern >> accumulated numbers
Figure 5
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5.1. Global Actors' Policy Instruments 
in a Global Policy-cycle
To apply the concept of the policy cycle, which is originally designed for domestic
policy processes, to the global level is not unthinkable, yet, it is even more dif ficult to
maintain the notion of phases of  this 'cycle'  because so many in fluences and so
many actors interact. The nation-state might try to implement a policy reform of some
former programs, while an international forum just develops a new standard in this
field,  while  a  global  actor  is  transferring  its  already  developed  concepts  to  the
national level, and a national coalition of veto players is trying to stop this national
reform. Who of these actors is in what stage of a 'global policy-cycle'? How can so
many diverse in fluences of all kind of different actors from multiple levels be merged
together to get out something like a sequential policy-cycle? I found this model not
applicable for this study and rather focussed on policy instruments and how they
have been used by one particular type of actor: international organizations. Yet, in
the end I discuss the results in terms of a policy-cycle model to show how the results
can be applied for  other  concepts.  Besides demonstrating applicability  the policy
-cycle  provides  conceptual  clarity  by  unravelling  the  complexity,  the  policy-cycle
demonstrates that this diffusion process is part of the discipline Global Social Policy
(GSP),  and  this  concepts  discovers  new  aspects  for  further  investigations  and
studies complementing the empirical findings outlined in this study.
The policy-cycle model from GSP has been chosen because it seemed to be
an  appropriate  tool  to  capture  also  more  complex  qualitative  findings.  While  the
complexity of multiple factors in a policy diffusion process seems to be acknowledged
in the literature (Rogers 2003; Brooks 2004; Elkins & Simmons 2005; Weyland 2005;
Berry & Berry 2007; Sugiyama 2011), it has often been a challenge to integrate the
factors  in  an  meaningful  way.  As  a  result,  many  studies  have  ended  up  in  a
quantitative  study  where  multiple  factors  have  been  integrated  into  multivariate
event-history-analysis. Such studies have corroborated the impact of global factors
like the presence of international organizations in a developing country or the number
of  rati fications  of  international  treaties  and  covenants  on  the  likelihood  of  the
implementation of a particular (global) policy model in a country.
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This  chapter  builds  on  the  qualitative  research  findings  of  this  study  and
discusses  them within  a  basic  phase model.  Scholars  from GSP operate  with  a
simpli fied policy-cycle model which is less about the the sequentiality of the phases
than about the global actors' involvement in each of this phases. Orenstein defines
global social policy by the involvement of global actors in each of the phases: ”Global
policies  are  those  that  are  developed,  diffused,  and implemented with  the  direct
involvement  of  global  policy  actors  and  coalitions  at  or  across  the  international,
national, or local levels of governance” (Orenstein 2005: 177). Thus, the categories
are: policy development, policy transfer and policy implementation. 
The guiding question for each category is similar:
a) To what extent were global actors – especially international organizations –
contributed to the development of the policy that has recognizably spread  
globally? The definitions for 'global' are twofold: spacial and by reference to  
global actors. Often a laboratory country, which as innovated the policy first, is 
involved in the process of policy development. Yet, this policy has to become a
model in some way in order to be picked-up easily by other countries. Where 
does this model come from?
b) To what extent were global actors – especially international organizations – 
involved in the transfer of the policy that has recognizably spread globally? 
While policy diffusion literature looks at the spread of a policy, which simply is 
the adoption of a similar policy by multiple countries in a narrow time-frame, 
the policy transfer can be driven by nation states as well as by global actors or
both. It  is to note that policy transfer could also be solely government-led  
without any involvement of global actors. The subsequent part of this chapter 
will show how dif ficult it is to identify the main drivers. Only an in-depth country
case-study might provide a final answer to such a question.
c) To what extent were global actors – especially international organizations –
involved in the domestic implementation of the policy that has recognizably  
spread globally? One could ask why policy implementation is a category at all. 
Cannot a policy only be considered as being 'transferred' if the policy has been
implemented?  Here  the  implementation  is  understood  as  an  ongoing  
process  exceeding  the  point  of  the  initial  policy  adoption  (cf.  Orenstein  
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2005: 180). This understanding matches with my observation that the policy 
implementation in a developing context can take up to several years. Policy 
innovation are in a constant risk of being reversed or phased-out. From a  
policy introduction to an institutionalized program can be a long way.
In the following the findings of the empirical chapter will be discussed with reference
to the categories developed above.
a) Policy Development
An in-depth analysis of how the ideas about Social Cash Transfers and particular
models  have been developed and spread within  the  global  community  has been
provided by Moritz von Gliszczynski (2015) and also from the FLOOR project. The
analysis  here  was  not  focussed  on  a  discourse  analysis  to  trace  the  roots  of
discursive elements and ideas. Based on a x-orientated research design this study
has focussed on the activities of global actors. Interestingly, both actors (World Bank
and HelpAge International) not simply refer to particular country programs as best-
practice or make country-speci fic suggestions. Instead the World Bank as well  as
HelpAge International have developed their own policy models.
One might expect that the World Bank suggests a development path for a
developing country's economy and leaves the development of concrete policies to
the nation-states. In this picture the countries would design country initiatives and
apply  for  funding  from the  World  Bank.  Instead  the  World  Bank  developed  with
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) a policy model based on observations of policies
of Social Cash Transfers in Brazil and built an abstract policy model out of it. This
policy  model  is  embedded  in  the  World  Bank's  rhetoric  and  concepts  of  human
capital and economic growth. Moreover, this policy fits perfectly to the World Bank's
ongoing and already established support for education and health.
One might expect that the engagement of an non-governmental organization
(NGO) in developing countries is focussed foremost on direct service provision. With
the support of NGOs schools are build and lessons to children are hold, wells are
drilled, food is distributed, and more. HelpAge International made early the experince
that it is a much more effective way to improve the life of their target group, which are
older people, by focussing on advocacy at global, regional, national and local level.
To  be  most  effective  with  its  efforts  HelpAge  has  developed  a  policy  model  of
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universal social pensions (USP) which they advocated at global level and fed into the
global discussions on Social Cash Transfers. By lobbying and collaborating with the
United Nations (UN), HelpAge has established with USP a legitimized rights-based
social policy model for developing countries. HelpAge can advocate social pensions
in the Global South on all levels and directly with national policy-makers, because
social pensions have become a UN policy concept.
What makes it so attractive for global actors to engage in policy development?
I see clear benefits for global actors, which makes it understandable that IOs invest
considerable resources (time and money) in order to engage in policy development.
A first benefit of  policy development can be that an organization has with such a
policy clear policy goals for itself and might better be able to focus its activities of
advocacy.  Subsequently,  an  organization  can  provide  a  clear  message  towards
others. Advocacy is then backed up by good arguments, because a policy model
often is described as a policy solution and provides the problem definition in the
same way. In such a way social facts might be (re-)defined as new social problems
which might not even have been existed before. In this way a new awareness for
social problems can be stimulated and the interest in a policy solution can increase.
Finally, designed and developed in a particular way these policy models can enjoy a
high level of legitimacy. Let me state three factors which also apply to the Conditional
Cash Transfer (CCT) and Universal Social Pension (USP) models.
First,  legitimacy  can  increase  when  a  policy  model  is  based  on  rational
arguments which resonate with values and norms that are already established in the
international development community (cf. Strang and Meyer 1993: 490ff).  Support
flows  from  scienti fic  evaluations  and  empirical  evidence  which  demonstrate  and
argue for the policy model's effectiveness and functional value with regard to global
norms  like  'human  capital',  'economic  growth',  'development',  'social  progress'  or
'poverty reduction' (von Gliszczynski 2015). Both, the models of the World Bank and
of HelpAge, argue scienti fically and are based on empirical evaluations through pilot
projects or 'laboratory countries'. For example has the World Bank proven that a cash
transfer  that  is  conditional  on  school  attendance  does  decrease  the  number  of
absence days of schoolkids, and HelpAge has shown that a cash transfer to older
people benefits empirically the poorest of the poor, because households with older
people often belong to this group, and kids in the same way, because older people
tend  to  be  the  main  caregivers  for  children  in  countries  where  the  middle-aged
people have died to a signi ficant extend due to HIV infections. All these arguments
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make the policy models more legitimate and make it easier for policy-makers to pick
up these policy innovations.
Second, the more a model is anchored at global level, within globally signed
conventions or declarations of intend, and the more it is discussed among actors, on
global or regional conferences or in publications, the more legitimate is the policy
model. Again, both actors made use of this source of legitimacy. While the World
Bank placed some major global events by holding large global conferences, HelpAge
tried to get their model in UN conventions and 'translated it down' to the regional and
then national level via conferences and workshops. Moreover, both actors created
and published maps which give the impression that the particular model is already
part of a global trend. The active discussion of the policy models among actors and
the manifestation  in  conventions and publications substantiate  those models  and
increase the legitimacy as well as it draws attention to those policy models.
Third, it has turned out that it has become less accepted in the developing
community if  policy models follow a 'one size fits all'  approach and appear to be
something  like  a  panacea  to  certain  problems  disrespecting  the  individual
particularities of each country. Terms like 'country ownership' have become important
buzzwords in  the international  developing community.  Thus,  policy  models  would
benefit from being cognitively open so that certain parameters of a policy model can
be adapted to national contexts.  The policy models of the two actors which have
been analyzed in this study are both described as adaptable. The World Bank says
explicitly that their CCT model should not be understand as a 'one size fits all' model.
Instead the World Bank starts its advocacy with evaluations at country-level which
'test' in how far CCTs would make sense in this particular country context. Yet, it has
been shown how the World Bank structures its argumentation so that the CCT policy
model  appears to be the recommendation with the best fit.  HelpAge International
instead is indeed much more flexible with their policy model. Instead of continuing
arguing for and talking about universal social pensions, HelpAge drops in most cases
to  talk  about  the  universality  component  and  its  rights-based  approach  appears
solely in introductions of side-notes. Instead HelpAge points out all the parameters
that can be adapted to the national level, like the age of eligibility for the cash transfer
and the amount of the monthly benefit. This adaptability is supported by a calculation
tool  on HelpAge's website with  allows policy-makers to  calculate the design of  a
social pension with a particular national budget given. Making the policy models more
responsive is an important further feature to increase legitimacy and the likelihood
such policy models will be picked up at national level.
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This section showed that the World Bank as well a HelpAge International have
engaged in policy-making. They had good reasons to do so and they established
their models in a way that gives them legitimacy from multiple sources so that one
might classify the policy models of CCT and USP as world cultural material according
to world society theory. The next section will discuss what it means for policy ideas if
they become part of world culture in form of policy models. Moreover, I point out the
manifold tools which those global actors have used in order to transfer their policy
models to the national level.  
b) Policy Transfer
As shown with this study: there is a rich variety of instruments for global actors to use
in order to transfer their policies to the national level. There is first to clarify what is
actually meant by a policy transfer. It can mean that global actors transfer a policy
concept from the global to the national level, leaving open if the policy is actually
adopted  or  if  the  policy-makers  deliberately  decided  to  reject  the  policy  concept
transferred to them. Yet, it seams that Orenstein had another concept in mind. He
mentioned the 'initial adoption' of a policy for this phase. So the 'successful' delivery
of  a  policy  would mean that  a  policy  truly  has been transferred.  Ideally  a  policy
transfer is defined by a transfer of a concept which in some way played a role for
policy-making at national level. If the relevance for policy-making is a criterion for the
definition of a policy transfer, it brings a further aspect to light: a policy transfer can
be led by global actors as well as from national policy-makers. 
National  governments can observe developments in other  countries,  in the
development  community  or  can be inspired  from global  conferences.  They  could
return and initiate policy-making by transferring particular to national level. If they pick
up a concept from global actors it would be a policy transfer where global actors have
been involved in so far that they have developed the policy model. Thus, it is not a
criterion for policy transfer,  if  governments or global actors have been the driving
force  begin  a  policy  transfer.  This  autonomy of  the  nation-states  and that  policy
transfer can be led from both ends, makes it even more dif ficult to measure global
actors in fluence.
Moreover, it is to note that for the observation of a policy transfer, which is a
concept traveling from A to B, the intentions of global actors does also not play a
role. A policy can be transferred due to global actors' activities also it was completely
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unintended. The intentional and strategic in fluencing of national states is no criterion
for the observation of a policy transfer. Yet, it would be interesting to see how the
activities of global actors come into play and if one can see strategic behavior shining
through.
While  policy  transfer  is  a  process  that  might  happen  around  the  world  in
multiple countries or not at all, I respond to policy transfer in so far that I pay attention
to the sending-site which are the global actors. Each of their instruments can lead to
policy  transfer  or  not.  The  assessment  if  policy  transfer  has  taken  place  would
require to prove in individual cases if  and in how far a policy adoption has taken
place.  As  this  was  not  matter  of  my  analysis,  the  discussion  of  global  actors'
instruments in the section is discussed from the sending site.
Policy  Models.  The  World  Bank  as  well  as  HelpAge  International  have
developed  policy  models.  While  the  World  Bank  has  made  Conditional  Cash
Transfers  with  the  abbreviation  CCT  popular  in  the  development  community  by
publishing books about CCTs and holding major events at global level, HelpAge has
made its policy model of universal social pension not quite as popular. Even though
the consensus in the global community for social pensions is high, the component of
universality is debated and the abbreviation of USP would be rather unknown to the
developing community. Instead HelpAge has lobbied and cooperated with the United
Nations to turn older people into a subject of global policies and debates. To raise the
awareness for older people as a particular vulnerable group which should be targeted
by particularly designed policies is one major aim of HelpAge. Through the strategy
of  'mainstreaming'  HelpAge  has  lobbied  international  actors  and  conferences
constantly in order to make older people a subject of debate. The second part of their
strategy was the development of the social pensions model and to make this policy
one of their most favored policies. By the strategy of 'packaging' HelpAge connected
on the theoretical  level  social  pension with all  kind of  topics,  like healthcare and
HIV/AIDS, childcare, social protection, poverty reduction and livelihoods and work.
As a result multiple actors can understand social pensions as a topic which is of
relevance for them as well. 
I see the reasons for the different strategic approaches between these actors
resulting from their different capabilities. While the World Bank is a global institution
in  itself,  HelpAge  is  not.  The  World  Bank  can  organized  global  events  via
conferences and flagship publications which attract a wide audience. HelpAge is not
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able to create similar global events directly. Instead the INGO needs the reputation
and in fluence of the United Nations.
Interestingly,  both  actors  are driven by  a 'mission'  to  spread their  models.
Many other actors do not develop or choose a favorite political  policy which they
would try to fed into the international community. Especially most non-governmental
organization are driven by a more pragmatic approach which is much more country-
led and focused on direct service delivery. I would not understand it to be a common
mode of in fluencing for NGOs to target national policy-making. Yet, as a finding of
this  analysis  both –  the INGOs as well  as  the IGOs –  have engaged in  policy
development to a similar extend.
As mentioned above, it is dif ficult to measure the in fluence of policy models
and policy ideas. They can unfold an impact without any further involvement of global
actors. How does that work? Well, learning at national level does not take place in a
vacuum  of  ideas.  There  are  always  ideas,  norms  and  institutions  around  that
in fluence  national  decisions.  If  organizations  engage  in  the  process  of  global
knowledge production to establish policy models they fill the cognitive and normative
space  with  ideas  which  can  be  in fluential  beyond  being  measured  via  direct
in fluence.  Instead multiple  channels  can carry  a policy  model  from one place to
another.  Countries can pass knowledge from one to another,  publications can be
picked up by policy makers who look for inspirations and policy innovations to tackle
particular social problems, and myriads of further actors – from big to small IGOs,
and all kind of different INGOs, development banks, NDAs, think tanks and institutes,
and  individual  policy  consultants  working  on  issues  of  social  protection  –  carry
elements  and  rationalities  of  policy  models  or  rationalities  those  models  are
embedded in to the countries in the Global South. The impact of global actors' policy
models is dif ficult to measure because their in fluence simply exceeds the range of
activities driven by a particular actor.
Although the clear impact is dif ficult and expensive to measure, the benefit of
analyzing qualitatively the activities of global actors on policy development and the
activities  involved  in  mainstreaming,  packaging,  publishing  and  developing  policy
models  indicates  in  how  far  indirect  processes  of  policy  diffusion  might  have
accompanied the direct attempts of global actors at national level.
The following instruments build up on the policy models and are about their
diffusion in a more direct way, where the interaction of global actors and national
governments stands in the foreground.
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Conferences. In this study the interplay of policy instruments turned out to be
important. Conferences are a tool to facilitate the spread of policy models. While it
has been discussed above that policy models can have an effect on policy diffusion
just  by  being  out  there  in  form of  publications,  one  can assume a  much  higher
probability  for  policy  models  to  spread  when  global  actors  actively  present  and
debate  their  policy  models  together  with  policy-makers  or  technical  experts  from
developing countries. The World Bank as well as HelpAge International have made
extensively use conferences in order to spread their models.
While  the  World  Bank  again  makes use  of  being  an institution  in  itself,  it
organizes its conferences as major events inviting a vast range of countries. The
World  Bank  hasn't  hold  many  conferences  but  only  a  few.  Yet,  they  where
encompassing in size and well received. Moreover, the audience increased with the
third event massively. Besides these major events the World Bank supported multiple
activities under the banner of 'South-South-Cooperation'. Many smaller conferences
were  hold  with  countries  from  the  Global  South  participating.  To  involve  their
audience and to make the countries feel to be in charge of the diffusion process
(buzzword: 'country ownership') is an important element of South-South-Cooperation.
HelpAge benefits from the United Nation System and the conferences and
debates around the  UN Madrid Conference on Aging (MIPAA) which was a major
event at global level. While HelpAge celebrates this event as a huge success, it was
'merely' increasing the sensitivity for the topic of aging and older people as a target
group of social policies. This is a huge step with regard to the former absence of any
age-sensitive policies including older people as a target group which are in particular
vulnerable and would need some extra attention and policies. Yet, the policy model
of  social  pensions  or  universal  social  pensions  was not  mentioned.  So HelpAge
initiated follow-up events on all levels. Each event was one level closer to national
decision-makers and more concrete and speci fic than the event before. The regional
Livingstone conference, Social Policy Framework for Africa, and the Yaoundé call for
action  speci fied how appropriate  social  policies  for  older  people  would  look  like.
Social pensions resulted as a clear policy advice from those conferences. This usage
of  a  global  UN  framework  for  a  sequence  of  follow-up  events  is  what  I  have
described  as  a  strategy  of  'translating  down'  policy  ideas  to  the  national  level
resulting in clear policy advice.
Both  actors  have  conducted  multiple  conferences  where  particular  policy
models have been explained to policy-makers, which in turn could decide to consider
them  for  policy  making  or  not.  One  might  neither  expect  policy-makers  to  start
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implementing CCTs or social  pensions right  after such a conference nor that the
ideas  about  new  ways  in  policy-making  have  left  no  effect  at  all.  At  least  new
subjects for national discussions might have passed on; leaving aside the question if
in the end those ideas have been rejected, implemented or used to modify existing
programs.
Technical Advice. The delivery of technical advice do both actors consider as
a  long  term effort in  order  to  influence  national  policy  making.  While  lending  is
traditionally the main activity of the World Bank, there are a lot of ongoing advice and
discussions to find. The World Bank is in continuous country dialogue in order to
assure that their  lending is spend wisely and according to economic preferences.
Countries  publish  their  country  strategies  and  action  plans,  and  the  World  Bank
answers with 'Country Assistant Strategy Papers' (CAS). 
The CAS and the World Bank's language would never entail explicit directives
of  what  countries  should  do.  Instead  their  directives  are part  of  technical  advice
where the World Bank would assess a current national development and than make
some  suggestion  emphasizing  their  effectiveness  with  regard  to  particular  social
indicators (e.g. school attendance). A recurrent policy advice of the World Bank is to
phase out subsidy programs and use this money instead for the introduction of CCT
programs.
For the introduction of pilot  projects the World Bank offers funding through
loans to the governments. While lending and pilot projects have turned out to be
effective to get countries started, technical advice has been used to stabilize such
projects. The Bank argues to develop social protection systems with CCT programs
at its core, and to better institutionalize the current programs by improving its design,
by scaling-up existing CCT programs, by improving their targeting and by founding
new committees at  national  level.  To support  the institutionalization of  CCTs the
World Bank can use monitoring and evaluations, offer additional funding for that, and
offers  trainings  to  policy-makers  in  order  to  advise  them  how  to  improve  the
program's design. The World Bank presents itself as a premier source for expertise
to improve CCTs targeting and through its reputation and privileged access to the
governments  and  ministries  of  finance it  can  ensure  that  is  technical  assistance
reaches its audience.
HelpAge  International  does  not  have  such  a  privileged  access  to  the
government. Instead of having the in fluential financial ministries as their counterparts,
HelpAge  usually  interacts  with  the  social  ministries.  These  ministries  are  usually
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among the weakest in the governmental setting, so that it is important for HelpAge to
win a broad coalition of policy-makers in order to be influential on policy making. Due
to its network structure HelpAge is effectively anchored at national level with country
of fices. These of fices are not newly set-up and steered by the London headquarter of
HelpAge. Instead, already existing non-governmental organizations working on aging
have become part of their network. They are supported by HelpAge and participate in
global campaigns rolled out by HelpAge. These organization are well institutionalized
and enjoy a high legitimacy at national level. In countries where such strong partners
are missing HelpAge sets up its own branch of fices. Through this network structure
HelpAge  is  broadly  connected  with  developing  countries  throughout  the  Global
South.
Like the World Bank in fluences on a longterm basis with its country dialogue,
HelpAge establishes informal longterm relationships to policy-makers, in particular
the social  departments.  Through continuous lobbying, workshops and knowledge-
sharing  HelpAge  establishes  itself  as  a  hub  of  knowledge which  national  policy-
makers can use as a resource in order to get expertise and technical policy advice. In
order to transfer its policy model to the national level, HelpAge tries to make allies
with all kind of different players. In this way it might take years before HelpAge can
effectively  transfer  its  policy  model.  One  approach  of  this  long-term  effort  is  to
in fluence in  stages.  While  some intellectuals  and media  can be convinced  more
easily to write articles and publish papers about a new policy, HelpAge tries to find
allies among other INGOs and lobbies national parliamentarians in a further step.
With such a support in its back, HelpAge can focus more on senators and to win
particular  national  ministries.  Often  even  with  so  many  steps  taken,  successful
in fluencing often is dependent on an initiating event. Among others, one factor for
such  a  window of  opportunity  can  be  public  demand.  Therefore,  in  a  final  step
HelpAge uses its close connection to its target group – the older people themselves –
to organize protest  and to actively work towards those windows of opportunity to
open up.
The important point is that HelpAge holds close relationships to policy-makers
and  establishes  itself  as  a  hub  of  knowledge  where  policy-makers  can  turn  to
whenever technical expertise is needed. HelpAge focusses on best-practice sharing
of information from countries which have introduced a social pension in one way or
another.  Moreover,  HelpAge argues as well  for social  pension as a cost-effective
instrument  to  implement  SCTs in  a country.  In  detail  HelpAge is  arguing for  the
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feasibility of social pensions and supports in a next step concrete expertise on how to
set up the targeting of the policies. 
The  overview  of  instruments  of  how  global  actors  actually  transfer their
policies to the national level showed that conferences and technical advice are used
to change the mindset of national policy-makers so that they demand support for the
implementation of global actors' policy models or the introduction of pilot projects in
order to put those policy models to a test. It seems that in fluencing is a longterm
process with two purposes. First, to transfer the whole argumentation and concepts
connected with a particular model in order to chance a mindset. Second, it is far from
sure that an introduced policy model with survive and become an institutionalized
part of the national policy. Thus, technical advice helps to facilitate the expansion of
programs and their  survival.  Advice on how to scale-up a program and technical
analyses of the effectiveness of programs are crucial to finally transfer a policy to the
national-level.  Important  to  note  that  international  organizations  do  not  consider
policy transfer as a one-time-delivery, but a as a longterm process which can take
several years until a critical mass or a tipping point is reached and the policy model
finally can be considered as being transferred. 
c) Policy Implementation
While the transfer of a policy model and the rationalities connected with it  is one
thing, the implementation is another. Organizations might transfer policies as much
as they want; their activities remain insigni ficant if they are not in one way or another
appealing enough to be picked up and policy implementations begins.
As my analysis showed: both actors have their mechanisms to kickstart policy
implementation. While the World Bank is making use of their financial capacities and
is providing loans for pilot projects, HelpAge is making use of being deeply rooted to
a national society and their target group, so they can organize political protest.
Part  2  of  this  analysis  described  the  organizations'  instruments  which  can
serve as a strong incentive.  The World Bank hast crucial  funding and mentioned
often in its Country Assistant Strategies the added value for countries to run a test-
period and “try” particular policy models with a pilot project. The funding for such
pilots would come from the World Bank. Especially in countries with high levels of
poverty and minimal social protection programs in place it might be tempting to take
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a  pilot  project  on  board,  especially  when  there  is  so  much  buzz  about  social
protection  at  global  level.  I  doubt  that  behind  every  pilot  project  stands  a  full
commitment of a developing country's government to implement a full-fledged social
protection  program.  This  would  explain  why  the  World  Bank  is  so  ambitious
motivating national governments to scale-up there pilot projects. As mentioned above
technical advice does play a crucial role in this regard.
HelpAge cannot kickstart policy implementation with vast amounts of money.
Instead they focus on what they are good: lobbying and campaigning. The London
Headquarter does play a key role in designing HelpAge's campaigns. The topics for
their campaigns are based on and are deeply integrated into international policies. By
doing so, it is assured that national policy-makers can understand the claims which
are made within those campaigns. Policy-makers have heard about the topics before
when they have discussed them in international forums and, moreover, have in most
cases  also  committed  themselves  through  international  conventions  to  bring
particular policies on their way in oder to increase social protection for its citizens.
The  need  for  governments  to  act  in  this  regard  comes  from  all  level:  from
international  commitments,  from the socio-economic  conditions  which  manifest  at
local  level  and from the lobbying of  HelpAge at  national-level.  Yet,  where  is  the
initializer  to  trigger  political  actions?  Each  of  this  in fluences  can  trigger  national
policy-making, but I found politically protest of older people an in particular visible
in fluence which is focussed on policy-making because it  is  about groups of older
people  make  their  claims  towards  the  government.  HelpAge  does  support  and
organize those protest through campaigning. In HelpAge's terms, older people have
been a in particular neglected social group and to give voice to their needs is one of
HelpAge's main aims. And indeed, the political protest seems to have its effect as
of ficials from HelpAge told me. It is not that politicians immediately start working on
social  policies  after  such  political  protests,  but  the  protest  stimulate  a  political
discussion.  HelpAge does use this  protest  as a momentum to start  working with
government of ficials on policy making in oder to present results when the protest rise
up again in the next year. In this regard it seems to be an important feature of those
protest that they are not organized once a year, but annually. 
As  I  mentioned  in  the  section  above  on  policy  transfer,  it  is  important  to
understand  the  interplay  of  the  instruments  of  international  organizations.  Policy
transfer  can  be  somewhat  toothless  and  rely  on  goodwill,  curiosity,  obligations,
innovations or the inherent necessity to act. While those are good reasons to assume
that the activities of international actors can bear fruits at national level, the strong
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incentives those organizations can set to kickstart policy implementation might be
interesting activities complementing the other instruments.
Moreover,  an  understanding  of  the  interplay  is  so  important  because  the
incentives  of  funded  pilot  projects  as  well  as  of  political  protest  can  not  be
sustainable  without  the  further  instruments,  which  are  here:  technical  advice;
delivered by HelpAge establishing itself as a hub of knowledge accompanying the
political protest and delivered by the World Bank through workshops, 'Analytical and
Advisory  Assistance'  (AAA) and  positive  evaluation  studies  accompanying  pilot
projects.
Conclusion
The analytical framework of to Mitchell Orenstein has been applied in order to show
in  how  far  global  actors  have  been  involved  in  each  phase  of  policy  diffusion.
According to Orenstein, only an involvement in all  three phases would qualify the
diffusion of CCTs and social pensions as a case of Global Social Policy. 
Moreover, I wanted to demonstrate the an analysis of instruments easily can
be  applied  to  other  analytical  concepts  in  order  to  make  use  of  the  empirical
observations.  An in-depth discourse analysis  would dig  deeper  into  the ocean of
policy  development  (von  Gliszczynski  2015)  and  the  development  of  a  large
database  of  national  policies  would  shed  light  on  the  variety  and  similarities  of
national policies (see the database FLOORCASH of all countries in the Global South,
e.g. Weible, forthcoming, for pensions Böger 2013). Moreover, country case studies
would  reveal  how  far  the  activities  of  global  actors  have  led  to  domestic  policy
innovations and policy change. 
With the current analysis of policy instruments, all phases of this global policy
cycle have been touched. This should have made clear that though all the activities
of international organizations can be seen and analyzed as quite separate from each
other, yet the effects on policy diffusion come best to light when the activities are put
into perspective and are understood as supporting each other. The interplay of the
instruments  is  what  provides  international  organizations  with  the  ability  to  be
influential, and the interplay helps to explain that the role of IOs in the field of SCTs
indeed a full case of GSP in Orenstein's sense, that is, IOs are active in all three
phases that constitute GSP. The story of international actors' in fluence is simply not a
monocausal one.
201
Finally, for all phases of a global policy cycle the importance of knowledge was
highlighted as an influential factor; whether it was the appeal of policy models from
the phase of policy development; or the role of technical advice and conferences as a
distributor of policies and concepts in the phase of policy transfer; or the importance
of evaluations, evidence studies and technical know-how accompanying pilot projects
and  development  of  the  design  of  national  policies.  It  is  hard  to  overlook  the
importance of knowledge at the interface of international organizations and nation
states. 
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5.2. Examining Quantitative Data of 
Waves of SCT Policy Diffusion
My analysis has shown a considerable amount of global actors' activities in the field
of social protection policies. Another question of interest would be to identify in how
far quantitative data substantiates that global actors have been in fluential at national
level, even though my research is not about the proof of causality but rather about to
show what kind of actors' activities one can measure. I consider this part a reflection
upon  these  activities  in  order  to  contextualize  it  with  quantitative  data.  This
information might help to better evaluate not just with what instruments global actors
contributed to the diffusion of SCTs but also indicates in how far they might have
contributed to real policy change at national level.
There  are  two  potential  categories  where  policy  change  can  come  from:
'above'  or  'below'.  If  policy  change  comes  from  'above',  the  governments  have
learned  from neighbor  countries  or  have  adapted  to  global  norms or  have been
advised  and  motivated  by  global  actors.  If  policy  changes  comes  from  'below'
governments rather react to observed socio-economic problems within their countries
or react to protests from affected social groups within the society. However, the next
quotation from DFID supports the overall impression that the spread of SCTs in the
Global South is rather a 'revolution from above' than result of local movements. 
“Building this political will may be a signi ficant challenge, particularly in poor countries
with  little  experience  of  successful  social  welfare  systems.  The  excluded  and
vulnerable  are  often  politically  weak  and  find  their  interests  absent  from  or  not
prioritized in poverty reduction strategies and national plans. Governments are more
likely to respond to citizens and interests that have a stronger voice. And those whose
interests are well served by the status quo may resist change if they perceive that it
will  not  benefit them.  Meeting the needs of  the  poorest  may,  in  some cases,  be
regarded as a waste of resources, mistakenly understood as diverting the state from
its key tasks of promoting growth and increasing access to social  services” (DFID
2005: 14).
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The situation might not be as dramatic as DFID says here, because national agendas
have changed since. Yet, it might be true that this is not due to the in fluence of social
pressure coming from the society. HelpAge is among the pioneers to activate the
potential  of  social  groups'  influence.  The formation  of  Older  People  Associations
(OPA) as social movements and political protest in developing country is a rather
recent  development.  And even in this case it  is  not  that  the recipients are being
directly in fluential, it needs HelpAge as an organization form outside to stimulate and
guide this movement and to mediate between the government and the older people
protesting. It seems that governments have chosen to implement SCT policies for
reasons beyond the need for  action  stemming from unfavorable  social  indicators
alone. But have global actors contributed to this spread? In this section I show in how
far  patter  of  policy  diffusion  waves may substantiate  such assumptions.  Yet,  the
quantitative  data  alone  will  not  show  causes  und  and  will  also  not  uncover  the
activities and processes that have stood behin policy adoptions. Therefore I take the
findings  of  this  study  into  consideration  in  order  to  find  explanations  for  policy
diffusion pattern.
What  diffusion  pattern  of  the  tow  models  conditional  cash  transfers  and
(universal) social pensions can be identi fied? In the following I show some charts that
put the activities of global actors into perspective. Indeed, the graphs suggest that
global actors have contributed to the diffusion of those programs, even though further
factors might have contributed as well. Yet, it seems that a lot of policy adoption was
driven by the countries itself. Let me explain that in detail based on quantitative data.
The FLOOR Project (Bielefeld University) from which this study stems, also
collected country data on virtually  all  major  SCT programs in all  countries of  the
Global South (main researcher Kathrin Weible, supported by Tobias Böger and John
Berten). This database served to be the raw material for the construction of graphs
about  the  diffusion  of  CCT  programs  and  social  pensions.  The  graphs  were
constructed on the basis on program introductions at national level. It was counted
whenever a country introduced a national program, either a CCT or a social pension.
Some countries appear twice in the graph because the first program for example was
phased out and another national program was introduced.
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Graph 1: Accumulated number of adopted CCTs in the Global South
Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B 
(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)
'Graph 1' shows that before 1996 almost no CCTs exist. This changed within two
years when a small number countries introduced some CCT programs. From 2000
until 2004 a first trend is visible and the number of CCT programs doubled. Then,
from 2004 onwards there is a strong trend towards CCT programs, happening in two
waves; first 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010. Moreover, the trend for CCTs is still
continuing.
Overall,  the  spread  of  CCTs  can  be  characterized  as  a  signi ficant  trend
gaining momentum in 2000 and speeding up after 2004. These years fall together
with landmarks. In 2000 there are to mention the Millennium Development Goals and
a new spirit in the global development community. Moreover, the World Bank began
advocating  CCTs  via  cognitive  in fluencing  and  in  some  countries  via  financial
incentives.  From 2004 on the World  Bank advocated CCTs more dominantly  via
normative  in fluencing.  Lending  activities  and  cognitive  in fluencing  became  more
pronounced.  The quantitative data provide a degree of  plausibility that  the World
Bank might have played quite an important role for the diffusion of CCTs. 
Yet, to be strict the World Bank's CCT model is on the normative level less
about  scholarships  but  about  CCT  programs  with  an  education  and  a  health
conditionality. However, in 44,6% of the cases the diffusion was about scholarships.
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In 42,9% were about full-fledged CCT programs, and a minority of 12,5% programs
had only a conditionality on health. This data re flects the heterogeneity at national
level. It is interesting to note that in almost half of the cases CCT diffusion was not
about the model which the World Bank advocated after 2004. That means that if the
World Bank was in fluential in this diffusion process the quantitative data would show
that  after  2004 CCTs with  both conditions (on health  and education)  signi ficantly
increased.  'Graph 2'  confirms the  World  Bank's  in fluence partly.  The trend-curve
looks very similar to the one shown above. The main difference is that the trend for
CCT  programs  with  both  conditions  started  later.  From 2000  on  CCT programs
according to the World Bank model began to spread with two recognizable waves
from 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010 similar to 'graph 1'. So, 2004 is the start for the
main diffusion wave for CCT programs in general and the Bank's favored model. This
is substantial evidence for the World Bank's influence. 
The next step makes a similar analysis for the spread of HelpAge's model of
social pensions. Again, I would need to evaluate the data according to all kind of
social pensions to show the general trend and, subsequently, an evaluation of the
spread of HelpAge's in particular favored model of universal social pensions.
Graph 2: Accumulated number of adopted CCTs 
(both conditionalities) in the Global South
Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B 
(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)
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The first thing that meets the eye by looking at 'graph 3' is that social pensions have
a much longer  history.  Social  pensions have been present  in  a  small  number  of
countries throughout the 20th century. The  first program we found was introduced in
1928 in South Africa. The graph shows that social pension, or rather non-contributory
pensions (because the term was not yet framed), began to spread in the 1970s. The
phase of 1970 to 1990 can be considered the introductory phase. The 1990s show a
signi ficant  trend-curve  until  2000.  Since  2000  the  diffusion  of  social  pensions
skyrocket. The graph displays an impressive and still continuing trend with a diffusion
three times faster than what happened from the 1970s onwards. 
Graph 3: Accumulated number of adopted social pensions in the Global South
Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B 
(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)
After several countries in the 1970s and 1980s have considered to introduce social
pensions a trend was starting in the 1990s. At this time HelpAge International was
not yet working on this issue. About 2000 when HelpAge began to push for social
pensions it  falls together with the start of a main trend. I would expect HelpAge's
contribution  to  be  measurable  starting  with  the  UN Madrid  Conference on Aging
(MIPAA) in 2002 and continuing onwards. Because of the long time-frame for the
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diffusion of social pensions 'graph 3' grouped all introduced policy innovations made
within five years together. In order to visualize the fine differences 'graph 4' was set
up. It uses the same data than the graph above but shows the policy adoptions of
social  pensions  for  each year.  While  'graph 3'  shows very  well  that  the  trend is
starting at the beginning of the 1990s, 'graph 4' zooms into the time-frame from 1990
to 2011.
Graph 4: Accumulated number of adopted social pensions
in the Global South: 1990-2011
Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B 
(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)
Th graph shows that the trend started in 1992 in a first wave until 1999. This first
wave hardly  explainable with HelpAge's in fluence.  In  2000 the diffusion of  social
pensions got  a  new impulse  and a trend started.  It  must  be  a combination of  a
national trend towards social pensions, which were already beginning, and growing
support and awareness for such kind of policy reforms at global level. After 2002 and
MIPAA there is a noticeable spike upwards indicating its influence. Following to that
in 2004 when HelpAge increased its support for social pensions the diffusion of this
program accelerated by about 30% and kept this enormous pace for five years until
2009. I would explain this particular increase of the diffusion process in its last period
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between 2004 and 2009 with the contribution HelpAge International and some other
global actors have played in this time-frame. Yet, as in the case study of the Word
Bank HelpAge's in fluence can be speci fied by looking at the diffusion of HelpAge's
model of  universal social  pensions which HelpAge favors in particular. If HelpAge
really contributed to this diffusion wave one must find a particular acceleration of the
diffusion process after 2005.
Graph 5: Accumulated number of adopted
universal social pensions in the Global South
Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B 
(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)
Subtracting all the means-tested pensions, which account for 81% of the diffusion, I
got a much smaller sample of only the universal ones. 'Graph 5' shows that indeed
the diffusion of universal social pensions skyrocket in 2005 when is was supported by
HelpAge. However,  the graph displays as well  that  not all  of  the universal  social
pensions came after 2000. The trend started much earlier with a first wave from 1965
to the 1980s and a main trend starting at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the
1990s. This trend is continuing since. So, the results give testimony of very mixed
influences. HelpAge has been one of those influences but accounts only for a small
share social pension innovations after 2005. The main trend began much earlier. 
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Both  confrontations  of  the  qualitative  results  with  the  quantitative  data
suggests that global actors have contributed to the diffusion of SCT programs. The
data indicates that the World Bank as an IGO has been considerably more influential
than HelpAge as an INGO. I would read the data as indicators that the World Bank
has played a central role for the diffusion of CCTs, while the causes for the diffusion
of (universal) social pensions are much more diverse and are much more dif ficult to
be attributed to HelpAge International. Nevertheless, the acceleration of the diffusion
of social pensions after 2005 has shown that even INGOs which for the most part
have to rely on advocacy and lobbying can have quite a considerable in fluence on
policy-making  even  though  in  the  end  the  introduced  policy  might  be  rather  a
compromise, which is a social pension without the component of universality.
Conclusion
First of all, the level of policy convergence among the countries in the Global South is
high enough to be recognizable in quantitative analyses from a macro-perspective.
The  global  policy  spreads  clearly  show a  trend  curve  of  accelerated  spread  for
conditional  cash transfers as well  as for social  pensions. The trend started early,
before global actors where pushing for the implementation of these models. In the
beginning  a  few  countries  provided  exemplary  evidence  of  successful  program
implementation.  Global  actors  supported  this  early  period  of  diffusion  with
evaluations and the diffusion of favorable rationalities and concepts, like children as
important carriers of prospective human capital or older people as an in particular
vulnerable social group and holders of internationally established human rights.
Having shown in this qualitative study the multiple activities of global actors
regarding SCT, the recognizable accelerations in the spread curves seem roughly to
be linked to the beginning of global actors' support of their particular policy models.
Parallel to global actors' activities it can be recognized that the main diffusion process
started or gained new momentum. Yet, in fluence remains dif ficult to prove in a strict
causal sense. Horizontal diffusion flowing from mutual observations and cooperation
between countries in the Global South also seems to have played a role. Moreover,
my  analysis  of  global  policy  model  development  showed  that  international
organizations  also  created  new  norms,  best  practices  and  global  events  like
conferences and conventions which can have a broader and indirect effect time after
the direct involvement of global actors.
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This co-existence of horizontal and vertical, indirect and actor-led, direct and
indirect diffusion shows that simple answers to the explanation of diffusion of SCTs in
the Global South are elusive. My analysis of how global actors are involved in the
policy transfer has examined in depth processes which in most other studies are
touched only selectively and measured as simpli fied parameters. I have shown that
global actors have contributed to the vertical diffusion of SCT in the Global South
with know-how and incentive-based instruments; global actors also exerted indirect
in fluence through the development of global policy models that were perceived by
many countries. Measuring the actual activities of global actors as this study has
sought to do, helps to make tangible the potential consequences of, e.g. rati fications
of global conventions by countries, which are analyzed in quantitative macro studies.
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Chapter 6:
Conclusion
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Knowledge as a Facilitator of Policy Diffusion
International organizations do play a prominent role in World Culture Theory, in the
discipline  of  Global  Social  Policy  (GSP)  as  well  as  in  recent  studies  on  policy
diffusion in the Global South. International organizations are described as important
developers of world cultural ideas and, furthermore, as 'transmission belts' or 'world
society links', which bring policy ideas from the global to the nation level. IOs operate
on the global level by creating international forums and conferences; on the national
level IOs advise national governments and ministries.
It  was  the  aim  of  this  study  to  show  the  instruments  which  international
organizations use. By doing so, multiple questions have been touched upon; such as:
How does this transmission belt  or  world society link work? In how far do global
actors engage in norm and policy model development rather than only following and
supporting concepts developed at the national level? If it holds true that international
organizations follow foremost  their  own agenda,  how do they seek to  implement
those ideas in developing countries? What kind of instruments do they use? And,
moreover: In how far are their instruments strategically interlinked with each other
and work together?
Analytically this study was guided by an institutionalist perspective with a focus
on two questions: Do international organizations develop their own concepts, norms
and policies? And if so, how do they spread them worldwide? 'Policy diffusion' starts
from the observation of emerging isomorphism of particular policies among countries.
In  this  process  international  organizations  could  be  a  potential  in fluence.  The
instruments and strategies used by IOs to spread social cash transfers (SCTs) have
been  uncovered  here.  Leaving  open  the  question  in  how  far  international
organizations had causal impact on policy-making in developing countries, this study
has investigated the role of international organizations in view of two clearly visible
and  distinguishable  policy  models:  conditional  cash  transfers  (targeted  towards
children  and  families)  and  social  pensions  (targeted  towards  older  people).
Interestingly, social welfare policies for persons of working age have spread much
less than CCTs and social pensions, one reason being that only CCTs and social
pensions were promoted by a strong global actor (von Gliszczynski 2015). 
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The  World  Bank  as  an  international  governmental  organization  (IGO)  has
promoted conditional cash transfers and coined the abbreviation CCTs for this policy
model.  HelpAge  International  as  an  international  non-governmental  organization
(INGO) has promoted universal social pensions, which is a policy model following a
rights-based approach. 
This  study has aimed to  capture the variety  of  instruments:  to  identify  the
instruments, to analyze the reasons for and strategies behind these instruments, and
finally  to  categorize  the  instruments  according  to  basic  modes.  The  categories
'advocacy' and 'advice' were chosen to re flect two layers of the diffusion process:
while advocacy is focused on norm and knowledge distribution at the global level,
advice  is  focused  on  norm  and  knowledge  distribution  in  domestic  politics  in
countries  of  the  Global  South.  An  additional  component  of  advocacy  is  agenda
development,  which  may  include  norm  and  knowledge  production.  Agenda
development is the prerequisite for advocacy.
Furthermore,  the research design was supposed to apply an institutionalist
perspective but also integrate realist assumptions, which emphasize the in fluence of
money and power (incentives) rather than knowledge and norms. This added up to
the three categories: advocacy, advice and incentives. What have been the general
findings  of  this  analysis?  Knowledge,  knowledge  production,  and  knowledge
distribution  become  increasingly  relevant  for  policy  diffusion.  The  three  basic
categories help to group in fluences in particular modes.
The  empirical  analysis  of  international  organizations'  involvement  in  global
policy  diffusion  of  SCTs  has  shown:  first,  the  importance  of  an  institutionalist
perspective; second,  the interplay of different modes of in fluencing and how they
support each other; third, that actors with different capabilities (IGO/INGO) can use
their instruments as functional equivalents for in fluence (e.g. political protests as an
innovative tool to compensate the lack of funding and the provision of encompassing
loan schemes); fourth, that global actor's in fluence is dif ficult to measure because
advocacy  and advice  take  effect  in  a  more  or  less  indirect  way,  because policy
implementation  remains  in  the  hands  of  national  policy  makers.  International
organizations advocated, advised and created incentives for national policy-makers
but decision-making remained with the countries. This interplay makes it a complex
task to confirm or to reject the in fluence of international organizations.
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a) Advocacy
Global actors are embedded in and even constituted by World Culture. Thus, they
make use of already established norms in order to increase legitimacy for their own
policy suggestions.  Yet,  it  was unclear  if  policy actors develop their  own policies
because they portray themselves as 'disinterested others',  following world cultural
norms.  This  study  could  demonstrate  that  the  World  Bank  as  well  as  HelpAge
International have a clear policy preference and took action in order to diffuse their
models  throughout  the  Global  South.  Their  policy  models  are  well  reasoned  by
references to global norms and concepts, such as 'development', 'poverty reduction',
'economic growth', 'human capital investment' and 'human rights'.  Advocacy is an
important and first step to raise awareness for particular policy models.
HelpAge International and the World Bank have different capabilities making
for different kinds of advocacy. The World Bank is a well known organization which
attracts attention in global arenas and regularly interacts with national ministries. If
the World Banks decides to announce a policy, it can stimulate a debate easily and
feed its ideas into a global discourse. Thus, it seemed to be suf ficient that the most
recognizable activities of the World Bank have been the publication of one flagship
document  about  CCTs  and  the  assembly  of  three  major  conferences  about  it.
HelpAge International does not have such a standing, but managed to increase the
legitimacy of its policies by teaming up with the United Nations, which is able to bring
multiple nations together on a desk to agree on policies. It was on HelpAge's agenda
to  draw the  attention  of  international  policies  to  older  people  as  an in  particular
vulnerable social group. Based on the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging
(MIPAA)  the  topic  of  aging  was  established  and  HelpAge was  able  to  initiate  a
cascade of conferences to 'translate' an abstract declaration of intend into concrete
action plans on which countries could be measured against.
A further technique is indirect advocacy, e.g. through reports and documents
that provide multiple rational arguments and play with world cultural ideas in order to
state why a particular policy is a good idea. Diffusion maps show a trend towards
policy models, and online calculators allow policy-makers to evaluate the costs of
policy introduction. So policy-makers who are looking for a cost-ef ficient social policy
will find social pensions via this calculator and countries who are interested about
social policy-making in other countries will find CCTs which appear to be a trend in
215
the Global South. This is fostered by South-South-Cooperation events held by the
World Bank. Its portrayed as a best-practice sharing, but it is all about CCTs where
countries with well-know lighthouse CCTs are invited. 
In  sum,  international  organization  have  clear  policy  models  which  they
advocate. Conferences are the main tool to do so. Legitimacy through concepts and
norms  and  country-led  implementation  is  the  focus.  While  the  World  Bank  can
advocate  a  policy  with  'big  actions'  (major  conferences  and  well-recognized
publications),  Help  Age International  can compensate  their  lack  of  recognition  at
global level with cascades of 'small actions' (regional and local conferences, call-to-
actions and workshops) and alliances with culturally embedded organizations like the
United Nations. Advocacy does increase the popularity of particular policy models. If
countries finally implement this policy model or not is left to the governments, but
through advocacy at least every country in the Global South has heard of this policy
innovation and can decide wether its implementation is a good idea of not. In this
way advocacy can be a facilitator of policy diffusion.
b) Advice
Global actors accompany the whole process of national policy-making with advice.
Their  advice targets the rationalities of  national  policy makers which can use the
knowledge passed to them to understand the technical aspects of particular policy
models  and  learn  about  the  next  steps,  which  would  be  necessary  to  get  the
implementation  going.  Moreover,  existing  policies  can  be  criticized  on  a  pure
technical level, so that new policy models appear to be the next best thing one might
take  into  consideration  for  policy-making.  Both  modes  intrigue  the  rationality  of
national actors and can affect domestic policy learning. 
Advice is done in three steps. First, the advice of international organization
argues for a cost-ef ficient and low-budget version of its policy model in order to get
things started. The World Bank is arguing for pilot project in particular areas and Help
Age International is arguing for a social pension, which is for everyone up to a certain
age-level. The low-budget version of the social pension can start with a low pension,
such as 5 USD a month for people with an age of 80 years and older. Second, the
advice of international organizations argues for the effectiveness and positive effects
of the pilot projects of entry-level pensions. Examples have shown that in developing
countries without such 'effectiveness studies' tend to phase out already introduced
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policies  after  a  while.  Third,  the  advice  of  global  actors  aims  at  scaling-up  and
expanding the introduced smaller and limited programs to make them full-fledged
country programs. It is a core element of the World Bank to advice countries on how
to scale-up pilot projects, to improve the targeting of the CCTs and to extend the pilot
to further regions. Within HelpAge's advice on social pensions they emphasize the
right-based character  and refer  to global  agendas in order to argue for  universal
social pensions for everyone of a certain age instead of implementing and continuing
a means-tested social pension.
In  both  cases  advice  in  a  contribution  to  the  institutionalization  of  country
programs. Limited budgets in developing countries put social programs under risk to
be discontinued with each end of  a finance period or  change of  government.  To
stabilize social programs over years until they become a countries' institution is as
important aspect of advice from international organizations.
The main difference between the World Bank's and HelpAge's approach on
advice is that the World Bank targets the government and the Ministries of Finance in
a country mainly to ensure a programs survival. This advice encompasses, on the
one hand, of how to scale-programs up and, on the other hand, of how to ensure the
program's funding (e.g. by phasing out subsidies). Instead, HelpAge's activities on
advice are tailored to the government and the Ministries of Social Welfare with the
aim  to  identify  so  called  “policy  champions”,  which  are  individuals  that  take  up
innovations and carry them further. To stream advice in the society (intellectuals and
media)  and  the  political  center  is  crucial  in  order  to  win  a  critical  mass,  which
supports policy development on social pensions. Moreover, HelpAge is a constant
companion of policy-makers with personal ties to individuals and establishes itself as
a 'hub of knowledge', which is a source of information that policy-makers can turn to if
they seek technical knowledge.
In sum, while the World Bank mainly tries to ensure a programs survival with
activities of advice and therewith 'to make their social program stay', HelpAge uses
advice to distribute knowledge and to win a critical mass in order 'to get their social
program  in'  the  political  process  and  make  policy-makers  start  implementing  a
version  of  social  pensions  which  suits  national  budgets  and  current  political
coalitions.  In both cases, global actors engage on a long and steady basis which
accompanies  policy-making  over  years. The  World  Bank's  country  dialogues
(Country  Assistant  Strategies  and  National  Development  Plans)  and  HelpAge's
establishment as a 'hub of knowledge' are continuing efforts. 
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c) Incentives
Even though, this analysis is designed from an institutionalist perspective, a balanced
analysis should be encompassing and include 'soft power' instruments (knowledge)
as  well  as  'hard  power'  instruments  (not  knowledge-based).  With  reference  to
Keohane and Nye these hard power instruments are described as 'carrot and stick'
instruments. While the offer of additional money in form of a loan can be a carrot and
the withdrawal of a loan can be a stick, these terms describe two sides of one coin.
The term incentives has been chosen in order to capture the usage of money and
power for the creation of strongly stimulating stimuli for policy-making.
It is an easy pick to assume that the World Bank would be the more powerful
player  when  it  comes  to  incentive-based  influencing.  The  World  Bank  can  lend
money in considerable amounts. The funds can be accessed by developing countries
by reaching goals for economic and social development, which are set by the World
Bank. Different scenarios ('cases triggers') allow further access to particular funding.
Yet,  CCTs  are  demanding  programs  and  require  a  functioning  infrastructure  of
schools and hospitals in place. Thus, the World Bank is guided by a 'development
approach', which means that the organization argues for investments in infrastructure
measures until the country is ready for the introduction of a CCT, which is considered
by the World Bank as the main social program for developing countries. However,
more and more developing countries – especially in Latin America – try to get away
from loans in order to avoid making new dept and remaining independence from
external in fluences. Furthermore, the World Bank was not the main actor with regard
to funding.  The regional  banks allocated much more money for social  policies to
developing  countries  without  having  visibly  strings  attached  to  the  funding.
Nevertheless, the initial assumption that the World Bank in fluenced via loans was
correct; it was just not a factor as dominant as one might expect. In contrast, one
could rather highlight the importance of knowledge, because there is not demand for
lending if not policy-makers have decided in a first step that they would want funding
for particular policy ideas, which created a need for further funding in the first place.
The remarkable finding was that HelpAge International as well was able to use
influencing to a high degree. The global spread of an organizational structure that
builds  thousands  of  older  people  associations  (OPAs),  which  are  connected  by
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common campaigns so  that  once a years  huge protests can be organized.  With
these protests older people criticize the lack of adequate social protection programs,
which is well perceived by the media as well as by politicians. To make social policies
for older people is a popular issue, because a broad consensus regards older people
as an in particular vulnerable group of people within the society. It is possible for
policy-makers to win votes with the promise and introduction of social pensions. That
makes these protests of OPAs an in fluential tool with repercussions for the lost or
gain of power. Yet, the protests serve two purposes:  to initiate a process of policy
implementation and to improve already existing social pension policies. HelpAge with
their  'hub  of  knowledge'  follow up on those events  with  ongoing  advice,  so  that
policy-makers can present in the protest campaign one years later the steps and
improvements that have been made. In this way the protest function as what they
have been designed for: as a monitoring mechanism led bottom-up by the target
group of the policies themselves.
In sum, both actors can set strong incentives to facilitate policy diffusion. The
World  Bank  uses  funding  for  pilot  projects  as  an  incentive  to  kickstart  policy
implementation,  while  HelpAge uses protests for  this  purpose.  Yet,  it  seems that
there is a difference between the usage of those instruments. The World Bank uses
funding to initiate policy implementation, whereas HelpAge uses protest to extend the
initial  low-budget versions of social  pensions. The organization of annual protests
seems to be the way for ongoing improvements of already existing programs until
they  become  universal  social  pensions  with  an  adequate  benefit  level  and  an
eligibility age of 60 or 65 years. 
Advocacy, Advice and Incentives: 
- The Interplay -
All the activities described in this study promote Social Cash Transfers by means of
different instruments. The strategies behind these instruments become visible when
the  interplay  of  the  modes  of  in fluencing  is  taken  into  consideration.  All  the
instruments are designed in order to in fluence national policy-making; but how are
they intended to take effect? How can they take effect?
Table 3 provides an overview of the analyzed instruments and describes what
kind of effect or in fluence this instruments aim at. It becomes clear, that the effect of
219
advocacy is somehow equal and the effect would be an indirect one, which is dif ficult
to measure but aims to increase the general commitment of countries. The policy
models of CCTs and social pensions have full attention of national actors. And while
the World Bank uses funded pilot projects to initialize policy-making, HelpAge  makes
a start with its constant lobbying and knowledge transfer. The local protests can than
push for the extension of the programs, while the the World Bank uses ist knowledge
transfer to stabilize programs and ensure that the pilot projects go to scale.
Actors /
Modes of In fluencing World Bank HelpAge International
Incentives Initialization
of Policy Implementation
-
“Loans for Pilot Projects”
Extension &
Institutionalization
-
“Political Protests / OPA”
Advice Extension &
Institutionalization
-
“Country Dialogue,
Effectiveness Studies and
Support for Scaling-up”
Initialization
of Policy Implementation
-
“Knowledge Transfer,
Advocacy Coalitions 
and Workshops”
Advocacy Indirect In fluence & 
General Commitment 
-
“Policy Model, Flagship
Publications, Conferences”
Indirect In fluence & 
General Commitment 
-
“Policy Model, Publications,
Conference Cascades”
Author's visualization
Table 3
220
The interplay of the modes of influencing is crucial for the instruments to possibly
take  effect.  Activities  on  advocacy  at  global,  regional  and  national  level  should
increase the  visibility  of  particular  policy  models  and raise  awareness.  Countries
discuss those models,  hear  and read about  them,  understand them as part  of  a
global trend and highly legitimate policy options that one 'should' take up for the sake
of 'development', 'human rights' or 'investment in human capital'. Yet, that does not
mean that countries actually take action. Policy-making is not as simple as the act of
buying. The AIDA rule for advertisement stands for: Attention, Interest, Desire and
Action. While advocacy increases the attention for a particular policy, the interest to
learn more about it and the desire to be part of a global trend, it needs also a political
coalition  in  favor  of  it,  the  resources  allocated  from  the  national  budget,  the
knowledge of how to implement it, the creation of governmental structures to carry
out  the reform, etc.  As a result,  advocacy alone is a weak guarantee that  policy
suggestions find their way into actual policy-making at national level. Thus, further
modes of in fluencing support international actors' activities on policy promotion.
Being in a dialogue with countries and serving as a source of advice and a hub
of knowledge for the government and particular ministries allows to refer to globally
established  models  for  the  concrete  policy-making  process.  Without  having
established  particular  policy  models  via  advocacy  first,  the  policy  suggestion  via
advice would be some kind of hollow and without substance. When technical advice
from the World Bank suggests phasing out subsidies and introducing a conditional
cash transfer instead, governments know that this advice is referring to a globally
established and well  recognized policy models and that this advice is suppose to
show how a government can take the next  step and start  policy implementation.
HelpAge's strategy with advocacy to 'translate down' a policy model until it reaches
from an abstract global agenda the regional and national level in order to result in call
for  actions  is  a  almost  direct  transition  to  activities  on  advice.  Once  advocacy
resulted  in  concrete  call  for  actions  (as  it  happened on  the  African  continent)  it
creates a need for advice in order to let actions follow. HelpAge is advising policy-
makers on how to design the policies and how to plan the budgets, etc.
Finally, incentive-based influencing can be an additional mode organizations
can use to facilitate that policy-makers actually take action on policy implementation.
It  was pointed out that 'implementation' in a developing context is not a one time
event but a gradual thing. While the World Bank uses money in form of loans to
initiate  policy  implementation,  HelpAge  is  using  political  protests  and  mediation
between different stakeholders to motivate national policy-makers to expand existing
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social  pension  programs  and  better  institutionalize  them.  Yet,  without  having
stimulated a demand for a policy via advocacy and having demonstrated via advice
that implementation in a developing context is possible, there would be no interest in
pilot projects on CCTs. In turn, having implemented pilot projects demands further
technical advice on the effectiveness of such programs and knowledge of how to
bring such programs to  scale.  In the case of  HelpAge International  the usage of
regular protests creates a strong incentive for policy-makers to improve their social
pension policies.  Thus,  HelpAge is able to make far-reaching compromises when
advising developing countries on policy implementation.  The introduction of a low
budget social  pension is not so dif ficult for governments and HelpAge can advice
them to initiate social pension in order to try out the policy and see if it is an effective
tool. Once introduced the programs become popular and a tool to win elections. In
this regard political protests of older people (OPAs) can push for the extension of the
previously introduced programs.
The interplay of the modes of in fluencing makes advocacy the general tool to
create  a  demand.  Making  use  of  this  awareness  for  globally  advocated  policies
advice for low budget versions or pilot projects can encourage policy-makers to start
implementation and to break through particular implementation barriers arising from
veto players, restrained public budgets or a lack of political will. While the World Bank
is  using  advice  to  stabilize  the  programs  and  stimulate  the  expansion  of  the
programs, HelpAge is using large scale protests to achieve the same. In sum, I see
the interplay  of  the  modes of  in fluencing  as  the  pivotal  element  that  is  assuring
effective policy promotion.
What's next?
The questions which have been the subject of this analysis call for an even deeper
analysis devoted to each of the aspects here. Partly that is already happening or
currently under development. The section of the FLOOR (Financial Assistance, Land
Policy  and  Global  Social  Rights)  research group,  which  is  focussed on financial
assistance in form of Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) is led by Professor Lutz Leisering
(University  of  Bielefeld,  Germany)  and  includes  several  further  investigations  on
aspects  of  policy  diffusion,  knowledge  and  norm  production  and  policy
implementation.
222
The study by Moritz von Gliszczynski (2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering
2016) investigated deeper the knowledge and norm production at the global level
with a discourse analysis. Tobias Böger (2013) investigated the policy diffusion of
SCTs from a quantitative event history analysis. John Berten examinded the usage of
statistics and numbers as factors of Global Social Policy making. Katrin Weible takes
stock of all SCT programs in the Global South (Weible, forthcoming), resulting in an
encompassing FLOOR database supplemented by country case studies. 
As  a  direct  follow  up  to  the  study  presented  here  on  the  instruments  of
international  organizations,  in-depth  country  case  studies  would  be  of  major
importance to understand policy diffusion in detail, because it is in domestic politics
that global in fluences meet national conditions, merge, and take effect. Analyzing the
interactions between national policy-makers and global actors in detail would be an
important contribution to substantiate not just the heavy involvement of global actors
in national  policy-making, but it  might help to corroborate the international actors'
in fluence on policy-making.
The (indirect) effects of influencing with knowledge
In  general,  this  study  has  strengthened  an  institutionalist  perspective  on  policy
diffusion and sensitized for the questions, such as: Where do policy-makers get their
policy ideas from? In how for are these policies part of a global trend and related to
globally discussed policy models? Where do the policy models come from? And, in
how  far  have  international  organizations  been  involved  in  the  process  of  policy
(model)  development  and  policy  distribution?  What  kind  of  interactions  between
international organizations and national policy-makers do we see? In how far have
international  organizations  advocated  a  nationally  implemented  policy,  advised
policy-makers on doing so, or even have set compelling incentives motivating the
implementation of particular policies? 
Especially in a developing county context international organizations can use a
variety of instruments in oder to promote particular policies. As it was shown: these
instruments do support and are interrelated with each other. The interplay of these
instruments involve advocacy and technical advice, encompass the global and the
national level, and often don't become visible by observing global actors' activities for
one  or  two  years,  because  knowledge  and  norm  creation  and  distribution  is  a
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process that  takes time.  Long and steady engagement,  relationship  building  and
continuing advocacy and advice is what has been found to be the cornerstone of
international actors' promotion of Social Cash Transfer policies in the Global South. 
The autonomy of nation-states is a cornerstone of the current world culture, so
that global actors which are operating against national preferences hardly can be
influential. This study has found that none of the actors uses instruments, which are
prone  to  conflicts.  Rather,  positive support through  advice  and  incentives  is  the
resource  that  countries  can  make  use  of  for  policy-making.  This  support  is  a
promotion of policy models. That global actors constantly promote policies globally,
can  be  compared  to  the  activity  of  dropping  stones  to  induce  waves  of  policy
diffusion.  The  initiatives  to  implement  policy  innovations  stem from the countries
themselves, but the ideas and the desire to be part of a trend seems to emanate from
international  organizations and their  activities of advocacy, advice and incentives.
The effect of knowledge bears great potential to unfold its effect indirectly, so that
agentic  actors  maintain  their  neutral  and  'disinterested'  appearance  and,
nevertheless, have instruments for influencing in place. In these processes global
actors are “dropping stones, making waves”.
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– CAS Brazil 1997
– CAS Brazil 2000
– CAS Brazil 2003
– CAS Brazil 2008
– CAS Brazil 2012
– CAS Chile 2007
– CAS Chile 2011
– CAS Colombia 2002
– CAS Colombia 2008
– CAS Colombia 2012
– CAS Costa Rica 2004
– CAS Costa Rica 2008
– CAS Costa Rica 2011
– CAS Dominican Republic 1995
– CAS Dominican Republic 1999
– CAS Dominican Republic 2005
– CAS Dominican Republic 2011
– CAS Honduras 2000
– CAS Honduras 2006
– CAS Honduras 2011
– CAS Indonesia 2001
– CAS Indonesia 2003
– CAS Indonesia 2009
– CAS Indonesia 2012
– CAS Jamaica 2010
– CAS Kenya 1998
– CAS Kenya 2004
– CAS Kenya 2010
– CAS Kenya 2012
– CAS Morocco 2005
– CAS Morocco 2009
– CAS Morocco 2012
– CAS Nicaragua 2007
– CAS Nicaragua 2012
– CAS Pakistan 2006
– CAS Pakistan 2010
– CAS Pakistan 2011
– CAS Panama 1998
– CAS Panama 2007
– CAS Panama 2010
– CAS Paraguay 2003
– CAS Paraguay 2009
– CAS Peru 1997
– CAS Peru 2002
– CAS Peru 2006
– CAS Peru 2012
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– CAS Ecuador 2003
– CAS El Salvador 1997
– CAS El Salvador 2001
– CAS El Salvador 2005
– CAS El Salvador 2009
– CAS Ghana 2007
– CAS Guatemala 2008
– CAS Guatemala 2012
– CAS Philippines 2002
– CAS Philippines 2009
– CAS Turkey 2000
– CAS Turkey 2003
– CAS Turkey 2008
– IEG Guatemala 2012
– IEG Indonesia 2012
Interviews with HelpAge International Staff
No.1 - Head of Policy, Influencing and Learning (2012-01-21)
No.2 - Social Protection Of ficer for the Latin American Region (2012-01-21)
No.3 - Campaigns Coordinator, and Campaigns Assistant (2012-01-22)
No.5 - former Director of Policy Development (2012-01-22)
No.6 - Regional Representative for East Asia and the Paci fic (2012-01-22)
No.8 - Head of Strategic Alliances (2012-01-22)
No.9 - Head of Policy, In fluencing and Learning (2012-06-15)
Further Interviews and Participatory Observations
– Bernd Schubert; Interview (2012)
– Veronika Wodsak; Interview (2012)
– HelpAge's conference and workshop at Dunford House, London; Participatory 
Observation (2012)
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